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SUMMARY
This thesis contributes to the developing field of the
critical theory of organisation. It presents a critical
inquiry into the ideological nature of (neo)Human Relations
management theory and its strategies for the management of
subjectivity and organisational culture. The introductory
chapters discuss the meta-theoretical grounds and contexts
for the development of the thesis. Chapter 1 responds to
the epistemological challenges put forward by post-
Modernism highlighting the basic trajectory and underlying
values of the thesis. Chapter 2 discusses the development
of critical organisation theory so far, with respect to the
discussions of subjectivity and culture. This includes a
discussion of aspects of the work of Foucault, (neo)Marxist
Theory, Labour Process Theory and critical social
psychology as they have been taken up by organisational
studies of subjectivity and culture. Chapter 3 clarifies
the use of the concept of ideology and outlines the
research strategy for the concrete study of (neo)Human
Relations management as ideological. This involves a 'depth
hermeneutic' research strategy, made up of the 3 components
of (1) A Social Analysis, (2) A Discourse Analysis, and (3)
An Interpretation of Meaning.
As the 'Social Analysis' component of this 'depth
hermeneutic', chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 highlights the work
of Herbert Marcuse, exploring his critical social
psychology; his notion of 'new forms of control'; his
discussions of the relationship between culture, language
and power; and his discussions of the rationalisation
process leading to the rationalisation of culture and power
relations.
This is followed by both the 'Discourse Analysis' and
'Interpretation of Meaning' components of the 'depth
hermeneutic' method. Chapter 8 offers an account of the
historical emergence of the management discourses around
subjectivity and culture and identifies its leading
authors. Chapter 9 offers a critical interpretation of
meaning of this discourse in the light of Marcuse's social
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A manager at a Glasgow whisky bottling plant
observed: "Old-style management methods don't
work. You have to involve people"
	 It is a
welcome change from the relics of so-called
scientific - meaning dictatorial -management....
Mr. Lederer thinks of his people as a "strategic
asset" ....Because the "lowliest" workers are
those who have the closest dealings with the
customers' attitudes and in the best position to
understand operational problems... .It is not easy
for companies used to working under the old ideas
to change to the new. But it can be done, with
"change programmes" which introduce the new
culture, as most large British and American
companies have proved.
I've started a local exchange trading scheme in
Leicester to give people an alternative to the
money economy.... You don't get anything from
appealing to government or bureaucratic
organisations, but people at the grassroots can
run things themselves in a co-operative way. The
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struggle is on the create the structures to let
co-operation come out.
People are tied into real hardship now and are
becoming scape-goats for an economic system that
is falling apart. Self-help networks are forming,
both locally and globally. We've learned that you
can't separate the environment from social
issues....
These two examples from The Guardian during 1994
graphically illustrate divergent tendencies within
contemporary society and different visions of future social
and economic organisation. It is clear from the comments
above that such tendencies are largely incommensurable.
These two visions of change in the nature of social,
economic and institutional relations seem to echo the
analysis provided by Herbert Marcuse, of a dialectic of
trends of social development.
Marcuse develops a thesis which
	 vacillate(s)	 throughout	 between	 two
contradictory hypotheses: (1) that advanced
industrial society is capable of containing
qualitative change for the foreseeable future;
(2) that forces exist which may break this
containment and explode the society (Marcuse
1964. p.xv).
It is evident from the two examples that such tensions,
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counter-tendencies, attempts to contain social change and
attempts to 'break this containment' still exist within
contemporary social and organisational life. Primarily I
shall attempt here to analyze the containment of the
potential for social change. Specifically I shall focus
upon (neo)Human Relations management theory which attempts
to manage more efficiently subjectivity and culture as
'strategic assets'. This has the consequence of initiating
a more consolidated form of organisational power and thus
'containing' the potential for change.
This thesis is at once theoretical and applied. It deals
with the theories of Marcuse, but it applies these theories
for a detailed analysis of a concrete social phenomenon,
the discourses of (neo)Human Relations management. Two
aspects are central to this contribution. Firstly it
highlights that the insights offered by Marcuse have not
been sufficiently taken up by critical organisation theory;
and secondly, through this take up, critical organisation
theory can develop its understanding of the ideological
nature of (neo)Human Relations management discourse by
developing an understanding of how culture, language and
subjectivity are specifically effected by this ideological
nature. Thus the application of the work of Marcuse
contributes to an explanation of the operation of ideology
as well as helps to identify its existence in certain
discourses.
Central to this thesis is the application of the work of
Marcuse for the critical inquiry into power and authority
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relations. It is concerned to analyze the integration of
the individual into a culture and the manipulation of
subjective processes which initiate the active involvement
of the subject into their own control, over and above
coercion. The critical inquiry into (neo)Human Relations
management theory is as an inquiry into one example of this
general trend.
To develop this, some initial epistemological points are
first made. In chapter 1, I make an Introductory
Confession. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, it seems
necessary to demonstrate some self-reflexivity as to the
concepts and arguments one is using. The concepts central
to my work are often contested, and so it is necessary both
to clarify the way I shall use them and demonstrate some
awareness of this contestation. The post-Modern challenge
to (Critical) Social Theory has revolved around the
deconstruction of the essentialist assumptions of
'modernism'. I discuss this in chapter 1 by way of
accepting the 'narrative' status of my thesis, its 'open'
nature and the 'epistemological nervousness' which
underpins it in these post-Modern times. I also confess in
chapter 1 to the humanist value position which underpins my
interests in both developing an ideology-critique of
(managerial) containment, and contributing to the
development of an 'applied' Marcusean perspective as it
relates to the contribution to critical theories of
organisations.
These epistemological points are continued in chapter 3, in
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which I discuss the central concept of ideology. In this
chapter I discuss some of the problems associated with its
use and attempt to offer solutions. I also discuss a
specific methodology and research design amenable to an
ideology-critique. The methodology and research design I
use is a 'depth hermeneutic'. This involves 3 elements; a
'social analysis', found in the Critical Theory of Marcuse
in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7; a 'discourse analysis' involving
a discussion of the historical and empirical features of
the (neo)Human Relations management discourse, discussed in
chapter 8; and a critical 'interpretations of meaning',
involving a re-assessment of the leading authors/texts of
the (neo)Human Relations discourse in the light of
Marcusean critical concepts, discussed in chapter 9.
Before this is developed however, a more general situating
of this thesis in critical organisation theory is
necessary. In chapter 2, I discuss existent critical
organisation theory. This starts with a discussion of the
take up of the work of Foucault which has been increasingly
significant in recent years. I articulate the nature of
this significance for the theoretical inquiry into the
impact of the organisation upon the human subject. However,
I also level two main criticisms at Foucault's work.
Firstly that Foucault's theoretical work exhibits an
insufficient concern with the material dimension
characterising the concrete economic conditions of an
industrial capitalist society and the consequences this has
for contemporary organisations. Secondly that Foucauldian
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organisational studies fail to provide an analysis of how
the organisation impacts upon the subject. That is, it
lacks any sustained social psychological dimension. It is
held that the application of the work of Marcuse offers
insights which can begin to fill this gap. Also in chapter
2 I explore the take up of neo-Marxist theories in critical
organisational studies, particularly post-Braverman Labour
Process Theory and the work of Habermas. It is argued that
such critical theories of organisations, concentrating as
they do on the internal discursive development of branches
of organisational studies, do not take up Critical Theory
in a very critical way. This neglects both the nature of
power and authority relations and the more emancipatory
dimensions of Critical Theory. Therefore it is again argued
that the lack of any sustained interest in the work of
Marcuse for a critical theory of organisations is a missed
opportunity. Finally, chapter 2 explores the existent
social psychological theories of organisational behaviour.
This has included a call for a fuller development of a
_
theory, of the subject. It also discusses the potential
relevance of other social/group psychological theories. To
contribute to this I suggest the development of a
materialist psychology, in particular the synthesis of
Marxism and psychoanalysis, a major representative of which
is again Marcuse.
For these reasons I suggest a sustained application of the
work of Marcuse would contribute to the critical
understanding of organisations. This application offers
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insights in terms of the critique of culture, 'new forms of
control' and the general critique of the ideological nature
of scientific rationality. To clearly expound this, I
develop a detailed analysis of the work of Marcuse in
chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. I extrapolate key critical
theoretical constructs from the work of Marcuse and apply
them to an analysis of the specifics of (neo)Human
Relations managerial attempts to deal with cultural and
subjective aspects of organisations. This amounts to an
ideology-critique grounded in the social theoretical locus
of a Marcusean analysis. However, as detailed in chapter 3,
and in order to as it were 'pin down' the ideological
nature of certain managerial discourses, a 'depth
hermeneutic' method is employed.
Therefore, after an account of the 'social analysis'
provided by Marcuse, I return to this 'depth hermeneutic'
method.
Chapters 8 and 9 reveal the specifics of both the
'discourse analysis' and 'interpretation of meaning'
components of a 'depth hermeneutic' study, set against the
'social analysis' component outlined in chapters 4, 5, 6
and 7. This is in line with Thompson's (1984) methodology.
In chapter 8, I provide a broad historical account of
managerialist theoretical concerns with questions of human
subjectivity, motivation and culture. This is necessary as
an account of the historical emergence of the 'human
relations movement' (Hollway 1991) as a whole and the
(neo)Human Relations management discourse in particular.
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The historical emergence of this discourse is related to
the triangulated empirical analysis of its leading
proponents. This demonstrates the 'leading authors/texts'
which characterise the (neo)Human Relations discourse. This
forms the 'data' which is subsequently subjected to
Critical Theoretical analysis.
In chapter 9, I apply Critical Theoretical constructs to a
detailed critical 'interpretation of meaning' of the
'leading authors/texts' of the (neo)Human Relation
discourse, in line with the 'depth hermeneutic' method for
a critique of the ideological nature of management theory,
and its conceptualisation of the human subject.
This thesis concludes in chapter 10 which both reviews the
contribution this makes, and highlights some of the
implications it has for further research. The Critical
Theory of Marcuse includes 'utopian' elements as to the
potential for the expansion of human autonomy and convivial
relations as the counter-tendency to managerialism, which
relate to the more practical-political emancipatory
interest found in Marcuse's work. In this way I hope to
contribute to a critical theory of organisation which moves
within the dialectic expressed by Marcuse in the quotation
above. One which discusses the tendency towards the
'containment of qualitative social change' on the one hand,
and points to the tendency towards practices which 'may
break this containment and explode this society' on the
other. However, to attempt to make such statements in the
contemporary social theoretical scene, which is often
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characterised by a post-Modern and deconstructionist
eschewing of such 'modernist' sensibilities is difficult.
So before the development of a 'depth hermeneutical'
account of (neo)Human relation management as an example of
an 'applied turn' (Forester 1985) in Critical Theory, it
seems necessary to make some initial meta-theoretical
comments on the nature of this thesis in the light of
potential deconstructionist criticisms and to make an
introductory confession as to the values and concepts which
inform it. For this reason I now turn to questions of
values, epistemology and research design.
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2 VALUES, EPISTEMOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN
CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTORY CONFESSION. 
"To sing you must first open your mouth."
Henry Miller. Tropic of Cancer
Before one begins to construct one's thesis, develop one's
concepts and devise a research strategy, it is necessary to
demonstrate some reflexivity to meta-theoretical and
epistemological challenges to the status of academic
monologues. This chapter therefore deals with some
responses to 'post-Modern' and deconstructionist
criticisms, declares the values underpinning the thesis,
and confesses to an underlying 'epistemological
nervousness'. It does so as a way of accepting the
'narrative' status of this thesis and recognising it as one
possible interpretation.
It is probably not easy to write a Ph.D thesis at any time,
but it is especially difficult in post-Modern times. Here
I shall explore some of the difficulties involved in
expressing a coherent thesis which nonetheless shows some
sensitivity to post-Modern arguments. What I intend is not
an exhaustive account of post-Modernism and its effects
upon social theory, but a personal account of my reception
of the post-Modernist argument, my attempt to digest its
potential significance, and to ultimately confess my own
theoretico-political position.
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So I should begin by confessing that whilst I see some
important and necessary philosophical, epistemological and
political ideas being articulated within post-Modernism, I
am on the whole unreceptive to it. This is because firstly
I feel many of the philosophical and epistemological issues
were being discussed adequately before post-Modernism
became the fashionable label, and that one can be
sophisticated in one's reading of such issues without post-
Modernism. Secondly, politically I find much of post-Modern
theorising idealistic and relativising of contemporary
politics and reality. The 'linguistic turn' has done much
to divorce social theory from issues I am still interested
in. So, from the beginning my rejection of post-Modernism
is born of a reading of it and not from a fear of its
deconstructionist directions. I am still of the opinion
that poverty, racism, sexism, the ecological crisis and the
man-made starvation of the 'Third World' are still
happening as a consequence of the global capitalist
economy.
The attempts at classifications, schema and periodisation
designed to summarise post-Modernism are by now too
numerous to mention, so I shall not attempt to do so. I
agree with Seguin who writes 'The term (postmodernism) is
remarkable because of its paradoxical character of denying
one thing only to affirm it in the same breath' (Seguin
1994), and I shall explore some of these internal
inconsistencies below. To attempt any classification would
inevitably be to leave oneself hostage to fortune, and to
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sidetrack the debate into an area which I do not really
want to write about. However, I have to start the
discussion of one's post-Modern difficulties somewhere,
which usually means some sort of preliminary definition. So
as Gibson Burrell is my Ph.D supervisor, I shall begin with
what as far as I know is Gibson Burrell's most recent
published 'definition' of the tendencies and directions
within post-Modernism. You/he write(s),
Postmodernists suspect 'reason' and validity
claims arising from the Enlightenment; they talk
of the end of philosophy and the decline of the
individual; they see the modernists as producing
metanarratives to explain away existing social
disorganisation. They seek to deconstruct not
reconstruct; they are suspicious even of
suspicion. (Burrell. 1994 p.4)
One is tempted to ask that if this is the case, and they
really do believe in these things, why do they keep on
writing so many book/monologues/narratives about this end
of philosophy. To answer that question would require idle
speculation, but maybe idle speculation is now as
legitimate as any other form of inquiry. One is also
tempted to ask where did this universalised 'Modernism'
which they are all so opposed to come from? Nietzsche or
Dickens, Marx or Hitler, Durkheim or Breton? But all this
does not help me to carve out some philosophical or
epistemological grounds for the act of writing in
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particular institutionalised circumstances, that is a Ph.d
thesis. Is it legitimate of post-Modernism to expect a
certain sort of writing from the writer, when it is these
institutionalised circumstances which declare whether the
act of writing has been successful or not? In short, should
one be sophisticated, sensitive and nuanced to the post-
Modern challenge, or should one get a Ph.D ?. One can
already see what a Post-Modernist Ph.D thesis might look
like, an interminably self-referential thesis about the act
of writing a thesis, a Ph.D about a Ph.D. This is of no
interest to me and it is not what I intend to write. I
shall therefore return to a more sober appraisal of post-
Modernism and a discussion of what it has to say.
Post-Modernism.
Post-Modernism can be seen as the deconstruction of the
epistemological and methodological certainties of what
post-Modernists have labelled Modernism. Commentators
(Norris 1982, 1992, Jencks 1986, Hebdige 1988) have argued
that such a post-Modern challenge has revolved around
various common features. The 'anti-foundationalism' of
post-Modernism refers to the challenge to any fixed
theoretical foundation or tradition as a legitimate basis
for theorising about social phenomena. Post-Modernists
characterise Modernist social theory as stemming from
fixed, and therefore limiting, theoretical positions. In
this sense perhaps Nietzsche (1956), Heidegger (1978), Kuhn
(1970) or certainly Feyerabend (1975), can be seen as
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precursors to the full blown post-Modern epistemology.
Post-Modernism deconstructs epistemes in the sense that it
wants to connect with an eclectic variety of theoretical
starting points and agendas in a way which can grasp the
multiplicity of contemporary social and cultural practices,
architectural forms and aesthetics. (Derrida 1978, Lyotard
1984, Jencks 1986, Baudrillard 1988, 1989, 1990, Rose 1989,
Keith and Pile 1993).
The 'anti-essentialism' of the post-Modern position is the
rejection of the notion that any essential theoretical
construct, such as labour, economy, technology, the
subject, can be easily assumed to form the basis for social
theoretical inquiry. (Baudrillard 1975, Foucault 1980,
1991). Post-Modernists have rejected this essentialism in
favour of references to the multiplicity of world-views and
the notion that 'reality' is socially and culturally
constructed. Again contemporary post-Modernism seems to me
at least to exhibit features very similar to those
discussed by Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend (1975).
Post-Moderns exhibit an 'anti-utopianism' which connects
with their critique of the purportedly misguided and false
presumptions underpinning Modernism concerning the notion
of social progress (Foucault 1980, Lyotard 1984, Fukuyama
1992). For the post-Moderns, Modernism smacks too much of
a utopian faith in science, technology and socio-political
projects stemming from an Enlightenment sensibility,
stemming from a unilinear conception of history and
progress. A loss of faith in this, and a rejection of the
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presumed inevitability of progress is what characterises
the post-Modern sense. In its place there is a celebration
of the multiple lived experience of the here and now.
Post-Moderns (Lyotard 1984) have rejected the notion of
theoretical 'metanarratives' in favour of an epistemology
which locates all social theory as narrative, stemming from
a socially constructed and linguistically shaped world-
view. Some (Derrida 1978) have argued for this linguistic
basis of social understanding as the vehicle for the
deconstruction of fixed notions of reality. This connects
with the much talked of 'linguistic turn' in social and
philosophical debate since the post-Modern challenge. Some
have argued for a move away from total theorising in favour
of a micro-orientation and a 'history of difference'
(Derrida 1976, 1978, Foucault 1991. See also Hoy 1985,
Norris 1987, Cooper 1989). There has been a linguistic
(textual and symbolic) turn in post-Modern theorising
(Barthes 1972, Bourdieu 1992) which emphasises language and
symbolic aspects of social and cultural interaction.
Derrida's	 work	 has	 also	 inspired	 a	 feminist
deconstructionism, and its critique of logo/phallo-
centrism, as well as a more general feminist philosophy
(Lloyd 1984, Irigaray 1985, 1991, Moi 1986, Cixous and
Clement 1987, Griffiths and Whitford 1988) and the critical
debate this has created (Plaza 1978, Moi 1986, Bologh
1990).
Instead of this post-Modern deconstructionism, I argue for
a 'depth hermeneutic' method (Thompson 1981, 1984) for the
15
critique of ideology understood within the material reality
of capitalism. In the light of Derridean deconstructionism,
I argue that a 'depth hermeneutic' which sets an
interpretation within a wider socio-economic theory is a
legitimate interpretation of one set of meanings at least.
This 'depth hermeneutic' account may be an interpretation,
but as Derrida suggests, all is interpretation. Given the
post-Modern challenge, it seem legitimate to argue that
supervisors and examiners can now no longer expect a Ph.D
thesis to claim universal truth. It seems, given
deconstructionism, one can only justify one's own narrative
as it stands amongst others. It should be emphasised
therefore, and it will be discussed in detail in chapter 3,
that I do not claim some version of truth for this
ideology-critique. All interpretations stem from a value-
laden position, and as such no interpretation can claim to
be outside value. In this sense all theory is ideological.
There is no arena where value does not operate, and in this
sense there is no 'absolute zero' of ideologicalness.
However, as I shall explicate below, to ensure that such
philosophical discussion does not end in absolute idealism
or relativism, and to continue to provide a Critical Theory
of existent organisational conditions, I shall demarcate
'degrees of ideologicalness' as part of my theoretical




Given this back drop, the difficulties in constructing a
testable hypothesis, designing a research strategy,
operationalising ones concepts, and collecting data with
any sense of epistemological confidence become evident.
This pervading loss of confidence is fuelled by some
important philosophical insights which cannot and should
not be ignored if one is to operate with any level of
philosophical sophistication. In any case some of the
underpinnings of the post-Modern deconstruction connect
with the necessary deconstruction of the positivistic
orthodoxy of the social sciences. However it is
illegitimate for post-Modern philosophy to present itself
as a historically new contribution to epistemological
debate.
The phenomenological, interpretative and hermeneutical
tradition includes some of the biggest names in the
philosophy of the social sciences, such people as Heidegger
(1978) and Husserl (1974), Dilthey (1989), Weber (1949),
Mannheim (1936), Gadamer (1975) and Berger and Luckmann
(1967). Such philosophical debates have been discussing the
socially constructed and discursively derived nature of
versions of reality for 100 years! For these traditions,
social understanding comes from an acceptance of the
contingent nature of social reality and perception which
positivist approaches could never grasp. Thus a discourse
based inquiry and an interpretative understanding is
necessary. Is this really so different to what the post-
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Moderns are saying? Methodological innovations within the
qualitative social sciences, such as participant
observation, ethnography, textual analysis and feminist
methods have all been driven by these fundamental
philosophical insights into the nature of knowledge and
knowledge generation in the social world (Garfinkel 1967,
1986, Douglas 1971, 1976, Roberts et. al. 1981, Denzin
1989). The history and sociology of the (social) sciences
has involved the celebrated work of Feyerabend (1975) and
Kuhn (1970), who have done much to deconstruct the received
view of the objectivity, neutrality and unity of scientific
inquiry. Feyerabend has called for the opening up of
(social) science to the multiplicity of traditions of
knowledge and inquiry. Berger and Luckmann (1967) showed us
that reality is a social construction.
Therefore, in connection with what the post-Moderns are now
saying, and despite a sense of irritation with their
failure to recognise the full historical scope of the
deconstruction of positivism, we cannot simply ignore these
epistemological issues and their methodological
implications. Any social theorist engaged in rigorous
inquiry should take such issues on board if they are to do
justice to their topic. It is no longer legitimate to
pursue social inquiry in a quasi-positivistic way and claim
veracity for one's findings on the basis of some spurious
notion that one has 'proven the truth' through adherence to
some particular scientific methodology. The most rigorously
quantified and tested social inquiry is only at best a
18
partial 'truth' and is at worst a particular value-laden
view of the world dressed up to be 'objective'. One should,
I feel, therefore accept the narrative status and
contingent nature of one's account.
But all this still does not help one to write a Ph.D thesis
which attempts to make an original contribution to
knowledge. For a Ph.D thesis one must it seems still
attempt to articulate a theoretical understanding of social
phenomena which somehow connects with, and here even the
language lets one down, the 'real world'. A dilemma.
Berger, Berger and Kellner (1974) have used the concept of
'cognitive nervousness' to discuss the partially fragmented
nature of contemporary social identity. At the level of
epistemology, and in the attempt to deal with this dilemma,
one could perhaps borrow this notion and talk of
'epistemological nervousness'; as the loss of confidence
in, and the deconstruction of, the basis of the thing one
is about to engage in. It is not easy writing a Ph.D thesis
in post-Modern times! We can perhaps still attempt to have
a meaningful and communicative inquiry into social
phenomena despite operating from this position of
nervousness.
One's nervousness is made more acute if one still feels the
need to construct a narrative which will have (hopefully)
some connection with the lived experiences of others, and
if one still wants to construct a narrative which is
critical. That is, if one wants to operate in a 'Modernist'
tradition to construct one's narrative. Logically, this
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should not present too many difficulties for the arch post-
Modernist. If one narrative is as good as the next, then
why not a Modernist one with lots of essentialisms, a
foundation, a commitment to a version of social progress
which still argues that Critical Theory can make the world
understandable (Burrell 1990)?.
One response to this epistemological nervousness is to
refer to Eco's (1989) notion of the 'open work'. By the
'open work', Eco means a 'work in movement', a 'field of
possibilities' and 'the discarding of a static, syllogistic
view of order, and a corresponding devolution of
intellectual authority to personal decision, choice, and
social context' (Eco 1989. p.15). The dialectic of
(counter) tendencies which Marcuse refers to above seems to
be a particularly clear example of this approach. Eco
discusses the philosophical development of the 'disjunctive
dilemma between true and false, a fact and its
contradictory, (as) no longer the only instrument of
philosophical experiment' (Eco 1989. p.15). He refers to
the work of Sartre, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty as the
development of modern psychology and phenomenology which
'.... indicates the availability of new cognitive positions
that fall short of conventional epistemological stances and
that allow the observer to conceive of the world in a fresh
dynamic of potentiality before the fixative process of
habit and familiarity comes into play' (Eco 1989. p.16). In
this way Eco recommends an 'open' approach to, in this case
philosophical issues and social critique. I hope to
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demonstrate such an 'openness'. However the main import of
one's 'openness' here is the recognition of it's
'incompleteness', and 'perceptive ambiguity'. For this
reason a definitive 'conclusion' to one's work is left
open-ended. To do otherwise would be to contradict oneself
and compromise assertions stemming from the attempt to be
epistemologically sensitive.
This does not imply however that a 'work in movement' has
to culminate in 'complete chaos'.
...to sum up, we can say that the 'work in
movement' is the possibility of numerous personal
interventions, but not an amorphous invitation to
indiscriminate participation. The invitation
offers the performer the opportunity for an
oriented insertion into something which always
remains the world intended by the author (Eco
1989. p. 19)
This is especially the case when the 'performer' (Ph.D
student) is also the writer (interpreter). Therefore,
notwithstanding the commitment to an oriented openness, to
the acceptance of the narrative status and contingent
nature of one's thesis, and the rejection of the unhelpful
basis of 'truth' stemming from an epistemological
nervousness, I shall refer to the tradition of radical
humanist Marxism (Marcuse 1955, Marx 1961, Fromm 1965).
This demonstrates a commitment to what I consider to be the
practically possible improvement of social conditions
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(Marcuse 1979, Gorz 1983, Russell 1993). I consider this to
articulate my 'oriented insertion into the world intended
by the author'.
Critical Social Theory.
This 'insertion' will necessarily involve the critique of
given social conditions which artificially contain the
possibilities for social change and the expansion of human
autonomy as a facet of the dialectic referred to in the
Preface. Thus what I am here confessing to is firstly that
I have a set of values underpinning my thesis which revolve
around a humanistic belief in the 'falsity' of the
domination and exploitation of one by another. For me this
is self-evident. No-one's self narrative and socially
constructed reality would voluntarily involve being
dominated. This statement can become problematic due to
masochistic strategies of avoiding self-responsibility and
gaining psycho-sexual gratification by some individuals.
However, this is rare enough I feel to allow a specifically
societal level of debate to continue on the above premise.
Individual psycho-sexuality geared towards a masochistic
desire for domination is one thing, a critique of the
systemic reproduction of the domination of those who do not
want it is something else. Masochism usually implies both
certain forms and times of domination and the self is
voluntarily given over to it, whilst the reproduction of
social and economic domination is systematised, regularised
and compulsory. Therefore, interesting though such
22
discussions may be, I see the qualification around the
individual choice of lifestyle and sexual practice to have
not very much bearing upon a socio-historical theory.
The second confession I am making here is that I am
operating from within a tradition of Critical Theory which,
in connection with a set of radical humanist values, has
generated its own set of concepts, its own essentialisms
and foundations. This orientation is Marxist in general,
and refers to the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School
in particular. (Marcuse 1955, Horkheimer 1972, Adorno 1973,
Adorno and Horkheimer 1979). At a very early stage in my
intellectual development I was struck by an intuitive
appreciation of the work of the Frankfurt School. It seemed
then, and still does, to provide an analysis which I was
struggling to formulate for myself, and expressed ideas I
myself was only dimly aware of. Since then I have become
convinced that such ideas, although in need of development,
provide the potential basis for a critical inquiry which
both connects with empirically identifiable phenomena and
provides explanations of such events. This century has seen
two popular literary visions of social control, Orwell's
1984 and Huxley's Brave New World. Whilst Orwell's vision
of control emphasises control through coercion, Huxley's
version of events is more apposite for an understanding of
the post-World War 2 world. Huxley emphasises social
control through pleasure rather than pain, through
integration rather than exclusion. The social theory of
Marcuse is one of the most sustained attempts to
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theoretically explain and analyze the phenomena which
Huxley's fiction dealt with. I concentrate on Marcuse's
work therefore, and apply its insights to the development
of a Critical Theory of the empirically demonstrable
phenomenon of the attempt to manage culture and
subjectivity inside organisations.
Alvesson and Willmott (1992) argue that Critical Theory is
characterised by an 'intellectualism', 'essentialism' and
'negativism'. In the spirit of an 'open work', it seems
apposite to say a few words about this and why I have
chosen to concentrate on the work of Marcuse. The primary
reason I shall concentrate on the work of Marcuse is that
it has not been fully taken up within the development of
critical organisation theory. It offers the potential for
a significant contribution to the critical understanding of
organisational behaviour, culture and subjectivity.
Critical organisation studies has recently focused to a
large extent on the work of Foucault. To briefly comment on
the relationship between the work of Foucault and Marcuse
will throw into sharper relief the reason for the
concentration on Marcuse.
There has been numerous commentaries on the relationship
the work of Foucault has with Marxism (Gordon 1979, Smart
1983, Poster 1984, Dews 1989); with the work of the
Frankfurt School (Miller 1987, Dews 1989) and as a theorist
of modernity (Giddens 1991). The work of Foucault is often
presented as superseding western Marxist theory (Miller
1987, Rose 1989, Knights and Willmott 1990).
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Foucault highlights a multiplicity of forces behind
historical events as the 'doing of history' which is not
self-satisfied with a synthetic history of extra-historical
mechanisms, as is vulgar Marxism. However, Marcuse deals
with the cultural and existential consequences of power and
knowledge (Marcuse 1966, 1970, 1979) and as such is not
dissimilar to Foucault. He also offers a dialectical theory
which deals with more systemic questions of the
rationalisation of domination within the social and
cultural institutions of global capitalism. For this reason
the analysis of domination offered by Marcuse is more
fruitful than that of Foucault, in that it involves a more
complete and contemporary picture of the technological
operations, existential and political consequences and
systemic reproductions of capitalism. One of the problems
with Foucault is that it ultimately embodies little
consistent political commitment, and does not immanently
offer itself to the development of practical alternatives
for the radical reconstruction of contemporary
organisational forms, practices or the redistribution of
power and resources.
The work of the Frankfurt School demonstrates that the
relationship between power, domination, reason and the
subject had been theorised prior to the work of Foucault.
Indeed Foucault himself admits that had he been more
conversant with the work of the Frankfurt School he would
have taken such a position on board (Foucault 1983, 1991).
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Given this admission, is it too strong to argue that Poster
(1984) and Miller (1987), as well as many other disciples
of the Foucauldian tradition are simply incorrect in some
of their assertions? Miller even goes as far as to say the
Frankfurt School has no theory of the subject. When writing
about Critical Theory and its discussion of power and
subjectivity he fails to say anything about the work of
Fromm and does not deal with Marcuse's Eros and
Civilisation and Five Lectures (Marcuse 1966, 1970). This
is simply amateurish.
The Frankfurt School members did not satisfy themselves
with a discussion of the relationship between power, Reason
and subjectivity simply at the discursive level though a
detailed analysis of archival material, as does Foucault.
Marcuse in particular contributed to the development a
theory of how the subject was influenced by power and
reason at the social psychological level. In his synthesis
of the work of Marx and Freud, Marcuse's declared aim is to
bring to our attention the 'hidden political trend' in
Freud's late meta-sociological work, and to historicise
Freudian theory of the relationship between subjective
existence and civilisation. In Eros and Civilisation,
Marcuse develops a theory of power which presents a picture
of how social, cultural and interpersonal relationships of
power produces a subjectivity, a set of attitudes and
behaviours, what Marcuse calls a Performance Principle. It
is a misrepresentation of the work of Marcuse to claim
there is no theory of the production of the individual
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subjectivity through power.
Despite this, Foucauldianism seems to claim at one and the
same time, that there exists within the work of the
Frankfurt School both an essentialist theory of
subjectivity and no theory of subjectivity! It has been
argued (Poster 1984) that Foucault's concept of power-
knowledge and his 'reason-in-history' thesis confronts the
notion of reason as the arbiter of historical truth and
reality. On the other hand the Frankfurt position is
presented as confused and essentially flawed in that they
held on to some notion of essentialist, Enlightenment
reason. This, it is argued implies an immanent connection
between reason and freedom; a notion of universal truth
through reason; and therefore a theory of an essential
subjectivity. However this fails to take account of the
practical political commitment of the Frankfurt agenda to
the practical possibility of human improvement through the
amelioration of the material struggle for survival given
historical possibilities. This demonstrates a continued
commitment to a notion of reason as the articulation of the
potential for social change. It also signals the refusal to
descend into either relativism or 'terminal disengagement'
(Norris 1992). This refusal of the nihilistic despair which
characterises the more Nietzschean pronouncements of
Foucauldian post-modernism saves the Frankfurt position
from overly academicist irrelevance. For someone like
Marcuse, as a representative of the more practical-
political side of the Frankfurt School (Kellner 1991),
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reason is not so much about truth as the practical
realisation of social improvement of the material and
existential conditions of life. Again anyone really
familiar with this work would know that the negative
philosophy of the Frankfurt School should not be easily
characterised as having an unproblematic and simplistic
conception of truth, reason or reality. Indeed it was the
Frankfurt School that did much to put such agendas on the
intellectual map in the 1930's and 1940's (Marcuse 1955,
Horkheimer 1972, Adorno 1976, Adorno and Horkheimer 1979).
Foucault's position is revealing in that he is able to
raise questions of how power operates on the body, of how
'...the body is marked, positioned, temporalised,
collected, and so forth'. This is useful, but again it
ante-dates significant work by the Frankfurt School
(Marcuse 1955, 1964, Habermas 1971a, 1971b), whose analysis
of the 'science' of power involves an analysis of the
motives and distributions of power which gave rise to these
technologies. The question of why particular technologies
were developed at particular times and not other
technologies of power are discussed by the Frankfurt
School. The application of the work of Marcuse contributes
to the critical organisation theory of the specifically
capitalist technologies of power as they act on the
subjective, to produce behaviour in organisations.
Marcuse shows how power operates to produce a culture
designed to reproduce existing authority relations and a
culturally compliant attitude within the self. For Marcuse
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the demarcation between the mode of information, symbolic
and cultural communication, the politics of language and
the mode of production is spurious. Given a Marcusean
analysis, the link between culture and the operation of
power is related to the nature of information, discourse
and communication as a route to the increase of industrial
production and organisational control.
On the concept of ideology, Foucauldians (Poster 1984,
Miller 1987, Rose 1989) argue that Marxism uses the concept
of ideology in connection with the notion of 'false
consciousness'. Whilst there is obviously some truth in
this, it is a crude formulation and does not capture the
full significance of the development of the concept of
ideology within western Marxism in explaining social and
cultural reproduction. Foucauldianism posits the
superiority of the concept of power-knowledge over
ideology. Firstly it suggested there is no absolute truth
as an epistemological grounds for the critical demarcation
of ideology and non-ideology. Secondly, Foucault's anti-
humanism argues that the locus of ideology in ideas and
subjective consciousness prevents an analysis of the
relationship between reason and power, which the analysis
of 'discursive practices' through the concept of power-
knowledge can facilitate. Thirdly the Marxist conception of
ideology suggests that the production of ideas is
determined by the mode of production, whereas Foucault
argues that power-knowledge stem from relationships between
knowledge, discourse and power situated in institutional
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relations at the micro level. As Poster puts it
'Discourses, for Foucault, are already powers and do not
need to find their material force somewhere else, as in the
mode of production' (Poster 1984. p. 87, see also Poster
1991)
In response to this critique of the Marxist concept of
ideology one can make the following points. Firstly, as
chapter 3 will show, the Frankfurt School conception is not
based upon some demarcation between truth and falsity, but
on ideology as the arresting of the potential for
historical social, economic, political and cultural change.
The epistemological demarcation between truth and falsity
is an orientation born of positivism which is anathema to
the Frankfurt School. Secondly, the situating of the
Marxist concept of ideology simply as a consciousness
orientation which neglects social and cultural practices is
to deny the full complexities of Marxism. To present the
Marxist concept of ideology in this idealistic, non-
dialectical way is incorrect. Thirdly, the Foucauldian
separation of 'discursive practices' from social and
economic relations, and the positing of discourse over
social and economic factors is problematic. This separation
and its implicit language-centredness is not born out by
empirical and historical investigations. The control
strategies making up (neo)Human Relations management show
that the development of communicative strategies of power
is directly related to the reproduction of the capitalist
mode and relations of production. For these reasons the
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Marxist concept of ideology, as outlined in chapter 3 is a
useful analytical and critical tool.
For these reasons I contend that the application of the
work of Marcuse,	 given his critical social psychological
analysis of	 how	 power	 operates	 upon	 subjectivity; his
insights into	 the	 nature	 of power	 and	 ideology; his
analysis of	 culture,	 language and	 discourses;	 and the
relationship between power, reason and rationality leading
to certain technologies; all have relevance for the
development of a critical theory of organisation over and
above the fairly well developed Foucauldian perspective in
organisation studies.
Thus I am confessing not only to the adoption of a value
position, but to the reliance of several key, essential
concepts which emanate from this position. It seems
advantageous to declare these concepts now.
All narratives need characters. I have already contended
that all social theoretical positions are informed by a set
of values. It is not only more honest but more
theoretically complete to be self-reflexive as to these
underpinning values. The concepts of central importance for
critical social theory, at least as far as this inquiry
goes are totality, ideology, the subject and, perhaps more
implicitly used here, alienation. The use of these concepts
connects with another central feature, that of dialectics,
as used from within the humanist Marxist approach of
historical materialism (Marcuse 1955, Marckovic 1974,
Sayers, S 1985).
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Totality as it is understood here proposes that whilst
discrete social and historical phenomena can be analyzed,
this analysis should be located within a wider conception
which connects discrete analyses to the social and
historical context within which they are found (Novack
1978, Jay 1991). A study of organisations is related here
therefore to a study of capitalism and the social,
economic, political and cultural relations which make it
up. It is assumed here that we live in a capitalist
society, and that the nature of this totality has a bearing
on the nature and strategies of management and
organisations.
Ideology as it is understood here refers to the process of
social and cultural reproduction whereby distinctly
capitalist power relations are maintained. A much fuller
discussion of the status, use and development of the
concept of ideology is discussed in chapter 3. Suffice to
say here that it is understood as the process whereby, in
the realm of ideas, the contradictions inherent within
capitalist relations are given an illusory mediation, or
'solved' (Larrain 1979, 1983, Parekh 1982, Thompson 1984,
1990, Eagleton 1991).
Alienation is understood as one outcome of this process of
social and cultural reproduction, and its political
connotations, as it exists as the experiential level. That
is, given the material reproduction of the totality of
capitalism and its coincidence with the ideological
reproduction in the realm of ideas, the individual often
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experiences themselves, their potential for freedom and
creativity, others and institutions, as something alien to
the self. Individuals come to reduce themselves and are
reduced to the status of objects, come to be objectified
within an alien power. (Fromm 1961, 1978, 011man 1976,
Markovic 1982). This may or may not be experienced as such,
which means we may be able to talk of an objective aspect
to alienation whereby one's human ability for creativity is
redirected as a consequence of the material organisation of
society. We may however talk of the subjective aspect of
alienation whereby individuals may or may not 'feel'
alienated. These are obviously thorny philosophical issues
which would require another thesis to fully explore. For
this reason the notion of alienation is not fully explored
below but remains implicit and informs the basic humanistic
perspective which inspires this thesis as a whole. However,
the notion that individuals could regularly become more
than they at present are, and that the current
organisations of society, economy and culture regularly
arrests this potential is the most basic 'truth' which
informs this analysis (Marcuse 1955, Fromm 1965). It is
this notion which is the defining characteristics of the
'humanism' to which I have referred.
Of course subjectivity (and recently 'identity') is a
contested concept. The Critical Theory which underpins this
thesis generates a particular theoretical position on
subjectivity which should be signalled. Many contemporary
theoretical orientations which focus on the socio-cultural
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shaping of subjectivity relate it to the consumption of
culture industry products (Featherstone 1991b, Nava 1992,
Shields 1992); the construction of 'privatised' lifestyles
(Logan 1985); language (Hanson 1986, Homachek 1992) and the
body (Ponce 1978, Brunt 1989, Featherstone 1991a, Giddens
1993). Rose (1989) and Cohen and Taylor (1991) suggests
that through 'therapy', as an expression of the self in
terms of one's symbolic and cultural presentations divorced
from any other aspect of everyday life, one can enable and
create a 'self'. Several theorists (Leadbeater 1989, Mort
1989, Featherstone 1991a, Giddens 1991, Shields 1992,
Bocock 1993) have argued for the celebration of individual
difference as demonstrated through consumption, posited as
forming the basis for a new 'politics'. This is an example
of the post-Modernist cult of consumption and of 'symbolic
exchange values' stemming from a Baudrillardian
perspective. These are the worst excesses of the idealistic
position which touts 'lifestyle' as the locus of
subjectivity. The philosophical basis for this post-
Modernism and Baudrillardianism comes down essentially to
the discursive and textual emphases, the much hyped
'linguistic turn' in cultural clothing. Norris (1992) has
shown with great clarity the ridiculous, self-
congratulatory smugness of this aloof position, what he
calls 'terminal disengagement'.
Mass media communication is also held to be an aspect in
this shaping of identity (Lash and Urry 1987, Castells
1991, Featherstone 1991b, Giddens 1991, Poster 1991,
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Baudrillard 1992). It is argued that interaction with and
communications from the electronic medias are increasingly
coming to form a major aspect of an individuals experience
and meaning (Baudrillard 1992).
Within the deconstructionism discussed above, is a
deconstruction of an essential subjectivity. Marxist theory
is held to have an essential subjectivity within it, and as
such produces a flawed theory of power which only sees
power as the repression of this essential subjectivity
(Foucault 1980, Miller 1987, Rose 1989). In response to
this I shall use the concept of subjectivity in a self-
reflexive way (Henriques 1984). Subjectivity is not taken
as something fixed nor as a simple emanation of the free-
willed individual. Rather, the notion of subjectivity is
understood in relation to the social, cultural and
interpersonal processes which constitutes and maintain a
sense of self, identity and subjective existence.
Subjectivity is used here to denote something which
emanates from a process, understood in a way which rejects
an individual-society dualism.
Contemporary critics of post-Modern and idealist notions of
subjectivity (Bauman 1989, Lodziak 1990) express a critique
of the various but heteronomously controlled social forms
and practices as a locus for identity. The general
conflation of identity with these factors of consumption,
as with the notion that an identity can be formed within
heteronomously organised work, fails to recognise the
externally controlled nature of the culture industry
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production. To equate this with an individual sense of
meaning, self-expression and agency is to reduce what being
human is, or could be, to a set of externally derived and
controlled functions, whether it be in production or
consumption, what Marcuse (1966) has called the
'Performance Principle'. This is the reduction of the
concept of self and identity to a trivial concern with
symbolic manifestations and paraphernalia. More
significantly, to equate the performance of such
pre-established functions as production and consumption
with identity is evidence of the loss of meaning in these
'troubled times' (Lasch 1985), of 'ontological insecurity'
(Giddens 1991) and 'identity crises' in general. To reduce
identity to consumption shows how little the concept of
identity means in the hands of Rose (1989), Leadbeater
(1989), Nava (1992) and the like. Furthermore, these so
called analyses of the question of identity simply
reproduce the symptoms of the problem of 'identity crises'
by positing what is as what should be, and ignoring
potential futures. They ultimately become representatives
of a cultural version of the 'end of history' thesis
(Fukuyama 1992).
If it can be accepted that identity relates to the
development by the individual of a sense of self and
meaning, then we can see how identity often develops
through reference to particular social encounters where
significant others are a source of self-evaluation.
(Goffman 1969, Laing 1971). That is, identity often
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develops through significant practices, social arenas and
interaction with others. It can be argued that these
sources of identity formation are being increasingly
brought under external instrumental control. The Freudian
tradition and its politicisation by Critical Theory has
offered one way of theorising the external nature of
identity formation. The notion of the super-ego and the
internalisation of the other through identification
motivated by the avoidance of guilt forms the basis of this
theory. (Freud 1930, Fromm 1941). The Freudian analysis of
the group has shown that through the socio-cultural and
psychological dynamics of the group, the individual can
come to subsume themselves and their subjectivity into the
group and group culture (Freud 1921, 1930, Lasch 1985,
Hinshelwood 1987), as well as the 'group-mind' (Janis 1972,
1982). Fromm (1941) has shown how the individual has an
existential incentive for avoiding autonomy and
responsibility and to 'escape from freedom' given the
discomfort of the knowledge of the lack of 'transcendental
guarantees'. Marcuse (1966) adopting Freudian concepts has
shown this, and developed this 'hidden political trend'
within Freudian social psychology. Marcuse radicalises the
Freudian notion of the super-ego and shows how it comes to
be an externally imposed mechanism of control of
subjectivity. Marcuse has shown how an externally derived
'super-ego' becomes a social and political moment of
control rather than a purely psychic phenomena.
Having said the above, I understand identity from within
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the context of a wider humanistic concern with individual
potential to become other than what one already is, that
is, de-alienation (Marcuse 1966, Maslow 1970, Fromm 1978,
Rogers 1980). A more useful focus would be on
self-determination and the ability to both determine and
maintain an autonomous identity over and above heteronomous
'identities'. It is for these reasons that I argue for a
theory of 'identity needs' in relation to a materialist
psychology in chapter 4, and the practical possibilities of
expanded autonomy. This notion of 'identity needs' develops
from the view that we should take the issue of
(existential) resources seriously for both the development
and maintenance of both subjectivity and action as the
precursor for a self-determined identity. Only through a
discussion of subjectivity and action geared towards the
expansion of autonomy does Critical Theory of identity
become meaningful. It is for this reason that a discussion
of identity, subjective meanings and senses of self cannot
be separated from a discussion of the politics of resource
distribution. This is not to attempt to delineate a priori
what the needs of each individual are, but is to argue for
the necessity of the theoretical discussion of resources in
the same context as subjectivity. Thus one can demonstrate
a sophisticated awareness of the contingent nature of
subjectivity without following the conservative post-Modern
argument stemming from an idealist, language or image-
centred theory of subjectivity. Indeed to fully accept the
social, cultural and discursive shaping of subjectivity, as
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with the social construction of knowledge and 'truth', one
should also recognise the political shaping of
subjectivity, along with knowledge and discourse.
Thus whilst being sensitive to individual difference, I
confess to also argue for this social dimension as part of
my humanist Marxist underpinnings. This involves the
rejection of a theoretical emphasis on solely individual or
privatistic action within a market orientation. I am
critical of this as the basis for the discussion of
subjectivity and self-creation as it neglects a discussion
of how a more pleasurable identity can be formed and
maintained. To form an identity is not synonymous with the
maintenance of an identity. To form an identity through one
aspect of life can mean that other aspects of life are
temporarily foreclosed. The reliance on market activity for
the formation of an identity makes that identity unstable,
contingent and inherently problematic. Identities formed
through the consumption of paraphernalia from the culture
industry are often consistently future oriented, where one
more artifact is always 'needed' for a complete 'identity'.
Convivial relationships to others and to the social and
natural environment relates to the relevance of Critical
Theory of organisations and the expansion of autonomy.
Central to this is the maintenance of a distinction between
subjectivity as a function of organisationally manipulated
and managed culture on the one hand, and subjectivity in an
expanded realm of autonomy and authenticity on the other.
The radical redistribution of material and existential
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resources as a practical possibility is held to be
politically desirable in terms of a social policy aimed at
solutions to urgent problems of social and urban life. Long
term unemployment and homelessness can be seen as the
redistribution of time and space. These processes of
redistribution could be humanised. This brings us to the
question of social justice.
The contemporary theorists who focus on the desirability
and practical possibility of the humanisation of life
(Lefebvre 1971, 1976, Harvey 1973, 1993, Illich 1973, Fromm
1978, Habermas 1981, 1989, Gorz 1983, 1989) all have,
implicitly or explicitly a radical theory of social
justice. Whilst these theories of social, economic and
spatial justice have to deal with the notion of the
'difference' of subjectivity, they also are able to argue
for social improvement. Whilst the concept of justice
should be recognised as socially and politically shaped,
this should not collapse into relativism.
We can demarcate between self-determined identity and
externally derived and imposed identity. An ideology-
critique of the (neo)Human Relations managerial strategies
designed to manage subjectivity and culture is a specific
example of subjectivity coming increasingly under
instrumental control connected to commercial interest.
Summary.
This chapter has been both epistemological and political.
I have been at pains to demonstrate some familiarity with
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post-Modern epistemological debates by way of a critique of
their consequences. I have shown how such post-Modernism
leads to meta-theoretical problems in constructing a
coherent and defendable thesis, and to 'epistemological
nervousness'. My response to this has been to argue for an
'open work' which is self-reflexive to its own value-
orientation. I have been concerned to highlight the value-
orientation which underpins this thesis because, despite
epistemological nervousness, I intend to construct the
'modernist' narrative nonetheless. As a result it has been
necessary to declare the specific theoretical base and
values which inform this endeavour, namely humanism
generally, humanist Marxism and Critical Theory. As part of
this I have articulated the concepts central to Critical
Social Theory, both in relation to social theory as a whole
and to the question of subjectivity in particular. Part of
this confession has been to declare my concentration on the
work of Marcuse, as holding both the potential for
developing the specifics of a critical theory of
organisations, and also contributing to a critical theory
of subjectivity.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of ideology and the
development of a methodology for its sophisticated use
which deals with notions of the discursive construction of
contingent social conditions, will form the main vehicle
for this critical theory of organisations. It is argued
that this position, narrative though it may be, underpinned
by values as it certainly is, is more beneficial to
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critical social inquiry than the pedestrian case-study
orientation which pretends at neutrality, or the post-
Modern 'terminal disengagement' (Norris 1992). As I have
shown, this is to provide a critique more than to prove the
'truth'; concerned to show precisely what the
deconstructionists suggest, that social reality is
contingent and socially constructed.
In addition to an ideology-critique, this thesis will be
implicity concerned with the potential for the development
of structures and relations which embody an expanded scope
for autonomy (Lefebvre 1968, Illich 1973, Gorz 1989). The
preliminary discussion of subjectivity, against the
backdrop of humanism places this concern with expanded
(organisational) autonomy, de-alienation and social justice
at the centre of a Critical Theory trajectory. This concern
resonates with the dialectical inquiry into potential
futures highlighted above (Marcuse 1955, Marckovic 1974,
Novak 1978, Sayers,S. 1985, Oilman 1993).
The exploration of these social and the political concerns
will proceed through the application of the specific
details of Marcuse's Critical Theory to the concrete
pronouncements found in the history of management and
organisational theory's concern with the subject. Such
theory will be approached as something of a data-base. The
organisation will not be approached from a position which
is implicitly informed by a concern to somehow or other
'improve' the organisation. It is proposed that the
organisation embodies many of the features of the social,
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cultural and ideological process of reproduction I am
concerned with here at a more general level.
In pursuit of this applied Critical Theory, and to continue
to establish the epistemological possibilities for it, I
shall discuss in further detail the central concept of
ideology and a methodology for its study in chapter 3. I
shall explore in detail the relevance of the work of
Marcuse in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. However, it is necessary
to discuss the development of existent critical
organisation theory. This will enable a better appreciation
of the contribution that the application of Marcuse's
Critical Theory to the analysis of organisations and the
ideological nature of (neo)Human Relations management may
offer. As the next chapter will show, existent critical
theories of organisation tend to revolve around the work of
Foucault, the Marxist underpinnings of Labour Process
Theory, growing references to the work of Habermas and the
use of social psychological concepts for a critical
appraisal of organisational behaviours and interactions. A
consideration of these orientations will enable the
explication of how and why the application of the work of




EXISTENT CRITICAL ORGANISATION THEORY. 
In chapter 1, some initial 'confessions' were made
concerning the trajectory and underlying values which
inform this thesis. This refers to the attempt to
contribute to the critical theory of organisations.
However, before one can proceed with this, it is necessary
to survey some of the contributions to this field made so
far. This survey will not be exhaustive, but will
concentrate upon those contributions which are most clearly
focused upon the questions of culture and subjectivity in
organisations, as they relate to questions of power and
ideology. A consideration of these themes will help to show
why the application of the work of Marcuse contributes to
the critical theory of organisations.
Critical Organisation Theory.
Critical themes are being taken up within contemporary
organisational theory, especially at the theoretical level
(Knights and Willmott 1982, 1985, 1990, Fay 1987, Mumby
1988, Alvesson 1989, Hassard and Pym 1990, Alvesson and
Willmott 1992, 1993, Wllmott 1993). In particular Alvesson
(1989) and Alvesson and Willmott (1993) have attempted to
develop and apply a Critical Theory perspective to
organisational studies. Such theorists see themselves as
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developing a nascent trend within management theory. Having
said this, it has also been argued (Alvesson and Willmott
1992) that the 'intellectualism', 'essentialism' and
'negativism' expressed by Critical Theory has led to 'the
marginalisation of Critical Theory within management and
organisation studies' (Alvesson and Willmott 1992. p.438).
They see their work as demonstrating a commitment to a
'deep appreciation' of the philosophical foundations of
Critical Theory, whilst also being concerned with
'reformulating' management. They argue that the application
of Critical Theory to management and (implicitly) Labour
Process Theory is necessary in that the development of a
Critical	 Management	 Studies	 isfully'...not
comprehensive'. Alvesson and Willmott want to improve
management through this 'critical turn'. However, it is my
contention that whilst such a critical organisational
theory has developed in recent years, it has done so
largely through taking up the works of either Habermas or
Foucault. As such it has been neither 'fully comprehensive'
nor can it claim to have fully developed a 'deep
appreciation' of all the strands within Critical Theory. It
is to overcoming some of these shortfalls that I hope to
contribute.
Some of the contributions which have been made to the
analysis of organisational culture and subjectivity are
surveyed below. It is necessary to provide a brief account
of these developments in the critical theory of
organisations so as to articulate the contribution which
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the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School can make to
organisation theory which is developed in subsequent
chapters. This will refer explicitly to the work of
Marcuse, and contribute to a Critical Theory of the
management of culture and subjectivity as ideological.
Foucauldian Organisation Theory.
Any inquiry into the question of subjectivity in
organisations would be incomplete without a consideration
of the influence of Michel Foucault's work. This has been
a major contribution to critical theories of organisations
in recent years. In this section I shall deal only with the
significance of Foucault's institutional history (Foucault
1971, 1977) and not with his more epistemological and
metaphysical writings. It may be argued that this is to do
an injustice to the full complexity of Foucault's work, but
to inquire into the epistemological work of Foucault would
be to detract form the focus of the thesis as a whole. The
essential significance of the work of Foucault is here
taken to be that he provides a history of institutional
power as it impacts upon subjectivity. His work revolves
around the analysis of firstly, the subjectification of the
individual as the focus of organisational discipline;
secondly, the normalisation of individual behaviour through
the definitional power of organisations for the Judgement
of the subject; thirdly, and most famously of all, the
consequences of the impact upon subjectivity given Panoptic
surveillance; and fourthly the category of power-knowledge
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and the simultaneity of the production of
knowledge/discourses with the (re)production of power-
relations. These themes illuminate the general concern of
this study with the relationship between power and
subjectivity.
A Foucauldian perspective on this question holds that power
and subjectivity have been for too long separated in social
theory and that the operation of power coincides with the
production of subjectivity and discourse. Foucault sees
power as not just acting negatively to repress an essential
subjectivity, but also as creating the subject (Miller
1987, Burrell 1988, Clegg 1989, Rose 1989). Power initiates
'regulatory practices of the self' according to this view.
Clegg (1989) points out that disciplinary practices
manifest in organisations stem from forms of knowledge and
meaning creation, that such disciplinary practices are
'knowledge constituted' in both texts and 'definite
institutional and organisational practices'. Given the
diffuse, pluralistic nature of 'discursive practices' and
the rejection of notions that discourse is immanently
linked to any one monolithic constellation of interests,
the Foucauldian perspective is keen to emphasise the
shifting nature of 'discursive practices' as sites of power
and the need for a situation-specific analysis of power
practices and
power-knowledge. Burrell (1988) makes the point that the
full significance of Foucault's work is to show not so much
how specific institutions ('carceral' or otherwise)
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operate, but to show that whilst 'carceral institutions'
may not be the norm, we as individuals tend to be
incarcerated in an organisational world. '...whilst we may
not live in total institutions, the institutional
organisation of our lives is total' (Burrell 1988 p.232).
In particular Foucault developed the notion of Panopticism
and demonstrated its fertility for an understanding of the
surveillance capabilities of information technology.
Mellosi and Pavarini (1980) take on board this Foucauldian
theme in terms of a comparison between the prison and other
organisational forms. They identify the common origins of
the prison and the	 factory from an implicit Foucaldian
genealogy. Mellosi	 and	 Pavarini	 demonstrate this
commonality by showing	 how	 organisational	 forms were
productive, of both	 things	 and	 men	 (sic)	 and the
transformation of the criminal into a mechanical subject
due to disciplinary domination. That is, they trace a
history of the organisation and its impact on the subject
from a perspective similar to Foucault's own micro-
histories of institutional discipline (Foucault 1971, 1977,
1979). Mellosi and Pavarini do however demonstrate a more
open link between discipline and material interest than
does Foucault. They argue that the 'anthropological
mutation' of the subject given disciplinary mechanisms is
linked to the 'logic of the free market'. They therefore
link the 'transformation of man' to the imperatives of
capital accumulation as the proletarian is integrated into
the disciplining of his or her own self. In this way
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Melossi and Pavarini echo the work of Gramsci and the
Frankfurt School as much as Foucault.
Zuboff (1988) has taken the concept central to Foucault's
theory of discipline, that of Panopticism, and the
surveillance which it ensures, and applied it to an
analysis of contemporary organisational power relationships
stemming from information technology. Zuboff coins the term
'The Information Panopticon'. She details through various
case studies how the utilisation of information technology
operates to ensure compliance on the part of workers, in
that it facilitates a 'universal transparency' through
information in a way analogous to the classic Panopticon
discussed by Foucault (1977, 1979, 1980).
Sakolsky (1992) delineates a perspective for a critique of
social institutions and the labour process which draws upon
the work of Foucault. Sakolsky emphasises the centrality of
the notion of 'disciplinary power' and its micro-
conceptualisation of power relations and situations. This
emphasises the general Foucauldian proposition that
disciplinary practices should not be separated from
discourses of power-knowledge. Sakolsky makes the
distinction between the orthodox Marxist notion of 'power
as property', and the Foucauldian conception of
'disciplinary power relations' which emphasise the
constitutive nature of power relations within the labour
process. In an attempt to demonstrate this, Sakolsky turns
to the notion of Panopticism, and in particular the
'Information Panopticon' discussed by Zuboff (1988. See
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also Finlay 1987). Sakolsky is also concerned however to
draw out some of the relationships and 'conviviality'
between this Foucauldian approach and a more Marxist
discussion of the capitalist labour process. The career of
Panopticism and surveillance is taken a stage further by
Davis (1990). In his 'excavations' of the future of Los
Angeles, Davis has shown how the use of surveillance
technology and the management of the urban space is
increasingly leading to a Panoptic arrangement, where
disciplinary technologies serve to either exclude or
discipline the inhabitants of Los Angeles.
Dandeker (1990) has taken on board a Foucauldian analysis
of surveillance in his historical analysis of bureaucracy
and the modern corporation. Dandeker relates the
rationalisation of administration evident in the historical
development of bureaucratization to the rise of
surveillance techniques. Dandeker talks of 'bureaucratic
surveillance'. Given this emphasis, Dandeker demonstrates
a limited and non-totalised notion of surveillance, and
relates his analysis more to a meta-Taylorism which links
'surveillance' to the centralisation of knowledge and
records more than to a Foucauldian notion of 'universal
transparency'. Dandeker links the surveillance capacities
of an organisation to the size of the files held in a
surveillance system; the centralisation of those files; the
speed of information flow; and the number of points of
contact between the system and its subject population.
Despite this however, he still attempts to articulate a
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theory of the modification of the subject by the
organisation.
Theorists working within the field of Labour Process Theory
have been influenced by the work of Foucault. Knights and
Collinson (1990) in their analysis of shopfloor discipline,
managerial control and organisational power have used a
Foucauldian framework. They have shown how the development
of knowledge, along with strategies of power and
surveillance within the management of the shopfloor can be
analyzed as disciplinary mechanisms. They have argued that
post-Braverman Labour Process Theory and the analysis of
power, control and organisational relations needs to be
supplemented with a Foucauldian theory of the relationship
between power and the subject. This holds that power is
best understood not simply as the repression of the
subject, but as producing the subject.
Deetz (1993, see also Sakolsky 1992) adopts this
Foucauldian stance in his analysis of 'Disciplinary Power
in the Modern Corporation'. He conceptualises organisations
as political systems made up of sites of conflict,
divergent interests and negotiations. This involves
divergent forms of knowledge and discourse within the
organisations. Thus this analysis sees organisations as
power situations, power and discipline is conceived through
a Foucauldian perspective as micro and situational. Deetz
demonstrates this Foucauldian perspective when he argues
for a move away from economic determinist theories of
organisational power relations, to an emphasis on how
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'world', 'self', 'system' are power-laden
conceptualisations born of discursive practices and thus
are constitutive of subjectivity (see also Cooper 1990).
Deetz posits the superiority of this position in that he
argues such a conceptual shift within organisational
studies would bring an '...analysis (which) focuses on
systems that develop each subject's active role in
producing and reproducing domination' (Deetz 1993. p.22).
This involves locating a theory of the subject in
organisational communication as the 'control of identity
production'. Rose (1989) has adopted this perspective in
his analysis of the history of social scientific
constructions of the self, found in the development of
techniques for the shaping of the self in work, the
military and the therapeutic professions. Rose links this
history of the institutional, social scientific shaping of
the self to the Foucauldian notion of power as enabling the
self, and to the notion of power-knowledge as developing
through discourses. He has attempted to show the nature of
discourses of subjectivity which arose in institutional
sites, how the management of subjectivity became a 'central
task of management', and how this gave birth to a new
'expertise of subjectivity'. Rose adopts notions of
disciplinary power, power-knowledge and 'discursive
practices' to make sense of this as a history of industrial
and institutional psychology.
Thus from this brief survey of some of the critical
theorists of organisations we can see the influence of the
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work of Foucault. Useful though this influence has been, it
has its problems, and as was alluded to in chapter 1, the
critical theory of organisations can usefully be developed
by the inclusion of a Frankfurt School perspective. This
perspective will make 'more complete' a theory of the
subject, and will relate this to the specificity of the
contemporary capitalist organisational context. It does
this be offering a critical social psychology developed
against the backdrop of a social theory, that is it offers
a dialectical analysis of the subject-object relation. The
contribution to this, through the application of the
insights of Marcuse to Critical Organisation Theory are
explored in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Before that however, this brief survey of some
contributions to the critical theory of organisations and
subjectivity should involve those which have taken a more
neo-Marxist perspective. This will enable the further
clarification of what a Marcusean analysis can contribute.
Critical Organisation Theory and Neo-Marxism.
In recent years the critical study of organisations has
also taken some inspiration from the neo-Marxist tradition.
This section will not explore in full the whole of the
Marxist tradition and its impact upon recent organisation
studies, a full account of which is beyond the remit of
this study, (Braverman 1975, Clegg and Dunkerley 1980,
Clawson 1980).
Central to the neo-Marxist approach are concerns with
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ideology and alienation. Also central to the neo-Marxist
approach which I will explore in this section is the
concern to respond to what has been called the 'crisis of
Marxism', a response which attempted to make Marxism
responsive to contemporary social and cultural situations.
This was sought by making connections and drawing upon
theoretical insights which attempt to link a basically
Marxist theory of the social totality, with psychoanalysis,
social psychology and cultural enquiry. Part of the
contemporary development of this, and one route in which it
has been applied to the study of organisations as such, is
the development of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School. However, the timing of the developments within a
critical theory of organisations has meant that to a large
extent the work of Habermas has been taken up by critical
organisation theorists (Mumby 1988, Hassard and Pym 1990,
Alvesson and Willmott 1993, Burrell 1994). This has meant
that, with a few notable exceptions, (Knights and Willmott
1982, Alvesson 1989, Alvesson and Wilmott 1993) the work of
the earlier generation of Frankfurt School writers has been
neglected in terms of its relevance for the explicit study
of organisation. Therefore, a detailed inquiry into the
work of Marcuse contributes to the critical theory of
organisation in that it addresses this lacuna. Those
critical organisational studies which emphasise ideology,
a linking of Marxism and psychoanalysis, and Habermas'
analysis of knowledge-constitutive interests and
communicative rationality (Habermas 1981) are not fully
54
developed. I hope to show below that a more sophisticated
theoretical insight into the full significance of Critical
Theory, a more energetic application of these insights, and
a contribution of these insights into potential
developments of alternative organisational theories and
practices, can be developed.
The basis of a neo-Marxist theory of organisations is a
Marxist theory of society, which argues that an
understanding of contemporary social forms and relations
needs to connect with a political and economic
understanding of the underlying power structures which
characterise capitalist society. Thus a critical theory of
organisations connects with a political economy of
organisations. Marx's only specific organisational analysis
comes in reference to bureaucracy, found in the context of
his response to Hegel (Albrow 1970, Beetham 1970, Perez-
Diaz 1982). Hegel advanced the idea that the bourgeois
State was the vehicle for the preservation of the general
interest, over and above the particular interest of
individuals.	 The	 State,	 and	 bureaucratic	 State
institutions, given their impersonality and
professionalism, later alluded to by Weber (1968), was the
arbiter of decisions within the democratic process. Marx's
specific discussion of the notion of bureaucracy was by way
of a critique of this orthodox, liberal view of the State
(McClellan 1986). The substance of Marx's critique was
based upon a rejection of the universalisation of the State
as a formal mechanism for the representation of civil
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society. Marx argues that such a dualism which separates
the State from civil society, and represents the State as
the bearer of the general interest is a false one, which
bureaucratic mechanisms use to legitimate their position
and function. This approach has given rise to emphases on
the capitalist organisation of work and the labour process,
as well as a focus on the political and ideological nature
of organisations generally within a capitalist industrial
society. This approach suggests that the form which
domination takes within the organisational setting needs to
be understood in ideological terms as well as, or in
relation to, political economic factors. This implies a
dialectical analysis of subjective and objective factors,
which demonstrates a greater sensitivity to ideological,
cultural and subjective aspects than does orthodox
structuralist Marxist criticisms of capitalism. That is, a
recognition of this implies a 'radical humanist paradigm'
rather than a 'radical structuralist paradigm' (Burrell and
Morgan 1979) for the development of a critical
organisational analysis.
A seminal example of this concern is provided by Gramsci,
in his famous essay Americanism and Fordism (Gramsci 1971).
Here Gramsci employs the notion of hegemony to discuss both
the objective political economic structures of capitalist
industry as well as, by implication, the motivational and
relational aspects of life and experience embedded within
those structures. In terms of the organisation of work,
Gramsci argued that the capitalist labour process could be
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seen as the transformation of the consciousness of one's
class position given one's position in the labour market,
from an active agent to the status of a commodity. Labour
is reduced from quality to quantity given the nature of the
organisation of work in the factory. The rationalising
imperatives within the Fordist/capitalist organisation of
work involved attempts to 'create a new type of worker',
one which is 'suitable for Fordised industry' as the
Fordist organisation of work brought with it its own
unintended labour management consequences. He goes on to
argue that the history of industrial rationalisation and
its managerial imperatives is the history of an increasing
subjugation of the 'natural' instincts to 'new, more
complex and rigid norms, and habits of behaviour'. Gramsci
is demonstrating the normative, that is ideological, nature
of management within capitalism. This is a history of the
new managerial imperatives around the 'labour problem'
which is more fully developed in chapter 8. Given this, we
begin to see that some of the Foucauldian 'discoveries' are
neither as novel nor as profound as some commentators wish
to claim (Miller 1987). Gramsci argues that Fordist
industry adopted an increasingly 'puritanical' tone in its
concern to align the human subject with the disciplinary
requirements of industry.
Post-Braverman Labour Process Theory.
Part of a general Marxist trajectory in organisational
studies have been theoretical debates which fall under the
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rubric of Labour Process Theory. These have seen
developments which point to the deconstruction of those
criticisms of management and organisations deemed to be
excessively mechanistic. As a result Labour Process Theory
has included calls for the development of a more 'full
theory of the subject' (Knights and Willmott 1990) from
within this largely Marxist orientation to organisational
studies. Most of these developments have occurred within
the context of a critical appraisal of the work of
Braverman (1975). The contribution of the work of Braverman
to an analysis of the capitalist labour process and the
analysis of managerial technologies has been seminal.
However, criticisms of 'Bravermania' and the development of
post-Braverman Labour Process Theory have revolved around
several points.
Braverman is said to demonstrate an excessively positive
and 'romantic' view of craft labour which he contrasts with
the 'deskilled' nature of work in industrial capitalist
organisations. He tends to present a universalised picture
of his 'deskilling' thesis which, it has been argued fails
to deal with contemporary claims for the reskilling and
hyper-skilling of some workers. Braverman focuses solely
upon Tayloristic management strategies in his account of
capitalist labour control and fails to deal adequately with
'voluntaristic' and multiple strategies of industrial
management. It is claimed that Braverman neglects the
resistance of workers to mechanistic managerial
technologies, and more generally neglects the potential for
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the development of a radical class-consciousness in his
'over-deterministic' analysis (Freidman 1977, Edwards 1979,
Clawson and Fantasia 1983, Gordon 1982, Storey 1983).
It has thus been argued that he has neglected the
subjective aspects of the labour process and management
control strategies, as well as gender issues (Cressey and
MacInness 1980, Giddens 1982, Littler and Salaman 1982,
Salaman 1982, Storey 1983, Thompson. P 1983, Burawoy 1985,
Herman 1985, Edwards 1986, Wood 1986, Alvesson 1989, 1993,
Knights and Willmott 1990, Reed 1990, Willmott 1990). The
critical theory of organisations developed here analyses
those management strategies which do concern themselves
with the 'subjective', ideational component in the
interests of control.
Theorists from within Labour Process Theory and
organisational studies who have begun to concern themselves
with a theory of subjectivity include those from both, what
Burrell and Morgan have called, the 'interpretative
paradigm', (Silverman 1979, Hassard and Pym 1990), and
those from a more 'radical' tradition (Knights, Willmott
and Collinson 1985, Knights and Willmott 1990, Collinson
1992). Knights (1990) has responded to the 'crisis' in
Labour Process Theory by arguing that it has failed to
develop an adequate theory of the subject and subjectivity.
He argues that Labour Process Theory has traditionally been
characterised by a 'dualism' which emphasises either the
voluntaristic subject on the one hand or determining
objective structures on the other. That is, according to
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Knights, Labour Process Theory suffers from a structure-
agency dualism. Given this dualism, Knights argues that a
'full theory' of the subject which situates subjective,
interpersonal and group features of action in relation to
objective conditions, has not sufficiently developed. As
chapter 4 will show, the application of the work of Marcuse
offers precisely such a potential development.
Knights (1990) and Willmott (1990) argue for an analysis
which revolves around a subject-object dialectic (Littler
and Salaman 1982, Benson 1983, Clawson and Fantasia 1983,
Herman 1985, Storey 1983, Knights and Willmott 1990,
Thompson and McHugh 1990). The '....dynamic of contestation
constitutes the basis for a dialectical interplay between
control and resistance' (Storey 1983).
Attempts to 'bring back in' the subject to Labour Process
Theory have proceeded, according to Knights, in the context
of the critique of Bravermanian technological determinism
and the (Marxist) positing of an 'essential subjectivity'.
Knights wants to 'eliminate determinism' from debates
around the subject and to '...supersede the objectivist and
empiricist contributions of managerial sociology' (see also
Burrell 1990, Alvesson and Willmott 1993). In pursuit of
this Knights makes the following points concerning the
failure of Labour Process Theory to theorise the subject.
Firstly that there is a prevalent tendency within Labour
Process Theory to emphasises either voluntarism or
determinism in an understanding of social action. Secondly
Knights argues that there is a tendency for Labour Process
60
Theory to posit a theory of the individual in relation to
isolated, usually deskilled tasks, and fails to deal with
the shaping of subjectivity and identity as a function of
the network of social and cultural relations within the
social organisation of work. Knights is essentially arguing
that Labour Process Theory and its treatment of the
question of the subject is, due to its non-dialectical
'dualistic' nature, either idealist, deterministic,
individualistic or some variation of the three. Knights
calls this characteristic within Labour Process Theory the
'failure of dialectics'. From an emerging Foucauldianism,
Knights goes on to argue that this dualism also brings with
it a 'control-resistance dualism'. Instead Knights points
to the over-determined nature of social and subjective
reproduction. He criticises the tendency of Labour Process
Theory to simply acknowledge the existence of subjective
factors as a substitute for an analysis of how and why such
aspects occur. However, in response to Knights, one could
argue that in turning to Foucault one does not really
overcome this failing, as Foucault himself fails to develop
a thorough-going theory of the subject but merely posits
the existence of subjects/bodies within determining
disciplinary mechanisms, despite his insistence on a
multiplicity of powers. In turning to social psychology,
Critical Theory of organisation to some extent overcomes
this problem. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 attempt to contribute
to the analysis of how such operations occur at the level
of	 subjectivity,	 culture,	 language and knowledge
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production, in relation to an analysis of the background
structuring of social existence and interaction, namely
capitalism. Such an approach is dialectical in its
orientation, in that it demonstrates both a fundamental
subject-object dialectic and recognises the flux of
potential futures stemming from control-resistance
interplays alluded to by Marcuse in the quotation in the
Preface.
Storey (1983) has argued that Braverman adopts a view which
is insensitive to the contradictions within management
(Watson 1980, Storey 1983). These criticisms also relate to
developments in Labour Process Theory towards a theory of
the subject (Knights and Willmott 1990). The varying,
multiple management strategies demonstrated by industry
raises for Reed (1990) the notion that management make
'strategic choices', and adopt a 'voluntaristic' attitude
with regard to the forms of organisational control they
mobilise. Reed argues that it would be incorrect to develop
an overly deterministic account of management as being
directed by any one universalised approach to management
which is insufficiently sensitive to the social, cultural
and motivational complexities of work relations (Edwards
1986, Wood 1986, Hyman 1987). He argues for an analytical
framework which can cope with the 'breaks and
contradictions' within management strategies. Reed shows
how, due to an internal dynamic, the guiding logic of
managerial practices change over time. It is important to
note that the analysis developed in subsequent chapters is
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concerned with a critique of this more integrative, socio-
cultural focus for authority relations, set against the
historical emergence of a (neo)Human Relations management
discourse. In this sense it echoes much of this work.
However, whilst the specific technology of management might
change from a mechanistic approach to a more 'integrative'
or 'socio-cultural' approach, the basic technological
rationality which drives such an endeavour, that of the
'assembly and regulation of those basic activities' remains
the same. Thus whilst what Reed is saying is at one level
useful, to emphasise the internal dynamic of the management
paradigm, the critique of the instrumental rationality
underpinning management remains valid. Indeed if Reed is
correct, it is more important to analyze management
technology from the standpoint of its underlying
rationality precisely given its internal complexity. As he
suggests, the concern with 'effective control' rather than
with formally rational techniques is what should give a
critical analysis of management its impetus (Littler 1982,
Salaman 1982, Knights, Willmott and Collinson 1985,
Willmott 1993). Similarly Storey (1983) argues that
Braverman fails to develop a suitably 'dialectical'
analysis of managerial control strategies which involve the
coexistence of these various approaches (Willmott 1990).
Braverman's 'functionalism' led to a 'panacea fallacy'
stemming from his over-deterministic analysis. Scott (1985)
shows the connection between the use of the variety of
management strategies for control and corporate strategy as
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a whole within which management is 'embedded'. Such
recognition of managerial strategies of control can
highlight connections between 	 internal managerial
'voluntarism' and the underlying capitalist/instrumental
rationality. Recognising some of the internal
contradictions within management which culminates in a
substantive rationality, suggests an over-determination of
the reproduction of power relations. By this it is meant
that through a combination of causes, be they material
power relations; social and cultural integration; the
control and regulation of relational, motivational and
other psychological factors as experienced by the worker;
the institutionalisation of conflict and its resolution;
that a multiplicity of potential strategies available to
management produce similar results. This effect is the
reproduction, legitimation and consolidation of the
existent relations of production which characterise the
capitalist organisation of work. The debate internal to
management raises interesting issues, but raising these
internal complications which challenge the universality of
one particular regulative strategy of management does not
invalidate the thesis that management as a function, and
the development of various management techniques as a
whole, is inherently guided by the capitalist logic of
domination and regulation. The debate touched upon above
serves to outline the projection of such an underlying
technological rationality into the socio-cultural,
subjective arena.
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Pignon and Querzola (1970) point to the 'new language of
capitalism' which emphasises job-enrichment, participation
and consensus as giving capitalist organisations a 'more
radical ideological form' which attempts to 'liberate mass
initiative'. Thus they interpret managerial control
strategies which attempt to initiate the subject into their
own control which is nevertheless understood against the
backdrop of the totality of capitalism. Pignon and Querzola
argue that managerial strategies developed around these
themes can be located within the rubric of (neo)Human
Relations. They explicitly refer to the work of Herzberg,
McGregor and Argyris and the emphasis on motivational
aspects in work relations. The historical emergence and a
detailed empirical inquiry into these 'leading authors' as
a signifier of the (neo)Human Relations management
discourse is fully explored below. This attempts to
'...transform into a science the art of organisation and
command' at the interpersonal and cultural level (Baritz
1974, Anthony 1977, Hollway 1984, 1991, Parker and
Slaughter 1990).
Organisation Theory and the Frankfurt School
The analysis of the 'authority' of capital relates to the
more sustained development of a Critical Theory of new
managerial control strategies. It stands against a general
Marxist backdrop which shows how the production of
commodities for exchange and the negation of production for
use engenders a reliance on exchange relations in
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production and consumption. 	 Given this economic
organisation, individual workers are subject to the
fundamental authority (power) of capitalist relations
despite the rhetoric of participation and democracy.
Whether or not to 'be a commodity' due to the
commodification of labour given these exchange relation
underpinning work, is an important question for the
experiential content of individuals. However the point
which Pignon and Querzola wish to make is that
fundamentally each individual worker '...is not in a
position to choose the answer'. In this way Pignon and
Querzola imply an objective aspect to alienation, given
these particular social and economic conditions, over and
above purely subjective aspects of alienation. The
experiential questions concerning the production of
identities or the presentations of the self in the
workplace are more fully understood in this dialectical
analysis. The commodity status of individuals as workers
and the organisation of work and work relations around this
basic feature corresponds to the experience of the
'economic necessity' of capitalist production and the
'political necessity' of control (Abercrombie 1980, Lodziak
1988).
Again the Frankfurt School demonstrates one of the first
sustained attempts to develop this subject-object
dialectic. Several organisation theorists have taken up the
work of the Frankfurt School. Knights and Willmott (1982)
have commented upon the significance of the work of Fromm.
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They cite Marcuse, Habermas and Fromm as theorists who are
concerned with this central demarcation between
subjectivity in given conditions and potential futures;
between the 'dead objectivity' which characterises
instrumentalist approaches to the subjective experience in
organisations with the 'live subjectivity' of expanded
autonomy (See also Gorz 1989). According to Knights and
Willmott (1982) central to Fromm's argument is the analysis
of the effects of the capitalist economic structure upon
the socio-psychological make-up of the individual. The
potentialities of the human individual are adapted to the
economically and historically contingent requirements of
the capitalist system in general, and the industrial
capitalist labour process in particular. The individual
actively demonstrates their loss of autonomy by presenting
the self as saleable commodity and through actively
attempting to 'escape from freedom' (Fromm 1941).
Alvesson (1989) has specifically taken up the work of
Marcuse and Habermas, and applied it to the analysis of
organisations. Alvesson has drawn out the connection
between ideology and the instrumentalisation of
organisational culture, given the 'increased need for
ideology' in the reproduction of capitalist organisational
relations. Alvesson gives a reasonably full account of
certain aspects of Marcuse's theoretical legacy, revolving
in particular around the ideas Marcuse explicates in One
Dimensional Man (1964). However neither Knights and
Willmott nor Alvesson relate the developments of a Critical
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Theory of organisations to the cultural, linguistic, and
social psychological dimensions of Marcuse's work. Their
accounts of the significance of the work of Fromm and
Marcuse are not fully developed, and therefore neither is
a theory of the subject. A contribution to its continued
development is what I shall be concerned with below in
chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. In particular, Marcuse's social
psychology offers insights into the operation of power upon
subjectivity. As with Foucauldian 'critical theory', a
failure to fully connect with this theoretical resource
could leave critical organisational theory simply positing
the impact upon the subject of certain organisational
factors, such as ideology, discipline, surveillance and
culture, rather than explaining them.
Critical organisation theorists have in recent years begun
to draw on the work of Habermas (Forester 1985, Mumby 1988,
Alvesson and Willmott 1992, Burrell 1994). Alvesson and
Willmott (1992) argue for the development of what they call
a 'critical management studies'. They argue that management
should be seen as a 'social phenomena' meriting 'serious
critical examination'. They are disillusioned with the
'tunnel-vision' of orthodox, technicist managerial
approaches. They advocate 'sociological, historical,
philosophical and critical study' of management. It is to
Critical Theory in general, and Habermas in particular that
the contributors to this volume turn for this critical
examination, relating to a Habermasian expression of the
concern to renew the emancipatory interest in science. This
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highlights the challenge to the myth of neutrality and
objectivity of management and the 'broadening of the agenda
of management studies'. It includes critical features
through a Critical Theoretical inquiry as one (but not the
only) way in which the agenda of management studies could
be so broadened. Such a Habermasian perspective enables a
critical analysis of 'epistemological issues, notions of
rationality and progress,	 technocracy and social
engineering, autonomy and control, communicative action,
power and ideology' (Alvesson and Willmott. 1992. p.9). In
comparison to this Critical Theory perspective in general,
and the Habermasian perspective in particular, Alvesson and
Willmott see other 'critical' positions such as
Foucauldianism and feminism as, whilst still offering
useful insights, nevertheless, 'limited'. A Habermasian
perspective is applied to various branches of management
studies to discuss the underpinning knowledge-constituting
interests	 within	 management	 science	 disciplines.
Interesting though this research is, it fails to
distinguish between the 'interest' discussed in such a
management community with wider emancipatory interest in
Critical Theory. These are obviously not the same thing.
Such 'critical' managerial studies tend to be very
discipline-oriented in that they provide a history of a
discipline and an account of its underlying rationality.
That is, they do not apply Critical Theory in a very
critical way, as such inquiry tends to still be largely
discourse-centred.
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More critically, Forester (1985, 1992) proposes the
adoption of a Habermasian stance for the development of
what he calls a 'Critical Ethnography' for the fieldwork
study of organisational life. He points out that Habermas
sees the discursive field as a site of power and authority
in a 'thickly layered texture of political struggle'. For
Forester the significance of the work of Habermas is found
in the fact that it highlights much more than instrumental
action and rationality within communication and agency.
Forester emphasises agency within the agency/structure
debate. He goes on to argue that the work found in
Habermas' sociology of communicative action is an
'unrealised potential for concrete social and political
research'. Through detailed analysis of competing and
simultaneous speech-acts and validity-claims obtained from
case-study, Forester uses a Habermasian schema to
critically analyze examples of organisational speech and
action. He argues that this shows how organisational
interaction produces social and political relations which
effect, firstly 'patterns of belief'; secondly 'patterns of
legitimacy', which can indicate a management of consent;
and thirdly 'patterns of status and identity', whereby
individual subjectivity and presentations of the self are
effected.
Forester therefore sees such a discursive field as
operating within, and helping to reproduce a 'practically
and politically bounded rationality'. Within this
rationality, organisational members operate to shape
70
belief, consent, trust and attention, or are subject to
such processes. Forester uses a Habermasian perspective
therefore to highlight the linguistic aspects to the
organisation as a political process. The use of this
Habermasian perspective for a critical account of
communicative interaction in relation to organisational
interests and power is advantageous for Forester, in that
it moves beyond strictly discourse/phenomenologically based
analyses and enables the study of the context of
communicative action as well as its content.
The 'Depth Hermeneutic' using Marcusean Critical
Theoretical constructs for a critical interpretation of the
discourse of (neo)Human Relations discourse developed
below, exhibits similar features to this, and adds to the
full development of the critical analysis of organisational
language. However, Marcuse has a more fully developed
theory of 'affirmative culture' and the 'closing of the
universe of discourse' against which this is set.
Similarly, Mumby (1988) has adopted a Habermasian
perspective in his analysis of power and ideology within
the organisational context, through a focus on
organisational discourse. For Mumby the discursive basis
for power and ideology within organisations proceeds
through organisational culture, symbolism and narrative. He
takes up the basic issue of the analysis of organisations
as cultures, as systems of communication and meaning
formation and relates this to the analysis of 'discourse as
power' (Parker 1992, Parker and Burman 1993). Mumby argues
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that organisational meaning and discourse does not arise
spontaneously, but should be understood as a function of
the uneven power distributions and pursuit of interests
that are '...part of the deep structures of organisational
behaviour'. Mumby argues that in everyday organisational
practices and relations, as rooted in discursive schema,
the individual is signified and constituted as a social
actor through ideologically formed meanings. In this
discursive universe, the interests of the materially and
discursively powerful are presented through the
organisational narrative in such a way as to appear
universal. This Habermasian perspective on the linguistic
analysis of ideology connects with the Marcuse's notion of
the 'language of the totally administered society'
discussed in chapter 5. This contributes to this analysis
by showing in detail how institutions define 'reality'
through their ability to invent or distort linguistic
communication geared towards a sectionally interested form
of the presentation of information (Marcuse 1964, Kellner
1990). Marcuse, Habermas and Mumby have in common a central
proposition, that the structure and maintenance of the
organisational narrative maintains and reproduces certain
ideological meaning formations.
Evidence of this is seen in the increased organisational
concerns with communication (Pondy 1983, Frost 1985,
Alvesson 1993), whereby '...organisational culture has
become a major theoretical rallying point' (Bittner 1965,
Pondy 1983, Hollway 1984, 1991, Frost 1985, Turner 1986,
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Lynn Meek 1988, Alvesson 1990, 1993).
The Critical Theory of this involves the distinction
between on the one hand the managerialist/theoretical
concern with organisational culture geared towards actively
promoting and changing the symbolic communication purveyed
by the organisation so as to promote and change meaning
(Peters and Waterman 1982, Martin 1985, Kropowski 1983,
Kilmann 1985). This approach is rooted in the
technological/instrumental rationality which is the focus
of much of the Frankfurt School critique (Willmott 1993).
On the other hand Mumby identifies is what he calls the
'cultural purist' approach. This view emphasises the
understanding of the formation of organisational culture
and how it is consolidated through symbolism and
communication. This view seems to have much in common with
the basic features of the sociology of knowledge (Mannheim
1936), hermeneutics (Gadamer 1975) and 'social construction
of reality' (Berger and Luckmann 1967) approaches.
Given the above survey we can argue that despite the
application of this specifically Frankfurt School
orientation of a Critical Theory of organisations, this
application is neither as thorough nor as developed as it
could be. To contribute to the interesting work done in
this area so far I wish to develop in subsequent chapters
a fuller account of the Critical Theory for the
extended application to the specifics of (neo)Human
Relations management theory and discourse to reveal its
ideological nature. As already declared, for this
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development I intend to concentrate primarily on the work
of Herbert Marcuse. Firstly Marcuse's work represents what
has been called the 'practical-political' strand within the
Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. This is vital in
that any worthwhile Critical Theory should have as an
immanent feature an alternative vision to the given
condition (Alvesson and Willmott 1992). The work of Marcuse
can be used to articulate the significance of new forms of
organisation and new forms of organisational relations,
although such an account cannot be fully explored here
given constraints upon the length of this thesis. Secondly
the work of Marcuse involves a social psychological
dimension which, in radicalizing the work of Freud, offers
a theoretical resource for a contribution to the deeper
understanding of the social, cultural, linguistic and
psychological dynamics within the group/organisation which
can be the vehicle for ideological reproduction.
However, one last aspect of this survey of the critical
theory of organisations remains. The relationship between
social psychology and a critical theory of organisation,
particularly in terms of the question of culture and
subjectivity is a fertile one. Also, a consideration of
some of this work will enable again to throw into sharper
relief the contribution made to the critical theory of
organisation which the application of the work of Marcuse
can make.
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Social Psychology and Critical Organisation Theory.
As discussed above, one of the major failings of the
Foucauldian perspective on organisations is the lack of any
consistent theoretical analysis of the psychological or
social psychological component of organisational life and
behaviour. The Foucauldian theoretical insights offers
useful analyses of the potential impacting of institutional
structures, practices and knowledges on the individual. But
this perspective asserts this impact, posits that the
relationship between the institution and the individual has
an effect, rather than attempts to fully explain how and
why such effects take place. Moreover, this impacting upon
the individual is effected by not just the structure,
practices and knowledge of the institution, but is also
effected by the interactions between individuals within the
context of the institutional structures. That is, there are
networks of relationships within the group setting which
impact upon the subjectivity of the individual as much as
the formal structures and power-knowledge of the
institution.
For these reasons a fully developed critical theory of the
organisation and the subject should include an exploration
of the significance of psychological and social
psychological theory. In this section I will comment on the
work of some organisational theorists who have usefully
taken up these themes. Such work refers to social
psychology as it contributes to this analysis through
symbolic interactionist, existential social psychology and
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a sociologically oriented psychoanalysis. This point of
inquiry will also relate to a materialist psychology which
attempts to locate interpersonal features of the social
process in the context of the material conditions of
contemporary capitalist society and its institutional
forms. Such inquiry also draws upon group psychology which
points to the social, cultural and psychological dynamics
within the group setting. It can be argued that this
'groupness' is a significant and distinguishing feature of
certain aspects of social and psychological life which
gives such features their defining character.
Whilst such a social psychology contributes to a more
complete critical theory of organisations, no causal
relationships can be gained from such an inquiry. This
relates to the notion of over-determination, that the
reality of social, cultural and group relations is such
that cause and effect logics are inappropriate, and that
several factors can often contribute to a certain piece of
behaviour or interaction.
In connection with the theme of the ideological nature of
organisations, a social psychological analysis is of use in
that it adds an experiential and existential element to the
critical analysis of (neo)Human Relations management, and
the historical emergence of managerial concerns with
subjectivity. An analysis of power and ideology is more
complete if it is partially informed by the analysis of the
experiential changes brought about as a consequence of a
group/organisational setting. In this way organisations can
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be seen as networks of subjects and subjectivities, and
potentially at least, controlled subjectivities. The notion
of ideology as the politicisation of the realm of ideas
relates at the psychological level a politics of
subjectivity. The critical discussion of the intertwined
psychic and cultural processes in organisational relations
and power thus relates back to the notion of ideology, and
'organisations as ideology'.
Group Psychology has contributed to the understanding of
the socio-psychological dynamics raised by the general move
within management away from the purely technical aspects of
work towards the more social and motivational. It
contributes to the understanding of the informal practices
within organisations and the generation of the meanings of
social action over and above the purely material and
pragmatic. The group and the group-mind can be seen as the
vehicle for the culture or sub-culture of the organisation.
We can see that the organisation and the relations therein
form of 'groupness' or 'group-mindedness' (Janis 1972,
1982). Group psychology can be seen as a theoretical
resource for the analysis of the 'mental changes' which
individuals potentially experience due to the impact of the
particular culture of the organisation, as the vehicle
through which the 'group-mindedness' is carried. Within
organisational settings, it is clear that there are
normative tendencies for the initiation of the individual
into a group way of thinking, an internalisation of the
groups norms and values. The hallmarks of a group
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psychological analysis as it refers to the individuals
relation to the organisation are concerns with the
initiation of the individual into the group and the
normative/integrative aspects of this as well as the
identification of the individual with symbolic
representations of the group/organisation culture. An
exhaustive history of group psychology is beyond the scope
of this project, but it is clear that certain theoretical
research findings have implications for the project.
Freud (1921) and Moscovici (1986) have both argued for the
significance of group psychology. Moscovici (1986) and
Grauman and Moscovici (1986) provide something of a history
to the development of group orientations in psychology.
Grauman (1986) points to 'the discovery of the masses' in
the history of psychology and social philosophy, and the
turn to an inquiry into the crowd. According to Moscovici,
this started in the 1930's, with the work of Ortega y
Gassett and Jaspers, and developed within the Freudian
tradition through the work of the Frankfurt School. Freud
(1921) is concerned with three sets of interrelated
questions. Firstly with what a group is, how it is formed,
and what determines the group. Secondly, with how group
membership comes to have a decisive influence over
individual members. Thirdly, and most importantly for
Freud, what are the mental changes which individuals go
through when they become group members. For Freud there is
something about group membership which changes the
behaviour of individuals, certain acts and behaviours occur
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only in the group setting, as the group setting is
characterised by a specific and unique group-mindedness
within which individuality comes to be submerged (Fromm
1941, 1980, Adorno 1969, Hinshelwood 1987). This process is
characterised by a '...sentiment of invincible power', a
'contagion' and a heightened 'suggestibility'. Similar
points have been made about groups and the impact of
groupness on behaviour by non-psychoanalytical traditions
in social psychology (Garfinkel 1967, Janis 1972, 1982,
Brown 1980, Henriques 1984). What these tendencies can
potentially create within the group/organisation is an
increase in irrationalism led by unconscious or
preconscious motivations, and overall a loss of critical
faculties on the part of the group to distinguish between
reality and a self-generated falsehood.
A further important and fertile aspect of what group
psychology provides to the general theme of the
relationship between the individual and the organisation,
as well as the management of the individual subjectivity,
is found in the use of the concept of the super-ego as it
is developed within the psychoanalytic tradition. It is
instructive to use the super-ego as a metaphor for the
development of group norms, for the initiation of the
individual into group norms so as to avoid social
sanctions, and for the development of a group culture
around various normative aspects. For Freud this was
facilitated in group terms through the emotional
identification of the individual with the group or leaders
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of the group. Elias (1982) has shown, at a very general
macro-historical level that this relationship between the
self and civilisation has a tendency towards the repression
of the autonomous self. Elias' work relates to the earlier
work of Freud (1921, 1930) in the sense that both attempt
to articulate the internal features of the civilising
process and its repressive impact upon the autonomous
being. Elias, along with Freud thus helps us to articulate
the macro-historical context for the more specific
development of a 'voluntary compliance' and social
constraints over and above the more Foucauldian notion of
'anticipatory compliance' (Foucault 1977). Elias shows that
this process develops through the conversion of material
and physical constraints into self-constraint due to the
specifically social nature of communal life. The
relationship between this notion and socio-political
features of social/organisational interaction is explored
during the detailed exposition of the work of Marcuse in
chapter 4.
This orientation contributes to the analysis of the socio-
cultural dynamic within the organisation. Firstly this adds
insight to the notion that organisations are made up of
interpersonal aspects over and above the purely structural
features. Secondly, such insights enable a contribution to
a critical analysis of management's attempt to control such
informal, psychological and motivational processes.
Management may not theorise what it is they do, but adopt
a practical, instrumental orientation to organisational
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'groupness' and culture. However such a social
psychological account can provide insights as to how such
cultures may operate upon the individual.
Group Psychology and Organisational Theory.
Group psychology as specifically applied to the study of
organisations has a fertile history. Brown (1980) has
argued for the 're-discovery of the group in
organisations'. She explores that the way individuals act
specifically in their organisational life is at least
partially due to their adoption of standards of behaviour,
expectations, perceptions and internalised notions of
'correctness' developed within the group. This highlights
the nature of the 'belonging needs' (Maslow 1970) of
individuals and points to the potential for the control
over normative aspects of behaviour, given the potential
for the control over group norms and membership. What Brown
is in part implying is the same social psychological
process identified in (neo)Human Relations managerial
theory for the design of strategies of control. The
potential to control the facility of individuals to meet
these 'belonging needs' brings with it an aspect of
normative control, put in more radical terms, the ability
to manipulate the potential of individuals to meet their
(belonging) needs coincides with ideology.
Schaaf and Fassel (1990) talk of the 'Addictive
Organisation' where they apply social psychological
thinking for an analysis of the particularly novel effects
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organisations can have upon the mental state of
individuals. They deal with the notion that individuals can
become 'addicted' to the organisation, and in this sense
'neurotic', as they subsume their self and individuality
into organisational (that is group) behaviour. Schaaf and
Fassel point to organisations in which the 'key person' is
an addict. This stems from the assertion that organisations
tend to take on the characteristics of leaders, and they
extend this notion into the idea that the personality of
the 'key' person sets the tone for the organisation. Schaaf
and Fassel also point to the development of 'the
organisation as the addictive substance'. This situation
thus becomes such that the life of the individual feels
incomplete without the organisation, and other aspects of
life lose their significance in comparison. They argue that
the 'promise' of the organisation (which implies normative
and ideological appeals made to the individual), becomes
something that the individual becomes 'hooked on', all of
which brings normative pressures to bear.
Janis (1972, 1982) is one of the best known theorists who
have taken up group psychological insights and applied them
specifically to organisations. Janis focuses on the group,
and on 'groupthink', as the explanation for organisational
pathology. Echoing Le Bon and Freud, Janis argues that the
group orientation which can effect organisational processes
is characterised by 'temporary states of elation, fear, or
anger that reduce a person's mental efficiency; chronic
blind spots arising from a person's social prejudices;
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shortcomings in information-processing that prevent a
person from comprehending 	 , (Janis 1972. p.2). Due to
this Janis identifies the group and 'group contagion' as
the potential origin of a 'group madness'; 'mindless
conformity and collective misjudgment'; 'excessive risk-
taking'; 'conformity to group norms'. Thus Janis refers to
his notion of 'groupthink' which exhibits these
characteristics as '...a mode of thinking that people
engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-
group, when members' striving for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of
action' (Janis 1972. p.9).
Janis, in his case-studies of organisational pathology
highlights the effects of group mindedness. We can see how
such a groupness has normative influences and impacts upon
subjectivity. Because of this normative aspect, the
development of a more critical social psychology and its
application to a critical organisation theory needs to take
on board such a group psychology orientation. This is
especially the case when the critical focus is an ideology-
critique of the technicist attempts to generate a
managerially controlled sense of 'groupness', to facilitate
normative effects commensurate with managerial interests.
Janis refers to 'groupthink' as universally pathological,
as 'a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing
and moral judgement...', but it is also clear that it can
culminate in a loss of critical faculties which negates
critical thinking.
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A Critical Social Psychology of Organisations.
Some organisational theorists have taken up this critical
theme in interpersonal social psychology and symbolic
interactionism (Goffman 1969). This connects with the
question of power, the self and others and 'collusion'
(Laing 1967, 1971). This also has a resonance with the
analysis of the fate of subjectivity in 'modernity'
(Giddens 1991, Beck 1992). A critical social psychology of
organisations moves away from what Salaman (1980) has
called the 'psychologism' of orthodox accounts of
subjectivity in organisation theory. 'Psychologism' is
premised upon the notion that the organisational structures
and processes are neutral and that subjectivity is formed
within this neutral arena. Critical theories of
organisation in general, and critical social psychological
accounts of organisations and subjectivity share a common
rejection of this purported neutrality. Sennett and Cobb
(1972) and Thompson and McHugh (1990) are concerned to
understand how individuals manage their presentation of the
self and the consequences of this presentation within the
context of a class society. Such views show how poverty and
the experiences of poverty have an impact on the
perceptions of the self and can undermine the capacity for
the control of self and self presentation. Sennett and Cobb
found in their research that those with experience of
poverty and low status often compensate with an exaggerated
concern with presentations of the self through signs of
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status and social mobility. Outward presentations of the
self can combine with a deference to those perceived of as
having a higher status. Whilst the self is active in
constructing the self, there is a tendency to do so in the
context of the acceptance of background features such as
inequality and meritocracy, and a tendency towards self-
blame as to the experiences and positions of inequality and
hierarchy. Given the material position of the individual,
the maintenance of the presentation of the self is
problematic and there is an increased tendency to
demonstrate and maintain a notion of self-worth in the
perceptions of others. This tends to become translated into
conformity, fatalism, 'depoliticisation', as well as self-
blame. The concern with the presentation of the self thus
tends to become translated into conformity within a mass or
group orientation. The self is constructed through
interpersonal relations and through attention to the
perceptions that others have of the self. Due to the
capitalist organisation of society and its class/status
division, identity formation and maintenance is made more
problematic. Due to this tendency the creation of self
comes to revolve around a defensiveness in relation to
others. It is these features which Sennett and Cobb refer
to as the 'hidden injuries of class'.
Several organisation theorists (Knights and Willmott 1985,
Willmott 1986, Knights and Willmott 1990, Collinson 1992)
discuss subjectivity and its production in relation to
organisational power, seeing organisational power as
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influencing subjectivity which in turn can consolidate
relations of power. They adopt a critical stance towards
the mainstream instrumentalist version of the organisation-
subjectivity relationship which focuses upon efficiency
criteria. They also criticise organisational psychology for
its failure to examine the question of subjectivity in
relation to material conditions in organisations. Collinson
(1992) in particular argues that despite the centrality of
subjectivity for organisational practices, it continues to
be ignored by much of organisational theory, whose focus
tends to be more on structure and procedure.
Knights and Willmott (1985, 1990), and Collinson (1992)
focus on an inquiry into subjectivity and organisational
analysis which is concerned with how subjects search for
'material and symbolic' security and positive presentations
of the self in a precarious organisational existence.
Knights and Willmott (1985, 1990) and Willmott (1986) are
critical of both 'structural' theories of power as well as
those theories of power which relate the dynamics of social
relations to a universalised theory of power and the
creation of a social order. Instead they argue that an
adequate theory of power, and the power-laden nature of
organisations, should relate to 'contemporary developments
in the theory of identity'. As part of this development,
Knights and Willmott start with reference to Berger and
Luckmann (1967) and the notion that social existence and
identity is constructed along an axis of powerfulness and
powerlessness. Here Knights and Willmott turn to Giddens'
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notion of a 'dialectic of control', whereby compliance to
such a situation coincides with the creation of 'identity-
damaging disciplinary controls'. For Willmott (1986) a
critical social psychology of identity involves a rejection
of the agency-structure dualism. As Giddens argues, this
structuration theory recognises that '....structure...as
implicated in power relations, and power relations as
implicated in structure' (Giddens 1979. p.91). In this way
the mutually effective relationship between power and
identity can be seen.
This has two immediate consequences which are either
implicit or explicit in the development of the general
theme of this thesis. Firstly the power-laden context of
identity formation, the 'existential' needs of the
individual and management's ability to partially control
this process amounts to the manipulation of these needs and
their satisfaction. This has normative as well as practical
consequences and stands in parallel with the more ideology-
centred arguments. Secondly, given what Knights and
Willmott argue, we can see that 'existential resources' are
vital for the maintenance and construction of an identity,
in the symbolic or material sense. This question of
resources for the meeting of 'existential' needs is also
something I shall return to below. In this way Knights and
Willmott argue for greater attention to be paid to the
'material conditions of identity formation', and they
criticise both Berger and Luckmann (1967), and Goffman
(1969) for a relative lack of such attention. 'Existential'
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resources such as time, space, effective control over one's
practical life-decisions and 'convivial technology' can be
seen as aspects of the 'material conditions' for a more
autonomous identity.
Collinson (1992) points to the contradictory nature of
subjectivity, characterised as a 'dual experience'.
Identity oscillates between the poles of self and group
membership, concerns with material survival and self-
expression, autonomy and alienation. In this way Collinson
attempts to express the complex nature of identity and its
over-determined nature, stemming from a critical approach
which locates subjectivity within power-laden context of
the organisation. Through his emphasis upon anxiety
avoidance and the seeking of security, Collinson discusses
the 'subjective motivation' which propel individuals to
engage in 'discursive practices'. He goes on to argue that
the focus on subjectivity within the organisational setting
leads to an explanation of how 'security seeking' behaviour
can lead to the reinforcement of control, in that the
fulfilment of the individuals needs for 'security' can be
manipulated by management. There are echoes of the work of
Fromm (1941) and Marcuse (1966, 1970) here. If for instance
the individual attempts to gain security from group
membership, this can be 'self-defeating' as the group, or
the management of group processes, becomes the arbiter of
'security'. The individual correspondingly looses autonomy.
Collinson, and Thompson and McHugh (1990) analyze
subjectivity in a way which moves away from what he
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considers to be orthodox organisational theory's idealist
treatment of subjectivity, to one which emphasises the
'political and material basis' of power inequalities and
their impact upon subjectivity.
Thompson (Salaman and Thompson 1980), Salaman (1979, 1980)
and Thompson and McHugh (1990) have discussed such
'subjective factor(s)' of the organisation, posited
'organisations as constructions of social reality', and as
such the 'reality' of an organisation is not fixed. This
interpretative/phenomenological stance approaches
organisational 'reality' through an inquiry into the
perceptions of members. Such a view points to the
construction of organisational 'reality' by participants
employing shared rationalities and logics. In this way
Thompson goes on to discuss the ideological nature of the
instrumental or technological rationality (logic-in-use)
which directs the management of the social construction
process.
Thus Thompson uses this 'social construction of reality'
argument to politicise the routinisation of the everyday
referred to by Berger and Luckmann and to relate this
process to the ideological self-legitimation of sectional
interest within the organisation. In this way Thompson also
echoes both Burawoy (1979) and Edwards' (1979) work within
Labour Process Theory, as discussed above. Thompson refers
to organisational power and control, given its impact upon
individual subjectivity and the construction of a
'reality', as an '...over-arching ideas system', and an
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'unobtrusive control', which echoes Marcuse's (1964) notion
of 'new forms of control', discussed in detail in chapter
5. This focuses upon the culture of organised reality which
develops into a taken-for-grantedness. This emphasises the
social psychological effects of culture, as organisations
come to define 'reasonableness, create news and
information, give authority to definitions of 'necessity',
and thus in this way also come to define and shape a
'reality' which impacts upon the perceptions of the
individual subject.
What these views point to is the 'negotiated self' as the
result of 'rationalised performances', and due to the
interactive, socially constructed versions of self,
subjectivity can be seen to be partially created by the
'social and cultural groupings' within which this
negotiation occurs. Thompson and McHugh (1990) refer to the
organisation as a specific social site which can have an
impact upon identity in that the resources available to the
individual given their position and 'structural power
within the organisation' will differ. They point out that
the structured position of individuals within the
organisation restrains identity formation as the
organisation forms the contextual backdrop for identity.
Within capitalist organisations this context is one of
fragmented, commodified relations and decentred work.
Therefore this context of work organisations will have
these effects upon identity, leading to the fragmentation,
distortion and dehumanisation of interpersonal relations
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within orthodox work organisations, implying an alienation.
Thompson and McHugh discuss the question of subjectivity in
relation to the instrumentalist approach within management.
They refer to this aspect of management as 'technologies of
regulation', developed historically through occupational
psychology and sociology. 'At its most visible level, this
process can be seen in the internalisation of the norms and
accepted standards of behaviour in workgroups which occurs
in organisational socialisation' (Thompson and McHugh 1990.
p.294).
Thompson and McHugh discuss the role of the 'organisational
psychologist' in relation to the ideological reproduction
of 'suitable' organisational relations and behaviour at the
normative level, and as a 'specialist helper' offering a
'therapeutic' solution to the problems of labour
management. In this way Thompson and McHugh echo Marcuse's
discussion of the 'therapeutic' nature of one dimensional
rationality and its control-orientation, discussed in
chapter 7. They also corroborate critical histories of
(neo)Human Relations management (Baritz 1974, Hollway's
1991) as stemming from instrumental control-orientations.
To summarise the position adopted by critical social
psychology as applied to organisations, Willmott (1986)
argues,
...critical social theory must penetrate the
existential as well as structural sources of
alienation. Only then can it understand why, when
dominated by the fear of freedom, the oppressed
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may prefer the security of conformity with their
state of unfreedom to the creative communion
produced by freedom. Oppression is sustained by
anxiety associated with human freedom as well as
by exploitative relations of production and
consumption. Dissolving the illusion of security
based upon a dualistic, egoistic mode of
awareness is as much a condition for realising
fully human relations as is the removal of
structured inequality. (Willmott 1986. p.118).
Here it is apparent that Willmott is turning to the work of
Fromm (Fromm 1941, 1961, 1965, see also Knights and
Willmott 1982). It is the development of this Critical
Theoretical stance for a social psychology of
(organisational) subjectivity found in the work of Marcuse
that I shall discuss in chapter 4. Such a critical social
psychology contributes to a critical theory of organisation
in that it relates subjective features to material aspects
of capitalist organisations and relations (Marcuse 1966.
Also Habermas 1971b, Seve 1978, Fromm 1980, Litchman 1982,
Leonard 1984, Lodziak 1988, 1990, 1994, Zizek 1989). The
work of the Frankfurt School highlights a humanist Marxist
philosophical stance which is concerned with an inquiry
into subjectivity, individual needs, relations with others,
creative intentionality and the development of personality
within the specific historical and material context of
industrial capitalism. The synthesis of the works of
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Marxism and Freudianism provide a fruitful route for the
development a critical analysis of human subjects who are
active in the creation of the self which occurs in and
through the active creation/reproduction of structures of
domination (Fromm 1941, 1980, Marcuse 1966, Adorno 1969,
Habermas 1971b, Larrain 1979, Lichtman 1982, Zizek 1989).
Without providing a fully developed account of the history
of this synthesis, nor of the many varied interpretations
of the thorny theoretical and philosophical issues it
presents, I shall turn to a detailed account of one
representative of this tradition, namely Herbert Marcuse in
the next chapter.
This is because firstly I feel Marcuse provides the most
fully developed account of the theoretical fertility of the
Freudian legacy which not only relates to the existential
aspects touched upon above, but also to the ideological and
political aspects alluded to. Secondly Marcuse's work on
Freud stands in relation to his legacy as a whole, which is
also considered in detail below, which provides a
convincing account of other technological, cultural and
ideological aspects for a developed critical theory of
organisations. Thirdly the work of Marcuse, because it
stems from a strand within the Frankfurt School more
committed to social change and the 'practical political'
(Kellner 1991), can be used to inform the development of
theories of potential new organisational forms. Any
'negative critique' should I feel have within it the
potential for the development of alternative social,
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economic and political organisations. The work of Marcuse
has this. It is for these reasons that the work of Marcuse,
taken as a whole offers more potential for the development
of a Critical Theory of organisations than other Frankfurt
School representatives, and it is with these aspects in
mind that I turn to a detailed inquiry into the potential
for this theoretical development, and for a contribution to
the Critical Theory of organisations in chapters 4, 5, 6
and 7.
Summary.
The sentiments which inform this chapter can be summarised
by what Burrell and Morgan (1979) identify as the 'radical
humanist paradigm' in organisational analysis. This
involves the critique of orthodox organisational theory and
practice; the explication of the potential for new
organisational forms; and its relation to the expansion of
individual autonomy within organisations. At the heart of
this is the critique of the political and ideological
nature of orthodox organisations as well as a contribution
to the understanding of alternative organisation forms and
cultures. This 'radical humanism' differs from a purely
interpretative view of socially and culturally constructed
organisational reality in that it posits a dialectical
relationship between subjective phenomena and an objective
material reality. The 'radical humanist paradigm' subjects
the objective features of the historically contingent
material reality of any epoch to a critique. For instance,
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humanist Marxism attempts to develop an understanding of
the human, subjective and cultural features of contemporary
society as they relate to the specific objective, material
conditions which characterise capitalism. It is this
component of the 'radical humanist paradigm' which
underpins the critique developed in subsequent chapters.
Specifically, the critique of (neo)Human Relations
management as it attempts to control cultural and
subjective aspects of existence as they exist within
capitalist organisations. For Burrell and Morgan (1979) the
'underlying unity' of the 'radical humanist paradigm' of
organisation theory stems from a common concern with human
freedom and autonomy, involving a critique of ideological
distortions of human consciousness within the historical
and social conditions of capitalist formations. Much of the
impetus for the development of the 'radical humanist
paradigm' lies in the critique of the instrumental interest
in administering social and cultural relations. Thus a
central theme within this is a critique of the
technological and instrumental rationality which informs
such an underlying functionalism. The specific data-base
for this critique of instrumentalism and technological
rationality is the managerial attempt to operationalise the
subjective, human factors of organisational relations, and
the development of technologies within management to
administer the human and subjective 'component' of work.
As a preliminary to this, and to throw into sharper relief
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its basic trajectory, this chapters has been concerned with
a survey of some of the salient aspects of developments in
the critical theory of organisations. It has surveyed
developments within Foucauldian, (neo)Marxist and
(critical) social psychological perspectives. It becomes
clear that the question of the relation between
organisational power and subjectivity is of central
importance to all three perspectives. A critical analysis
of managerial and 'disciplinary' strategies highlights the
power-oriented nature of these formulations. Another aspect
of this is the technocratic and positivistic nature of
managerialist control strategies, the self-consciously
instrumental approaches that management as a specifically
capitalistically oriented profession takes in dealing with
power related imperatives, and the underlying material
contexts of many of these institutional and commercial
technologies. This raises questions as to the relationship
between the Foucauldian tradition and Marxism in general,
and to Critical Theory in particular (Gordon 1979, Smart
1983, Poster 1984, Miller 1987, Dews 1989). My intention
has been to highlight the significance for a 'fully
comprehensive' critical theory of organisations that the
work of Marcuse has, from both social and social
psychological theory.
Whilst existent critical theory of organisations (Alvesson
and Willmott 1993) criticise the technocratic orientation
of orthodox management, they do themselves demonstrate a
failure to be 'fully comprehensive', in that their version
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of Critical Theory does not develop into a thoroughgoing
critique of capitalism and tends towards a discipline-
oriented account of the history of various management
theory specialisms. As I have tried to show, a more
thorough-going Critical Theory of organisations would
involve a radical account of the reorganisation of the
material and political aspects of the socio-economic
relations which are labelled 'the organisation'; it would
offer alternatives, challenge the existence of 'the
organisation' as a reified entity and tend towards the
negation of management as a separate specialist function
(Gorz 1983, 1989).
The survey of critical organisation theory from
Foucauldian, (neo)Marxist and (critical) social
psychological perspectives shows the contribution that a
Marcusean analysis can make. Marcuse's work adds insight to
the lacunae found in the above mentioned perspectives. His
work adds to Foucauldian insights in that it includes a
social psychology to more fully explain the operation of
power upon the subject rather than simply asserting an
influence. However, Marcuse's work adds to social
psychology in that it adds a materialist element which




material/group/political contexts. As we shall see below,
Marcuse's works adds insight into the theory of power which
takes account of cultural, symbolic, technological and
linguistic elements. The Habermasian focus on discourse is
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extended through a Marcusean analysis of the power of
language set against a broader and deeper theory of
'affirmative culture'. All this contributes to the fuller
development of a theory of the subject in organisational
studies.
All this implies that the concept of ideology is one of
central importance. It is one which is at the heart of the
Critical Theory of Marcuse and humanist Marxism in general.
However the concept of ideology is a notoriously slippery
one, and some clarification of the way I intend to use the
concept seems in order. It is therefore necessary to
respond to both the epistemological challenges to the
Critical Theory/Marxist position in general (often labelled
as the 'modernist' position), and to various theoretical
discussions of ideology to both arrive at a clarification,
and to attempt to overcome some of the epistemological
problems inherent in the development of a thesis which has
the notion of ideology central to it. Given the
epistemological 'confession' in chapter 1, I shall now turn
to a discussion more specifically applied to the concept of
ideology. This will include theoretical clarification, an
operationalised concept of ideology and a methodology for
its application in concrete social inquiry. I will attempt
to show in subsequent chapters how such an inquiry holds
relevance for the development of a Critical Theory of
organisation. However, before this more substantive element
of inquiry, it is the aforementioned theoretical
clarification and epistemological discussion that I turn.
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CHAPTER 3.
IDEOLOGY:	 CONCEPTUALISATION, OPERATIONALISATION AND
RESEARCH STRATEGY. 
The Concept of Ideology.
Whilst the notion of ideology, and in particular a
'dominant ideology thesis' which enshrines mechanistic,
deterministic and 'ideology-centred' views of social
reproduction is problematic, it nevertheless holds
potential for illuminating critical inquiry (Abercrombie
1980, Lodziak 1988, Mann 1986).
This chapter will not attempt to come up with a single
definition of the concept of ideology across all
theoretical traditions. It will not consider the work of
all the writers who have written on the subject. It will
however express the way I intend to use the central concept
of ideology. It will also attempt to offer a research
strategy and an operationalisation of the concept of
ideology to enable a critical conception of it to be
applied to the empirical analysis of (neo)Human Relations
management discourse. The discussion of the concept,
inevitably abstract though it is, will be thus related to
preparing the conceptual ground for a more concrete account
of management discourse advanced below.
We can begin a process of clarification of the use of the
concept of ideology with a basic demarcation between
'liberal/neutral' and 'critical/Marxist' versions (Thompson
1984). The liberal (neutral) conceptualisation sees
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ideology as relating to the shared ideas and values of a
particular group, class, political movement etc. This
conception also refers to the ability to articulate a
particular ideology. However this conception is not the one
which is referred to here. I intend to concentrate upon the
more critical (largely Marxist) discussions of ideology.
The conceptualisation of ideology to be developed here will
be the one developed from within humanist or 'Western
Marxism'. An exhaustive discussion of the more general
Marxist conception of ideology is beyond the scope of this
essentially methodological chapter. (For a general
theoretical/historical account of the development of a
Marxist conception of ideology see Larrain 1979, 1983,
McCarney 1980, 1989, Thompson 1984). It seems more apposite
to express a version of the conceptualisation of ideology
as it relates to a potential contribution to the
development of a critical theory of organisations.
Individuals engage in productive activity are thus engaged
in definite social and political relations. These relations
and the structures which reproduce them are linked to the
material reality of production. The nature of ideas and
consciousness are effected by these material conditions.
Mental activity is dialectically related to material
activity as the two opposites interpenetrate and inform
each other within the reproduction of the social totality
(Fromm 1972, The Frankfurt School 1973). Such an approach
is based on the premise that actual social and economic
practice is the beginning of historical investigation of
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definite human practices which occur within definite
historical conditions. Thus, given this dialectical
materialism, Marxism resists the positivist/empiricist
fascination with 'dead facts' as well as the German
Idealist concern with 'imagined subjects'. The Marxist
conceptualisation of ideology is fundamentally based upon
the rejection of views which falsely separate the reality
of material conditions from the purported 'realism' of
purely scholastic endeavour. This is the politico-
epistemology for the subsequent development of the
discussion of ideology which I shall explore, and in
subsequent chapters use for a critical analysis of the
concrete nature of (neo)Human Relations management
discourse and organisational power relations.
The sense of the critical concept of ideology is found
through the critical analysis of the functioning of ideas
in the reproduction of the material and power-laden
relations which make up this socio-historical context.
Critical Theory developed this concept in relation to their
critique of scientism, the metaphysical faith in the
scientific approach to knowledge and technological
applications, which eventually assumes power over social
and cultural relations rather than being guided by social
needs (Marcuse 1955, 1964, Adorno 1976, Adorno and
Horkheimer 1979). For the Frankfurt School, the notion that
some version of 'objectivity' can be the antidote to
ideology becomes problematic. Scientific 'objectivism'
itself comes to be ideological as the 'reason' of The
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Enlightenment becomes its own opposite (Adorno and
Horkheimer 1979). It is this dialectic and the 'abdication
of reason' to which Marcuse refers when he discusses the
'one dimensional' nature of 'technological rationality' and
positivism (Marcuse 1964).
A specific case of this general point concerning the
ideological nature of 'objective' knowledge production
through scientism is discussed by Parekh (1982) in relation
to the ideological nature of classical economics. Parekh
argues that classical economics can be seen as scientific,
in that it is the study of social and material relations
and not just the study of abstract ideas; it attempts to
study the essence of economics and political relations,
rather than just describes the surfaces of appearances; it
is not 'base', but attempts to be 'honest', 'impartial' and
'disinterested'. However, whilst such classical economic
inquiry can in these terms be seen as 'scientific', it is
also 'bourgeois' according to Parekh. Classical economics
operates totally from within a pre-established world-view
which has politico-economic consequences. This point
parallels the analysis below and forms part of the basis
for arguing that the managerialist science and technologies
geared towards the modification of the organisational
subject is similarly ideological. Parekh argues that
classical economics is 'bourgeois' in the sense that it
studies economic life from within the bounds of the
bourgeois horizon and is '... prisoner of the capitalist
standpoint' (Parekh 1982). This means that classical
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economics looked upon the capitalist economy and society in
a way which absolutises, universalises and dehistoricises
it.
According to Parekh, bourgeois classical economics sees
capitalism and its socio-economic relations as being the
culmination of the best elements of its predecessors, as it
'frees' labour, capital, exchange and so on.
Whilst classical economics may in this way demonstrate an
'impartiality', in the sense that it adopts rigorous
standards of inquiry and applies such impartial standards
to all avenues of research, the content of these standards
of inquiry are formally biased. They are formally biased in
the sense that such an outlook becomes a closed world-view
where the assumptions about the universality of the
particular nature of the economy as capitalist are already
and always present before specific inquiry. Put more
prosaically, only certain types of questions are asked by
classical economy, and therefore only certain answers are
demonstrated. In this way classical economics is
ideological in its very scientificity, in that it
'...dehistoricies the present and arrests history. They
(bourgeois economists) dismissed the past, foreclosed the
future and eternalised the present'. (Parekh 1982. p. 82).
As I hope to demonstrate below, this same notion of
bourgeois, capitalist-oriented social research as evidence
of ideology can be applied to the innate managerialism of
(neo)Human Relations theory. Both exhibit this self-
limiting and partial view of what it is they are studying.
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As will be demonstrated below, (neo)Human Relations
management theory assumes a particular, limited view of the
nature of the capitalist production process and the power
relations involved as the universalised site for
specifically organisational relations of power within the
reified organisational context. Similar to classical
economics, such managerialist theory routinely ignores the
total pattern of relations of production in a wider sense,
and fails to set their theories within a specific
historical context.
This relates to a key feature of the Marxist
conceptualisation of ideology, the notion of ideology as
the illusory mediation of contradictions inherent in the
material organisation of society and the existential
aspects of life within such material conditions. Larrain
(1979, 1983) provides an extended exposition of the
historical development of the Marxist conceptualisation of
ideology which is related to this point. Larrain argues
that Marx developed his theory of ideology in relation to
the more general philosophical discussion of the
relationship between consciousness and objective material
reality. As we have seen, this philosophical discussion
proceeded largely in response to the idealism of German
philosophy. Of the Marxist conceptualisation of the
relationship between consciousness and material reality,
Larrain writes,
...what seems to be the objective reality is by
no means a pure datum, on the contrary it is to
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be understood as the historical product of man's
(sic) practice.... the subject-object relation
becomes neither a relation of mere contemplation
of an external objective reality nor a relation
of ideal creation of reality, but a relation
mediated by practice (Larrain 1979. p. 40).
Thus Larrain expresses the materialist dialectic which
underpins the Marxist conception of ideology. The nature of
capitalist relations imbues such 'practice' with a
particular and contradictory character. The development of
the capitalist material practice and the corresponding
organisation of the social and the economic is based at one
and the same time on the active involvement of creative
humanity and the simultaneous exploitation and repression
of that potential for creative self-expression. Given this
basic contradictory nature of the capitalist material
organisation of society, an illusory 'mediation' of these
contradictions in the realm of ideas is necessary for the
reproduction of these 'practical' relations. As Larrain
puts it,
As contradictions emerge and reach consciousness
before men (sic) can solve them in practice, they
are given distorted solutions in the mind..., as
men in their reproductive practice are unable to
solve these contradictions, they project them in
ideological forms of consciousness. Ideology is,
therefore, a solution in the mind to
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contradiction which cannot be solved in practice;
it is the necessary projection in consciousness
of man's practical inabilities (Larrain 1979. p.
46).
A very clear and concise example of this practical
contradiction and the attempt to 'solve' these
contradictions in the realm of ideas is found in the
specifics of (neo)Human Relations management. On the one
hand we see historically the deskilling of work, the
hierarchisation of power relations and exploitative nature
of wage-labour relations due to the logical development of
capitalist organisational forms. This stands in
contradiction with, on the other hand the managerial
imperative of ensuring in practice the active involvement
of the subject in their work and a demonstration of
commitment and initiative. This is evidenced by the
ideological nature of the management function as a whole,
and by the more intense ideological function of normative
aspects of the (neo)Human Relations management of
organisational relations and culture. This can be seen in
the attempt to create a 'solution' in the mind by
initiating a sense of identification with ones work, or
more probably with the social, social psychological and
cultural relations found in the workplace. It is this
definition of ideology which will be used in the critical
empirical inquiry made specific to (neo)Human Relations
management theory developed below.
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Thompson (1990) offers something of a summary of the
Marxist conceptualisation of ideology which relates to this
basic notion. Thompson also provides a useful schema which
we might use to extrapolate an operationalised version of
the concept for application in empirical study of
(neo)Human Relations management. He argues that the basic
features of the concept of ideology relate to the
understanding of the conditions under which societies in
general, and capitalist society in particular sustain and
reproduce themselves, in spite of their recognisably
negative features such as exploitation and poverty. This
basic formulation relates an ideology-critique to
mechanisms which secure this socio-economic reproduction.
Thus Thompson's (1990) schema suggests an analysis of;
1. The reproduction of shared values and beliefs through
the provision of 'symbolic forms' which help to create
'normative rules and conventions'. This tends towards,
2. Securing the adherence of individuals to the social
order. The analysis below is a concrete example of the way
in which this process may happen, through the study of
organisations as ideological systems which have normative
effects upon the individual. This connects with;
3. The activities of institutions (the State) in producing
and diffusing 'the dominant ideology'.
However, this 'dominant ideology thesis' is open to
criticism (Abercrombie 1980, Lodziak 1988).
The view of ideology proposed here falls somewhere between
the 'strong' and 'weak' conceptions discussed by
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Abercrombie et al. (1980), seeing the tendency towards
greater cultural uniformity and ideological consolidation
by the ruling class, whilst also recognising the potential
for resistance and ideological breakdown. The notion of a
dialectic of potential futures, a dialectic of subject and
object, lived contradictions and counter-veiling tendencies
is taken seriously here (Marcuse 1955, Marckovic 1974,
Sayers 1985, Oilman 1993).
Abercrombie et al. (1980) have argued against what they
have called this 'Dominant Ideology Thesis' as a set of
theories which proceeds through an exaggerated emphasis on
ideology, which thereby privileges it as a concept over
other theories of power and social reproduction.
Abercrombie et al, argue that there is the need for more
empirical analysis of the content, effects, generation and
reception of ideology. The analysis developed below offers
one example of this. They also argue that the existence and
impact of ideology cannot be read off simply from the
production of ideology itself (Mann 1986). Nor, they argue,
can ideology be read off from the mere existence of a
particular class. This, for Abercrombie et al. raises
questions of 'evidence and methodology' to which we shall
return in more detail below.
Abercrombie et al. argue that 'dominant ideology thesis'
approaches fail to 'specify the institutional mechanisms',
and detail the 'origins of a dominant ideology'. This is
also something which I hope to do through the development
of the thesis, by focusing on the specific institutional
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site as a site of ideological generation, and by attempting
to detail its content and attempted impact upon the
individual/group within the organisation. I hope to show
that there is at least the tendency, given the specific
developments of (neo)Human Relations management towards the
developments which Abercrombie et al. identify as central
indicators of ideology. The fact that I argue that there
are tendencies for these developments does not mean that I
fully accept the existence of a 'dominant ideology', partly
as I do not fully accept Abercrombie et al's interpretation
of the theoretical discussions of ideology. This is for the
following reason.
As part of their critique of the 'dominant ideology
thesis', and its ideology-centredness, Abercrombie et al.
focus on 'economic compulsion' (see also Lodziak 1988), as
a form of social reproduction and a source of cohesion of
a class society. In part this 'economic compulsion'
involves 'possession' of economic resources which implies
'control over a specific labour process'. It is central to
the thesis developed below that such 'control', whilst
being economically grounded and commercially motivated at
the level of the organisation, also includes a normative,
that is to say an ideological element. As I hope to show in
detail, (neo)Human Relations management increasingly
involves an ideological component geared towards
integration of the individual into the labour process, as
well as the technical/managerial reproduction of the labour
process as such through overt forms of control. This is the
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'voluntarism' referred to in chapter 2. The lack of detail
and nuance in Abercrombie et al's attempt to construct a
theory of 'economic compulsion' through reference to the
labour process only goes to show how important the concept
of ideology still is for a critical appraisal of the
capitalist labour process, organisational relations and the
managerial techniques of control. Indeed Abercrombie et al.
write that it is '...possible to see control by management
over the worker as a fundamental process, if not the
fundamental economic process of capitalism' (Abercrombe et
al. 1980 p.162). They seem to see this as a source of
critique for a focus on ideology, but it is precisely the
opposite given a recognition of the developments in
managerial technologies of control over the cultural and
normative spheres and the tendency towards 'new forms of
control' (Marcuse 1964) which are exhibited by modern
management.
The 'possession' and control of resources by management
gives them authority, according to Abercrombie et al, but
they argue it needs to be explained why 'authority is
accepted'. Again the analysis of the normative, cultural,
that is ideological aspects of management strategy offers
at least a contribution to this explanation. Again, this
analysis should be seen in the context of tendencies, and
not an argument for the 'dominant ideology thesis' as such.
It will not be argued that such ideological managerial
projects are in any way 'complete'. The analysis of
ideology stands in a dialectical relationship to the
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development of resistance.
In turning to the question of 'acceptance' Mann (1986) has
made a distinction between 'normative' and 'pragmatic'
acceptance of ideology. Normative acceptance being the
inculcation of the belief in the veracity, 'naturalness'
and universality of a particular world-view imposed in the
interests of the reproduction and maintenance of power.
Normative acceptance implies the integration of the
individual into the particular belief system. On the other
hand, pragmatic acceptance refers to the acceptance of the
consequences of a system of belief and action whilst not an
internalisation of the beliefs as such. Pragmatic
acceptance does not imply the integration of the individual
into the belief system, but refers to the individual 'going
along with it'. This variable is a useful one, and will
inform the later operationalisation of a working concept of
ideology for empirical inquiry.
In a wider sense, the acceptance of a 'reality', the
'reality' of everyday life, has been theorised from a
phenomenological direction by Berger and Luckmann (1967).
They have pointed to how the routines of the everyday are
accepted as 'normal', due to the very fact that they are
everyday, and as such are not contested. Berger and
Luckmann have thus pointed to the 'solidity' of everyday
life as a reason it is accepted as such. The everyday
'reality' of work, work organisations and relations may be
accepted on this basis. The notion of the 'habitus' as
formulated by Bourdieu (1991, 1992) echoes this. For
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Bourdieu, the reproduction of everyday life relates to the
creation and reproduction of certain 'dispositions' which
generate practices, perceptions, attitudes and propensities
to act in a certain way. These coincide with the conditions
of existence, of which the habitus itself is also a
product. In this way the 'habitus' is both structured by
actions and perceptions, but is also structuring of actions
and perceptions.
What these kinds of views suggest, in connection with the
general theme of ideology and the particular
problematisation of the concept by Abercrombie et al, is
that there exists what we might call a 'background
ideology', which is the backdrop against which the choices,
actions and decisions that the individual makes in their
everyday lives, occurs. In this way we can again enliven a
more dialectically sensitive version of ideology which does
not theorise in a deterministic way, but refers to the
tendencies to act in certain ways and not others. This
enables the development of a concept of ideology which is
sensitive to subjectivity, the active creation of 'reality'
on the part of the social actor, and the Foucauldian notion
that power produces the subject rather than simply
represses.
If we politicise the notions of the 'solidity of everyday
life' and the 'habitus', especially through reference to
the specific ideological nature of the organisational
setting, we can see the notion of ideology re-emerging to
the foreground. We can recognise the externally derived and
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imposed, consciously and technocratically developed nature
of normative appeals made by management, as ideology. This
notion of 'background ideology' is the backdrop against
which both normative and pragmatic acceptance orientations
to ideology occurs. This is what Marcuse (1964) meant by
the tendency towards 'closing of the universe' of politics
and discourse which stands in dialectical relation to the
breaking of these features through resistance.
Ideology and Truth.
A second set of key problems which the Marxist debate
around ideology involves is the debate around the
relationship between ideology and truth. This general
question, in relation to the ideological nature of science,
relates to a large part of the substantive analysis in
subsequent chapters in terms of the critique of the
managerial scientisation of culture and motivation in
organisations. As discussed in chapter 1, sensitivity to
post-Modern and deconstructionist epistemologies,
epistemological nervousness and the desirability of an
'open work', all require the eschewing of a truth-
orientation and the move towards a more interpretative
stance with regard to an ideology-critique. With such an
epistemology and the use of the concept of ideology, a
'truth-centred' approach becomes obsolete. Such an
ideology-critique is not in the business of demarcating
truth from falsity, but in using the concept of ideology as
a critical tool with which to understand the nature and
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content of the process of (capitalist) social reproduction.
This takes us onto a further related concern, the
relationship between ideology and the social construction
of knowledge. The key route taken in the substantive
critique of the managerial scientisation of culture and
motivation, as well as the abstract development of a
methodology for the study of ideology will connect with the
general thrust of the hermeneutical, phenomenological and
interpretative approaches. Such an approach is connected to
a critical reappraisal of the content of the social
construction of knowledge within relevant managerial
discourses.
With a 'depth hermeneutic' (Thompson 1984) the insights
stemming from the recognition that knowledge and 'reality'
are socially constructed will be supplemented by the
recognition that this process also involves a politics of
the social construction of knowledge/reality. Thus this
takes us straight back to the concept of ideology. However,
part of this debate necessarily involves one of the major
potential stumbling blocks of an ideology-critique. This
refers to the problem of a value orientation which is
inevitable within any social critique. I shall attempt to
steer clear of suggesting on the one hand that my ideology-
critique proves the 'falsity' of capitalist managerial
strategies of control, and thereby the truth of my own
values. On the other hand I shall not go for the outright
post-Modern relativist position of just offering up one
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more narrative, which fails to relate itself to power
issues. As outlined in chapter 1, I shall accept the
'narrative' status of my thesis, but the argument I wish to
construct implies that practically, that is politically,
some 'narratives' are 'better' than others (whilst not
'true').
Therefore, instead of a truth-centred approach which
demarcates ideology from truth, I shall provide a critique
of managerial ideology against the backdrop of a notion of
'degrees of ideology'. This attempts to deal with some of
the valid criticisms of the orthodox Marxist use of
ideology, that Marxist critiques are themselves based upon
a particular socially constructed view of the world. Rather
than a futile attempt to find some firm objective grounding
for a Marxist critique outside a value-oriented view of the
world, I shall accept my position as value-laden. However
I shall argue from a humanist position that some value-
laden social theories are more ideological than others. In
parallel to Popper's (1969, 1972) notion of 'degrees of
falsifiablity' which holds that whilst scientific
hypotheses may not be true, they can be demonstrated to
have more efficacy and can stand as theory until disproven,
so with ideology. Whilst all social theoretical positions
may be value-oriented and therefore none can justifiably
claim 'truth', some can be demonstrated as more efficacious
than others on the basis of humanistic argument. In this
way 'degrees of ideology' can be demarcated without
reference to the problematic notion of objective truth.
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To develop a point made above, all theoretical positions
can be considered to be 'formally biased' (Feenburg 1988),
in that all theoretical positions have a particular view of
the universe and are informed by assumptions which tends to
preclude other views. This amounts to something similar to
the notion of the 'paradigm' as articulated by Kuhn (1970).
Given this 'formal bias' all theories can be seen as
ideological, and thus only partially at best related to any
notion of truth. However, we can maintain a demarcation
around the notion of 'degrees of ideology' if we recognise
that whilst all theories may be formally biased, some are
more 'substantively biased' (Feenburg 1988). This is
because some theoretical position are inherently geared
towards conditions which imply social, political and
economic inequalities within the practical, concrete realm
of material existence. For example management theory is
underpinned by a basic assumption that some individuals can
be used as means to pursue the end of others. In this way
one can demarcate degrees of ideology which relates not to
truth but to an ethical underpinning which holds that the
only universal 'truth' is the humanism of concerns to
expand human freedoms and negate the use of humanity as a
resource for the ends imposed by another. I therefore shall
not be attempting to prove the 'truth' of my thesis but
shall refer to this humanistic argument as a basis for its
defense. This goes back to the notion of ideology as
'solving' the contradictions between the practically
possible alleviation of domination and exploitation, and
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the reproduction of said domination and exploitation which
arrests the development of a more humanistic organisation
of society.
In relation to a more phenomenological orientation, I shall
move away from any latent positivistic fascinations with
the idea of a fixed, objective version of truth, a notion
which is inappropriate for social inquiry, and use the
concept of ideology as a conceptual tool for a practical-
political critique of the given (in part ideologically
reproduced) existent conditions and shaping of
subjectivity. Thus humanism at the practical level forms
the politico-epistemological antidote to the inappropriate
obsession with positivistically 'proven' truths (Marcuse
1955, Marx 1968, Adorno 1973, Sartre 1991).
Pursuing the connection between Marxist concerns with an
ideology-critique and more phenomenological/hermeneutical
orientations, Thompson (1984) distinguishes between two
forms of ideology-critique. Firstly, Thompson shows that
one aspect of the study of ideology is comprised of the
analysis of the construction of meaning and the formulation
of what is said in discourses. This raises an alternative
'truth-claim', as another interpretation which provides the
basis for the critique of established truths. The focus
here is on truth.
Related to this truth-oriented interpretation is the second
approach identified by Thompson. This study of ideology is
based upon an interpretation directed towards the
explication of how the generation of meaning drives
117
domination. The focus here is on authenticity, which
renders possible not only the analysis of meaning-serving-
domination, but also how relations of domination produce
and sustain particular meanings. It is this second basic
approach which Thompson seems to favour and the one which
informs the way ideology is understood here.
However, Thompson argues that neither of the two approaches
outlined above establish that relations of domination are
'unjust' or 'inhuman'. For Thompson, the epistemological
aspects of the study of ideology need to be related to a
more ontological aspect which relates the critique of
ideology not as (un)truth but as (in)justice. For
Thompson's Critical Theory, following a Frankfurt School
tradition, humanism seems to form the ontological
underpinnings for a critique of ideology which has no use
for the problematic concept of fixed, objective truth. The
focus is now upon the 'truth' of humanised relations and
the freedom from domination. For Thompson '...it is
important to recognise the difference between inquiry into
the truth of a statement on the one hand, and deliberating
on the justice of a particular social arrangement on the
other' (Thompson 1984 p.132).
The study of ideology should, according to this view,
concentrate on the humanistic justice of social
arrangements measured in relation to a declared set of
humanistic ends such as the attenuation of social control
and the alleviation of the attendant poverty, starvation,
misery and unfreedom, rather than attempt to delineate some
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objective truth. Chapter 1 was a declaration of such a
value-position relating to this thesis.
To establish the 'falsehood' of ideological statements
therefore means here the establishment of how meanings are
constructed which reproduce a system of social arrangements
based on domination. That is, pursuing the notion of
'degrees of ideology', how certain theoretical positions
reproduce a 'substantive bias' over and above a 'formal
bias'. The 'falseness' of this 'substantive bias' is given
by its character as the unnecessary reproduction of the
domination of one by another. The 'truth' of other
statements is only given by their character as arguments
geared towards the construction of more humane social
arrangements and the expansion of human freedom. The
epistemological arguments around the concept of ideology,
by developing in connection with an ontology, become
political arguments around versions of humanism and
freedom. Thus, through this demarcation of 'degrees of
ideology' and the linking of ideology-critique with justice
and humanism, the notion of truth can be dispensed with
without collapsing into relativism. Such an approach is
commensurate with an 'open work' (Eco 1989) in that it is
open to debate as to the humanism to which it refers, the
changing nature of the human subject and the historical
potential for the expansion of human autonomy.
This brings us to the question of the concretisation of
ideology-critique which proceeds through a linking of
Marxist	 critique	 and	 hermeneutical/phenomenological
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perspectives which lie in the interpretative tradition as
a whole. This also relates to the development of a more
sophisticated and nuanced version of ideology open to
notions of human agency and subjectivity. Forester (1985)
seeks the application and concretisation of a Critical
Theory analysis for an understanding of social action and
the structurally embedded conditions within which action
takes place. For Forester this requires the combination of
phenomenological and ethnographic concerns of social
inquiry with more orthodox Marxist criteria to allow for an
understanding of the 'concrete constellation of action'.
Forester argues that the 'applied turn' in Critical Theory
involves an understanding of;
1. the phenomenologically meaningful experience of social
action.
2. the structural staging of that action.
3. the institutional contingencies of practical action.
4. relations of control, authority and power.
5. the requirements and possibilities of resistance, of
social action cast not simply as instrumental politics but
also as emancipatory praxis.
Forester argues for the application of Critical Theory such
that its focus changes from '...disembodied forms of
'consciousness' to concrete constellations of action, to
specifically situated patterns and instances of claim-
making performances (for instance the claims of (neo)Human
Relations management), of so called experts or of
bureaucratic officials' (Forester 1985 p.xi). Chapters 8
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to this general proposition, of combining Marxism
interpretative perspectives. This is as a response
criticisms of truth-centred and deterministic
and 9 take such a trajectory and are about developing such
an 'applied turn' specifically to (neo)Human Relations
management. For Forester this allows the critical
theoretical inquiry to illuminate the 'situational,
interpretative, and judgemental character of social
action...and to understand power not as a simple possession
but '...as an ensemble of relations in which diverse
historically situated subjects have variously showed
chances, abilities and capacities for action' (Forester
1985. p.xiii). Thus Forester, in conjunction with the
others discussed above can be seen as laying the grounds
for the development of a more sophisticated formulation of
the concept of ideology which draws together ideology as a
tool for social critique with more interpretative
understandings.
Towards a Methodology for the Study of Ideology; Social
Critique and Discourse Analysis.






For this reason it is my intention to turn to a
of epistemological attempts to understand the
basis of the shaping of meaning and discourse, and ways in
which an understanding of it may be approached. This is
what I shall generally refer to as the hermeneutical
tradition.
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Such a hermeneutical understanding of a particular
discourse can be related to a concrete, empirically
detailed analysis and linked to an ideology-critique of the
politically interested shaping of meaning. However, given
the recognition of this interpretative and hermeneutical
perspective, it could be argued that the concept of
ideology is now defunct and holds no relevance. I see this
as an unhelpful conclusion.
The concept of ideology does need to be made more sensitive
to competing 'realities' as they are socially and
culturally shaped, but knowledge and belief also continues
to be politically shaped by external agencies. For this
reason the capacity of the concept of ideology to say
something which is critical of this process needs to be
maintained even as it is made more hermeneutically
sensitive. Mannheim's (1936) call for a 'sociology of
knowledge' connects here with the development of what we
might call a 'critical sociology of knowledge', as a route
to an ideology-critique.
Discourse analysis (Parker 1992, Parker and Burman 1993)
has attempted to clarify the grounds for something like
this critical sociology of knowledge by developing the
grounds for a discourse analysis. Parker (1992) identifies
successful discourse analysis as involving the following
criteria.
1. A discourse is realised in texts: Parker argues that we
find discourses, or pieces of discourse in texts which are
'...delimited tissues of meaning reproduced in any form
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that can be given an interpretative gloss'.
2. A discourse is about objects: Discourse and language
should be seen as giving objects a reality, '...discourses
are the sets of meanings which constitute objects...'.
3. A discourse contains subjects: 'A discourse makes
available a space for particular types of self to step in'.
As such discourses place subjects into a context.
4. A discourse is a coherent system of meaning.
5. A discourse refers to other discourses.
6. A discourse reflects on its own way of speaking.
7. A discourse is historically located.
(Parker 1992. p. 17).
In laying out these criteria, Parker is attempting to
establish the grounding for a sophisticated and social form
of discourse analysis which does not suffer from the
potential failings of idealism. By highlighting these
criteria, we can begin to demonstrate the general
epistemological basis for the empirical study of (neo)Human
Relations texts as a justifiable object of critical
inquiry. Parker goes on to identify three other criteria,
which he calls 'auxiliary criteria'. These are of more
particular interest to us here in establishing a
definition, methodology and operationalisation of the
concept of ideology. These are;
8. Discourses support institutions. Here he argues that
discourses are implicated in some way into the structure of
institutions and the institutional creation of meaning.
9. Discourses reproduce power relations. 'We should talk
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about discourse and power in the same breath. Institutions
for example, are structured around and reproduce power
relations' (Parker 1992. p.18). Therefore Parker recommends
that discourse analysis should include; firstly looking at
which categories of person (class?) gain and lose from the
employment of a particular discourse; and secondly looking
at who would want to promote and who would want to dissolve
the discourse. And therefore finally;
10. Discourses have ideological effects. Lying behind
discourses is a 'political' position. For Parker, discourse
analysis has had a 'deleterious' effect in that the
category of ideology has 'virtually disappeared'. He
stresses the potential link between a discourse analysis
and an ideology-critique. In this way we can begin to
respond to the requirements of Abercrombie et. al. in
finding 'evidence', 'institutional' location and 'details
of origin' of ideology.
However, Parker warns against assuming that all discourses
are ideological, and argues that we can distinguish between
those discourses which are true and those which are false.
As I have argued above, I feel the 'degrees of ideology'
demarcation is more helpful here. Parker argues that the
final 'radical steps' in a discourse analysis proceed
through; firstly showing how a particular discourse
analysis connects with other discourses which sanction
oppression; and secondly showing how the discourses allow
dominant groups to express their narratives about the past
in order to justify the present, preventing those who use
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subjugated discourses from expressing their own history.
This informs the epistemological base for the critical
interpretation of (neo)Human Relations discourse developed
in chapter 8 and 9. In relation to the above discussion
linking Critical Theory to subjectivity, Burman and Parker
(1993) sees the use of something like a critical sociology
of knowledge in its discursive, textual and hermeneutical
form as being increasingly influential in social psychology
for the study of 'what goes on 'inside' the individual'.
They argue that attitudinal aspects of individual lives are
'created by the language that is used to describe them', as
language becomes organised into discourses. We might point
out here that this already begs the question as to the
managerial/institutional power to so organise language,
discourse and meaning. As Burman and Parker put it,
'Language organised into discourses.. .has an immense power
to shape the way that people ...experience and behave in
the world' (Parker and Burman 1993. p.1). Therefore a
critical discourse analysis stands in intimate relation
with an ideology-critique of the power-oriented shaping of
subjectivity, meaning and belief. Significantly, they argue
that discourse analysis should not proceed as a unified
methodological certainty, nor should it reify language out
of social encounters, but rather, '...discourse analysis
offers a social account of subjectivity by attending to the
linguistic resources by which the socio-political realm is
produced and reproduced...'. This places discourse analysis
as '...the latest successor to, or version of, approaches
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such as hermeneutics' (Parker and Burman 1993. p.3).
However, despite this assertion of the social context of
discourse analysis I feel Burman and Parker's account
suffers from one major potential flaw. Their equation of an
analysis of language and discourse with the analysis of
socio-political power, useful though that is, is in danger
of collapsing back into an one-dimensional, empiricist
account of power focusing upon only the observable outcomes
of power situations. This position is already a pluralist
account of power with all the attendant assumptions
concerning its operation and distribution. Burman and
Parker's account of the study of discourse alone as the
route to the study of power and ideology does not emphasise
a social theoretical basis for such analysis strongly
enough. Their position cannot deal with an analysis of
power where there is no discourse, and where the operation
of power and ideology has worked to a priori circumvent
competing discursive strategies, to 'close the universe of
discourse' (Marcuse 1964). So whilst there is the
possibility of relating the work of Burman and Parker to an
ideology-critique, they fail to account for the societal
wide potential for ideology to shape belief and expression
before a particular discursive encounter.
Further Parker, despite some protestations to the contrary
shows a tendency towards textualism and a universalisation
of discourse as the empirical indicator. He recognises the
power inherent within most social/discursive encounters and
relates discourse analysis to an ideology-critique. However
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his warning that not all discourses should be seen as
ideological and his view that 'true' and 'false' discourses
can be distinguished from each other tend to contradict
this. Ideology understood as the societal shaping of
meaning is likely to pre-date any discourse, where else
would any organisation of a discourse come from? It is
clear that all theory, that is discourses, are ideological.
The very selection of a partial meaning and the
construction of it into a 'coherent system' (such as this
thesis) is in itself ideological, although as was shown
above, some may be more ideological than others. As to
Parker's notion that discourses can be demarcated by some
notion of 'truth' and 'falsity', this is particularly
unhelpful. To do so is crude, would constitute a regressive
move away from the use of critical sociological categories
and demonstrates a 'truthism' embodying a latent positivism
which is shown to be inappropriate by everything else that
Parker himself says.
A Research Strategy; Depth Hermeneutics, Language and
Power.
Therefore, whilst travelling a similar trajectory to
Parker, overcoming some of these problems involves turning
to 'hermeneutical' accounts which more strongly emphasis
the social theoretical contextualisation. Such accounts
steer clear of universalising notions of discourse and
conceptualises ideology in a more sophisticated way. An
example of this is found in 'depth hermeneutics' (Thompson
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1984). A 'depth hermeneutics' is able to develop a
sociology of knowledge/discourse which is sensitive to the
socially constructed nature of discourse, meaning and
language, whilst also being able to maintain a critical
socio-political inquiry into the historico-material context
of that discourse.
Habermas' debate with Gadamer (1975) informed the purported
'linguistic turn' in Habermas' work (McCarthy 1978,
Thompson 1981, 1984, Thompson and Held 1982, Roderrick
1986, Holub 1990). Originally Habermas turned receptively
to hermeneutics as part of the wider critique of empirico-
analytical and positivistic approaches in the social
sciences (Adorno 1976). This was propelled by the
perception of Gadamer and Heidegger as representatives of
the 'ontological turn' in 20th century hermeneutics. This
'turn' moved away from developing rules for understanding
texts to become an epistemological and ontological element
of a philosophy of both being and method. This connects
with the general historical development of the
interpretative tradition of social research, with
phenomenology, ethnography and the development of
qualitative research methods. It also relates to the
theoretical development of the general proposition that
reality is socially constructed and being-in-the-world is
the seat of our interpretative understanding. Habermas'
discussions of Gadamer's work (1975) is in terms of a
theory of language and language-use. Such a position
perceives a 'plurality of languages', given a plurality of
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interpretations of socially located reality constructions
and discourses. Modern hermeneutics therefore argues for
the application of principles of understanding which
analyses the speaker's (writer's) pronouncements through a
process of 'translation'. Hermeneutics aims to enable us to
understand the 'always already situated nature of the
interpreter'.
Still at the linguistic level, and by way of a connection
between the 'depth hermeneutic' in particular, and the
general proposition that language is a source of social
power, Bourdieu (1991) has pointed to the linguistic
element of social forms of coercion and constraint through
accounts of the concrete ways in which this can occur.
Bourdieu's analysis sees everyday linguistic interchange as
situated events relating to social structures and contexts
of power. He points towards the power of particular,
'proven' sets of linguistically derived and conveyed
meanings. Here Bourdieu echoes Marcuse's (1964) relating of
language to power in his notion of the 'language of total
administration' and the linguistic form which this takes
through 'internally self-validating analytical
propositions'. In these ways, in connection to other
institutional sources of power, we can see language as a
source of power, certain languages become legitimated and
dominant, become 'victorious' languages (Bourdieu 1991).
A critique of this process of power-as/through-language can
be provided by an analysis of how particular 'languages'
emerge historically. This suggests a historical dimension
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to the social/discourse elements of the 'depth
hermeneutic'. The historical emergence of the specific
(neo)Human Relations discourse around managing subjectivity
and culture is given in chapter 8. Bourdieu's concern to
analyze how the 'official' language of emerging nation-
states becomes a 'victorious' language is paralleled in
chapter 9 by an analysis of how the 'official' language of
(neo)Human Relations management becomes 'victorious'. This
is presented as an empirical indicator of the more general
integrative, normative and ideological project of
managerial technologies of cultural compliance.
This radicalisation of the hermeneutical stance mirror's
Habermas' subsequent more critical responses to the
hermeneutical position. Habermas argues that hermeneutics
should not separate itself from methodological and
epistemological attempts to deal with the nature of society
as a whole in its rejection of positivism. He argues that
hermeneutics should resist the tendency to become meta-
critical and fail to connect with this social 'reality'
which is to be criticised. To do this would mean that
hermeneutics would collapse into a linguistic relativism.
Holub (1990) summarises the Habermasian position when he
writes, 'In short, we cannot be concerned solely with the
structure of understanding or the possibility of
understanding, we must also take into account the validity
of understanding' (Holub 1990. p.64). This implies that an
ideology-critique which connects with the hermeneutic
understanding of discursive constructions of meanings
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should also be connected to an inquiry into to the system
of power and power-laden structures across the social
totality. Already we are moving towards the recognition
that a hermeneutical understanding needs to be connected
with a social theory. As Habermas (1989) suggests,
hermeneutics should 'be situated at a different level',
connected with Critical Theory, and with 'an emancipatory
political practice'.
Thus we can see that Habermas is arguing for the retention
of the Critical Theoretical stance for critique over and
above the methodological aspect of the possibility of a
hermeneutical, interpretative understanding, as the basis
for the study of ideology. Depth hermeneutics starts and
finishes with a recognition of the power-laden nature of
much of discourse and language. Language is no longer seen
as an emanation of public dialogue, there may be no
correlation between speech, discourse, action and the
collective generation and sharing of meaning. Thus with
this recognition,
Depth hermeneutics requires a pre-understanding that
reflects upon language (ie. a socio-political theory
which informs a view of language-in-use), it sets up
assumptions about the way in which the human mind
(social institutions) function and the way in which
symbols are produced and subjected to distortion....
depth hermeneutics proceeds from the notion of a
distorted communication that needs analysis and
correction (Holub 1990. p.71)
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Thus interpretative understandings are related to a
critique of the totality, connected to the politics of
meaning and knowledge construction as well as the
recognition of its social nature. Habermas' (1989) turn to
the notion of the 'ideal speech situation' is central here.
He has shown that a positivistically derived theory of
objective truth which presumes the centrality of science as
a route to truth, is flawed. Thus the 'truth' of social
encounters should be measured with reference to the
consensual or dissensual nature of linguistic encounters.
That is, if argumentation within an ideal speech situation
arrives at a consensus, then this consensus would be
rational and 'true', in terms of an ethical orientation
rather than a truth-centredness.
However most social and linguistic encounters do not occur
within such ideal speech situations, and occur within
relations of domination. Thus the linguistic and discursive
aspect of social enquiry can provide a platform for social
critique as discourse becomes the vehicle for the
reproduction of relations of domination within the field of
meaning construction, that is ideology. We have here the
linguistic equivalent of the notion of 'substantive bias',
referred to above. Language organised into discourse which
enshrines power relations proffers a 'speech situation'
which is already biased even though the linguistic
resources may be open to all involved. (Neo)Human Relations
management discourse which a priori establishes the
existent organisational relations as the arena of discourse
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is a graphic example of this, despite or even because of
their 'humanism' and 'democracy'.
Thompson (1984) explicates a schema of how this 'depth
hermeneutic' could be operationalised as a specific study
of ideology. For Thompson, pursuing a Habermasian line,
ideology-critique is propelled through an analysis of the
social, cultural and linguistic shaping of meaning, is
propelled by the '...study (of) ways in which meanings
serves to sustain relations of domination (Thompson 1984).
For Thompson the study of ideology should be set within a
specific socio-historical context and conceived of in terms
of particular institutional and structural terms. Thompson
focuses on the study of ideology which is on the one hand
capable of critical theoretical inquiry, whilst on the
other is sensitive to the active nature of subjectivity,
the social creation of 'reality' and the notion that power
is involved in the 'production' of the subject. Thompson
argues for a conception of ideology which involves some
account of the relation between action and social
structure, an account which implies a subject-object
dialectic and implicitly at least relates the fundamental
understanding of ideology to the illusory reconciliation of
lived contradiction (Larrain 1979). Thompson echoes
Forester (1985) when he argues that the three levels
involved in such an inquiry are;
1. an inquiry into action, whereby agents participate and
intervene in the social world.
2. an inquiry into social institutions, whereby specific
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institutions viewed as constellations of social relations,
and 'sedimented' institutions are understood as
configurations which can persist in various forms which may
enshrine power relations in a more general way. (The
institutional obverse of ideal-speech situations)
3. an inquiry into social structures, conceived of as 'a
series of elements and their interrelations which
conjointly define the conditions for the persistence of a
social formation and the limits for the variations of its
component institutions' (Thompson 1984 p.149).
For Thompson an analysis with these levels of abstraction
realises aspects of the phenomena of power within the
structure-agency relation. Power at the action level, in
the most general sense, is the ability to pursue ones own
interests, is the power to act. Power at the institutional
level is the power which enables and empowers the
institutional actor to make and implement decisions
delimited by the remit of the institution, Weber's
'effective co-ordination'. Such power is therefore
structured by the particular place/function which the
institution occupies as part of the more general
structuring of the social process. For Thompson, these
levels of analysis form the backdrop of (institutional)
power relations against which ideology should be studied.
This version of the ways in which the construction of
meaning and signification relate to the reproduction of
power relations (in institutions) also involves 3 elements;
1. Legitimation, whether on rational, traditional or
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charismatic grounds, whereby the institutional-structural
system cultivates belief in its legitimacy.
2. Dissimulation, relations of domination which are
concealed, denied, 'blocked', in various ways.
3. Reification, the presentation of a transitory,
historically contingent state of affairs as if it were
permanent, natural and 'outside history'.
Thompson's theory of power and ideology moves in the
general hermeneutic/phenomenological direction and away
from sterile structuralist accounts of ideology due to its
concern to bring into the study of this ideologically-
laden-meaning-construction analysis of language. Agreeing
with Foucault and Parker in that the study of the
reproduction of power relations and ideology is grounded in
the shaping of meaning, Thompson argues that the analysis
of language and discourse becomes fundamental, as language
and discourse is the principle medium for the construction
of power related meanings. In relation to a consideration
of Bourdieu, Thompson writes of the ideological aspect of
language and discourse, 'One seeks not only to be
understood, but also to be believed, obeyed, respected,
distinguished' (Thompson 1991). Power relations are seen as
shaping the meaning of what is said as well as the means of
saying it, power relations are represented in meaning due
to the differential power to 'make a meaning stick'. This
formulation of ideology takes into account the nature of
meaning and the way it is mobilised to create a world-view,
which is sensitive to the differential capacities and
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interests at the individual, micro-level, but which still
maintains the necessary link between this and the
reproduction of power relations and structures.
This approach, and the discrete methodology offered by
Thompson which is discussed below, seems eminently suitable
for the study of the creation of ideological meaning and
reproduction of power found in the (neo)Human Relations
managerial discourses. Such discourses are concerned to
mobilise organisational meaning, discourse, language and
culture so as to control the organisational subject and
culture. As will be shown in chapter 9 the effects of such
discourse is precisely to legitimate managerial authority,
dissimulate contradictions in the managerialist attempt to
mobilise the individual subject into the organisational
functions, and reify the organisation as in the common
good.
A Methodology for the Study of Ideology.
Before we operationalise a conceptualisation of ideology in
more general terms, it seems useful to discuss the related
issue of a discrete method for the study of ideology. The
link between language and ideology offers the possibility
of the elaboration of a 'methodology of interpretation'.
Thompson (1984) proposes to combine both an analysis of
domination and meaning in a study of ideology by using
'depth hermeneutics'. This is comprised of 3 principal
elements; (a) social analysis, (b) discursive analysis and
(c) the interpretation of meaning.
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Social Analysis.
In Thompson's 'depth hermeneutic' the study of ideology is
inseparable from the social-historical analysis of the
forms of domination which meanings serve to sustain. The
three levels at which social analysis proceeds include
(a) the identification of the specific contexts within
which action (speech) and interaction occur, within which
agents pursue their aims; (b) a concern with institutional
limits to action, and the analysis of the institution as a
complex of social relations forming a relatively stable
frameworks for (inter)action which also generate action
within those frameworks and delimit acceptable behaviour.
For Thompson institutions are the loci of power and the
crystallisation of relations of domination. It coincides
with one of the central planks of this thesis that Thompson
identifies the institutional/organisational site as a
significant complex of power relations. Thus the analysis
of the specific strategies of (neo)Human Relations
management is a way of grasping the operation of ideology
at the normative level; (c) a concern with structural
elements which condition 'structurate' institutional
frameworks, rather than a view of the institutional,
organisational site in an isolated, reified way. For
Thompson, The relation between wage-labour and capital
'structurates' the institution of G.M. for example, in the
sense that it specifies certain conditions for the
persistence of the institution, conditions which the
institution cannot exceed without a change of structural
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type. (Thompson 1984). That is, the 'practical
contradictions' refereed to by Larrain (1979). It is
central to the critical nature of the sociology of
knowledge/discourse proposed here, in conjunction with an
ideology-critique, that it proceeds against the backdrop of
a critique of capitalism and the socio-economic relations
which this implies. The nature of wage-labour relations and
the exploitation inherent therein are assumed as the
essential feature which characterises the relationships
between management and worker and thereby 'structurate' the
specific institutional framework. Thus whilst an ideology-
critique moves away from an over-emphasis on a productivist
account towards an analysis of discourse and meaning
construction it does not neglect socio-economic features of
class related power relations. In the pursuit of this
social analysis element, below I shall turn to the more
developed theoretical accounts offered by Marcuse as an
articulation of these concerns with societal power
relations and the analysis of capitalist society as the
'specific context' and 'institutional form' within which
such power tends to operate. This is apposite in that
Marcuse's work offers an insightful 'social analysis'
commensurate with the critique of the integrative nature of
(neo)Human Relations management strategies. His work is
also commensurate with the specifically linguistic route
for that critique. In this way chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 form
the 'social analysis' component of the 'depth hermeneutic'
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Discursive Analysis.
The second element of a 'depth hermeneutic' methodology is
a discursive analysis. This is the element of an overall
study of ideology which emphasises the expression of
ideology as connected to specific 'linguistic
constructions'. The levels of analysis which Thompson
proposes for the analysis of discourse are; (a) the study
of discourse as narratives which display their own internal
logical, articulated structure. This relates to ideology in
that the narrative logic of discourse functions to
legitimate a particular perception through a particular
discursive structure; (b) the argumentative structure of
discourse. Thompson writes 'Forms of discourse, as supra-
sentential linguistic constructions, comprise explanations
and chains of reasoning which may be reconstructed and made
explicit in various ways' (Thompson 1984 p.138). For
Thompson, the reconstruction of the argumentative
structures of discourse can highlight the ideological
function of dissimulation, as well as legitimation. It can
highlight how ideology conceals domination; (c) the
analysis of syntactic structure as the analysis of the role
played by syntax in discourse. This study involves the
recognition of the way particular syntatical structures
relate to nominalisation; passivisation and conflation; the
use of pronouns; and the structure of tenses, as these
elements of syntax relate to the linguistic process of
reification. In chapter 6 I shall refer to the work of
Marcuse which exhibits similar concerns with the
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argumentative and syntactical structures of pronouncements
as having ideological effects. Marcuse also offers discrete
critical concepts with which to pursue such a discourse
analysis. Also involved in a discourse analysis is an
inquiry into its historical emergence. Chapter 8 is taken
up with such a history, of the general shift within
management discourses towards the cultural and subjective
aspects of managing labour. Chapter 8 also identifies the
'leading authors/texts' of this discourse as a concrete
empirical indicator of its general themes and concerns.
Chapter 8 thus describes the content of the (neo)Human
Relations management discourse and as such it forms the
'discourse analysis' component of the 'depth hermeneutic'.
Interpretation.
However rigorous and systematic the methods of
discourse analysis may be, they can never abolish the
need for a creative construction of meaning, that is
for an interpretative explication of what is said.
(Thompson 1984 p.139)
Thompson includes an interpretation of meaning in his
'depth hermeneutic' which goes beyond the methods of the
analysis of discourse and its formal structures. For
Thompson, the ideological process of mobilising meaning in
order to sustain relations of domination involves the
'splitting of the referenial domain'. That is
The terms of a discourse carry out their ideological
role by explicitly referring to one thing and
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implicitly referring to another, by entangling these
multiple referents in a way which serves to sustain
relations of domination. (Thompson 1984 p.139)
Thus for Thompson, to present a study of discourse as
ideological requires the deconstruction of the meanings of
the discourse by unfolding the referential domain,
specifying the multiple referents and showing how this
entanglement sustains relations of domination. Therefore,
after an empirical description of the (neo)Human Relations
discourse, it is this interpretation of meaning, again in
conjunction with Marcusean Critical Theoretical constructs,
which I shall be most concerned with in chapter 9. The
application of Marcusean Critical Theoretical constructs in
conjunction with a discourse analysis of argumentative and
sytnactical structures allows for a specifically critical
(re)interpretation of meaning. Articulated in chapter 9 is
a concrete example of this with reference to the specific
pronouncements of the 'leading authors' of the (neo)Human
Relations discursive community. Chapter 9 therefore forms
the 'interpretation of meaning' component of the 'depth
hermeneutic'.
Summary: Operationalisation of the Concept of Ideology.
Given the above discussion, it would seem apposite to now
detail an operationalised version of the concept of
ideology for use in the concrete critical study of
(neo)Human Relations management theory. This may not be
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strictly possible, as the dialectical nature of such
analyses do not easily fit with the scientistic notions of
operationalising concepts for deterministic scientific
analysis. However, by way of a summary, it seem worthwhile
to attempt to say something about the way in which the
concept of ideology is to be taken forward given the above
discussion, and how it relates to a critical analysis of
data collected.
1. The first point to reaffirm is that I shall not attempt
here to 'prove the truth'. As was indicated above what will
be advanced here is a negative critique from an openly
declared ethico-political position, humanism. This relates
to the basic premise that exploitation and domination are
both unnecessary and unjust. The basis for the study of
ideology is a negative critique which holds that ideology
is the part of the process whereby these conditions are
reproduced and sustained. Thus the conception of ideology
used here relates to a critical conception. It takes a
dialectical orientation which analyses the relationship
between the production of ideas and the reproduction of
material condition. It argues that mechanisms of ideology
relate to the reproduction of social and economic
relations. It holds that these relations are reproduced
within a particular socio-historical context, in that the
production of ideas and the reproduction of social and
economic relations relates to the specific reproduction of
a capitalistic organisation of society and economy.
2. A significant manifestation of this socio-economic
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context, one which often has the power to develop
'victorious languages' is the institution and the
management thereof. Implicit in the conceptualisation of
ideology therefore is a notion that agency is dialectically
interrelated with structurally conditioned contexts for
action.
3. In relation to this, and to the problematic notion of
subjectivity, it is argued here that the subject is active
in the creation of a 'reality' and this stands in a
dialectical relation to the power which 'produces'
subjectivity.
The specific attempt to delineate such an analysis proceeds
through;
4. Ideational elements. The study of the content of
produced ideas, meanings and significations which relate to
the reproduction of beliefs, values, communications which
attempt to have a normative effect in terms of reproducing
power relations. In the discourse analysis in chapters 8
and 9 the content and origins of (neo)Human Relations
management discourse will be directly related to the
tendency towards stronger ideational/ideological uniformity
and control.
5. Phenomenological/experiential elements. This involves
the analysis of the impact of the social order upon the
individual. It involves the analysis of the relationship
between these effects and the meaningful experience of
action generated by the active participation of the
individual in the creation of their own structured world.
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This aspect relates to;
6. Institutional structures and a social analysis. The
experiential and discursive elements of analysis implied by
the partial adoption of a phenomenological/hermeneutic
stance	 relates	 to	 the	 notion
	
that
institutions/organisations are the specific, structured
contexts for agency, discourse, interaction and the shaping
of meaning. The institution/organisation is one important
mechanism whereby ideology is conveyed and the context
which thereby shapes and limits action. This relates to the
'social analysis' component of the 'depth hermeneutic'
7. Discursive elements. The 'depth hermeneutic' provides
the methodological link between the use of the concept of
ideology for the critical analysis of the reproduction of
the social totality and the phenomenological/experiential
aspects of that process of social reproduction. It does
this through its emphasis upon language and discourse and
through the critical approach to language as official or
'victorious' (Bourdieu 1991) as the vehicle for ideological
reproduction. This involves the analysis of discourse as
narrative, argumentative structures of language use and
syntactical structures. These factors relate to the
methodological approach to the study of ideology as
conveyed through language as it conveys and shapes meaning
and belief. The analysis of 'official' discourses, in this
case the critical analysis of the 'official' discourse in
'leading' (neo)Human Relations managerial texts, is
therefore a route to the concretisation of critical
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analysis of ideology and the shaping of meaning which this
implies. The discourse within 'leading' managerial texts
will thus form the data-base for a 'depth hermeneutical'
analysis. This will form an example of this concretised
analysis of the ideological nature of the process of social
reproduction in general, and of institutions/organisations
in particular.
8. Normative and pragmatic acceptance. A necessary and
useful variable included in this operationalisation of
ideology is the variation in ways in which ideological
shaping of meaning, discourse is received and (not)
accepted. This variable formulated by Mann (1986) will be
included in the operational use of the concept of ideology
as a necessary qualification and antidote to an over-
emphasis on ideology. However, the question of 'acceptance'
requires detailed field-work which (problematically) would
try to gauge the origins of the internal beliefs of
individuals. As the focus here is upon the organised
discourse of a particular, developed theory, this level of
analysis is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore the
normative/pragmatic acceptance stands in the background as
a theoretical corrective to ideology-centredness rather
than as a specific component of operationalisation.
9. Over-determination. The application of the concept of
ideology for subsequent critical analysis will not
demonstrate an 'ideology-centredness'. That is, ideological
or normative 'compulsion' will be understood as standing in
a relation to other forms of 'economic compulsion'. The
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reproduction	 of	 social,	 economic	 and
institutional/organisational relations is conceived of here
as being over-determined, in that various forms of
compulsion coincide to produce certain effects. The
emphasis in the subsequent critique will be upon ideology
and the tendency for ideology to impact upon the
individual. It will not be a one-sided, deterministic
account of ideology, but an 'open work'. This view also
involves the rejection of a naive truth-centredness in
favour of a humanistically grounded interpretation of the
(in)justice of social/organisational conditions, against
the backdrop of the notion of 'degrees of ideology'.
10. The Historical Emergence of Discourses. As part of the
'social analysis' component of a 'depth hermeneutic' and
the situating the particularities/organisation of a
discourse in the 'discourse analysis' component, there is
a need to develop an insight into the historical emergence
of a discourse. In particular the historical emergence of
the (neo)Human Relations management discourse which
embodies the concerns with the control of the subjective
and cultural aspects of organisational relations is
presented in chapter 8.
Given the above operationalisation of the key features of
the use of the concept of ideology for critical analysis at
the methodological level, it is useful to highlight here
some of the more specific, technical constructs which will
also be used in this critical reappraisal of (neo)Human
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Relations discourse. Central to this critical re-reading of
(neo)Human Relations managerial discourse in the light of
the methodological concerns discussed above will be the
following;
Legitimation. This refers to the way in which discourses,
in relation to structural imperatives and contingencies,
reproduce and re-present the sectionally interested
perceptions and activities of management as somehow neutral
and value-free, thus providing such discourses/practices
with greater authority. This relates to a radicalisation of
the Weberian schema, whereby ideology can also be seen as
part of the 'grounds for legitimacy' which help to
reproduce managerial authority and authority relations.
Dissimulation. This refers to the way in which an
understanding of relations of domination and their
reproduction is concealed, denied, confused or fragmented,
through linguistic, conceptual or symbolic means and the
way in which a critical understanding of social relations
tends to thus be negated.
Reification. This refers to the way in which transitory
elements of the process of social/institutional interaction
are re-presented with a fixed, 'naturalised' identity which
they do not merit.
Universalisation. This refers to the re-presentation of
historically contingent social phenomena in a de-
historicised way such that these forms of social
organisation and relations appear as normal, natural and
disinterested.
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Conflation. This refers to the conceptual alignment of
certain aspects of the social process with other aspects in
such a way as to re-present these features as normally
coinciding, where such a conceptual elision is an emanation
of the sectional interests of a particular group.
Given this conceptual clarification of how I understand the
concept of ideology, a discussion of the methodology for an
ideology-critique and the operationalisation of features of
this approach to the study of ideology, let us now turn to
the application of this approach for the specific, concrete
study of a particular empirically identifiable social
phenomena. The 'social analysis' component (chapters 4, 5,
6 and 7) will outline Marcuse's Critical Theory both as the
general social theory required by the 'depth hermeneutic'
and highlight various critical conceptions to be taken
forward for the 'interpretation of meaning' component.
Chapters 8 and 9 together form the 'discourse' anal ysis and
'interpretation of meaning' components.
Against the backdrop of the discussion in Chapter 1 of
'epistemological nervousness' and the Critical Theory
orientation which underpins this thesis, the
conceptualisation of ideology has been clarified here. The
clarification of this difficult theoretical issue has
involved elements of the history of the concept. It has
also involved attempts to develop the use of the concept
through discussions of the relationship between ideology
and truth, and the notion of formal/substantive bias.
Therefore, in pursuit of an 'open-work', the notion of
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degrees of ideology has been proposed which allows for an
ideology-critique without spuriously arguing for the
universal truth of one's value position. This allows for a
developed and sensitive response to the post-Modern and
deconstructionist criticisms of Critical Theory whilst
maintaining the potential for the critique of social
conditions and cultural relations. Specifically this has
involved demonstrating that language, knowledge production
and meaning creation are related to power
relations/structures. This chapter has developed an
explication of the specific methodology which will be used
in the concrete critical analysis below. This proceeds
through a 'depth hermeneutic' which involves a 'social
analysis' of concrete social, political and economic
conditions; a 'discourse analysis' of the specifics of (in
this case) (neo)Human Relation management theory; and the
development of an 'interpretation of meaning' of this
discourse. The specific technical components which make up
the details of this methodology have also been outlined.
The concrete empirical analysis of organisational power and
ideology as it impacts upon subjectivity and culture can
thus proceed through such an operationalised concept of
ideology. The first component of this 'depth hermeneutic'
method is the 'social analysis'. To develop this I discuss
in the next chapter the Critical Theory of Marcuse. A
detailed exposition of his work will show that as he
combines a critical approach to not only societal wide
power structures but also experiential, psychological,
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cultural and linguistic aspects of power, his work is an





SOCIAL ANALYSIS: THE CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY OF HERBERT
MARCUSE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL NATURE OF (NEO)HUMAN RELATIONS
MANAGEMENT. 
In response to Forester's (1985) call for an 'applied turn'
in Critical Theory, I shall apply the key features of the
work of Marcuse to the development of a Critical Theory of
(neo)Human Relations management in particular, and
organisations in general. Specifically, this will be
developed in terms of extracting various themes from the
work of Marcuse for an ideology-critique. Given this
'applied turn' I shall not develop an internalist account
of Marcuse. Discussions of the historical development of
Marcuse's work, along with that of the Frankfurt School
(Jay 1973, Tar 1977, Bottomore 1984, Wiggershaus 1993), and
secondary text assessments of his work (Jay 1973, Tar 1977,
Schoolman 1980, Kellner 1984, 1989, Geoghegan 1986, Pippin
1988) are numerous enough as to make such an inquiry
unnecessary. However, it is hoped that through the
'application' of the critical concepts of Marcuse, the
continued relevance of the Marcusean legacy will become
apparent.
Above I discussed the 'open' nature of my approach. In line
with this I shall not claim that the work of Marcuse is
universally superior to that of the other theorists
discussed so far. One of my principal aims is to argue that
the work of Marcuse as been largely ignored or not taken
account of within the critical theory of organisations. The
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presentation of its significance for the development of a
critical theory of organisations, through its
'application', is therefore the contribution I hope to
make. The work of Marcuse offers a fertile theoretical
resource which operates at various important levels for a
Critical Theory of organisations. Marcuse's analysis offers
an insight into the production of subjects whilst at the
same time relating this subjective level of analysis to
historical, structural, political-economic aspects of the
social conditions within which subjects exists. His work
offers a 'philosophical' analysis into subjectivity,
meaning, culture and discourse whilst maintaining a
political commitment to social change. His analysis is
therefore at once historical, critical and dialectical. It
offers the theoretical resource for both a 'negative
critique' of existing social, economic and cultural
conditions whilst maintaining an 'emancipatory interest' in
the potential for the expansion of human freedom,
creativity and autonomy. It is for these central reasons
that I turn to an account of the work of Marcuse, which
informs the more 'applied' discussions below as they
develop within the 'depth hermeneutic' research strategy.
It should be noted that Marcuse's social analysis is
related to the general dialectical position he adopts, and
to the 'dialectic of civilisation' in particular. This
implies that Marcuse's formulations should not be misread
as being somehow 'complete'. By this I mean that a critique
of rationalised domination is the critique of tendencies
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towards this. As highlighted in the Preface, Marcuse's
dialectical formulations are concerned with countervailing
tendencies which may on the one hand lead to a
consolidation of domination and repression, whilst on the
other 'explode' such domination and repression.
The social analysis of Marcuse has 4 themes which have
relevance as the basis for a 'depth hermeneutic', which
throw up critical concepts applicable for a critical
discourse analysis and interpretation of meaning of the
strategies to control culture and subjectivity found in
(neo)Human Relations management. These are;
(a) the notion of 'new forms of control' whereby
individuals and groups become active in their own control.
This is discussed in chapter 5; (b) the notion that culture
and language are aspects of such a control. This is
discussed in chapter 6; (c) that an underlying
'technological rationality' and 'one dimensional thought'
are key to understanding the historical development of such
politico-administrative systems. This is discussed in
chapter 7; (d) a social psychological aspect of power and
control, to understand the impact of power upon
subjectivity. It is to this aspect of Marcuse's work that
I turn to first. Central to the thesis developed here is
the question of subjectivity, and the operation of power
upon it. It is in Marcuse's radicalisation of Freudian
psychoanalysis that we find Marcuse's earliest and most
extended treatment of the question of subjectivity. It is
however somewhat arbitrary to start with Marcuse's social
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psychology as it forms a integral part of a wider social
analysis and relates intimately with the other themes
developed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. However I shall begin
with his social psychological work as its focus is most
clearly upon subjectivity itself, and expand this analysis
out to wider socio-political considerations subsequently.
Marcuse's Social Psychology and the Radicalisation of
Psychoanalysis; The General Theoretical Context.
Marcuse develops a humanist Marxist inquiry in relation to
the meta-psychology of Freud. This brings together a
critical analysis of subjectivity and of objective
historical and material conditions, exhibiting both
existential and political-economic aspects. The basic
position which Marcuse expounds, most notably in Eros and 
Civilisation, is both the radicalisation and
historicisation of the work of Freud, culminating in the
notion of the 'dialectic of civilisation'.
The analysis here concentrates on the broad theme of
'civilisation'. However, given the important part that
organisation has played in the historical development of
civilisation such a focus does not detract form the
significance of these meta-psychological debates for the
development of a critical social psychology of
organisations. It is for the historico-political analysis
of social subjectivity, the impact of civilisation upon
autonomy and the analysis of the social and cultural
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negation of this potential at the level of subjectivity,
that Marcuse turns to the work of Freud. In this
'philosophical enquiry into Freud' Marcuse argues that
subjectivity geared towards the expression of human freedom
and pleasure, the 'Pleasure Principle', is transformed by
the artificial maintenance of the struggle for survival
geared towards a particular interaction with the material
world, the 'Performance Principle'. Civilisations impact
upon subjectivity, and the repression of self which its
institutions require involves renunciation and submission
which proceeds through a socio-culturally reproduced sense
of guilt. Marcuse turns to Freud's 'allegorical history' of
the Primal Horde and the development of the 'Brother Clan'
as a metaphor for the civilisational process of the
domination of the subject. This metaphor has potential
significance for the development of a politicised critical
theory of organisations, and an inquiry into its
ideological nature, as it shows the operation of social and
cultural features upon norms and subjectivity.
A contribution to the Critical Theory of organisations
through this psychoanalytic dimension also involves an
analysis of the emotional and psychological transformations
which the individual, as part of a group/organisation, goes
through. It is concerned with how this transformation in
subjectivity relates to the domination of the individual by
the organisation through the establishment and introjection
of a particular 'Reality Principle'. More specifically to
the Critical Theory of organisation, the simultaneous
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repression and continued existence of the Pleasure
Principle makes up the 'subterranean history' of the
organisation (Burrell 1993), as well as offering an input
into the debate about the principles which could guide the
development of alternative organisations. Civilisational
reproduction of institutional domination, understood both
as process and as existent state of development involves
repression from without, from primal father to brother clan
to modern organisation; and repression from within, the
individual development and introjection of guilt through
the development of the super-ego. This is at least in part
produced by the organisation and specific managerial
techniques encouraging the psychological as well as
cultural identification of the individual with the
organisation and the introjection of the 'reality' it
requires.
The (repressive) civilisation and its organisational
forms/relations are in part enforced and sustained by what
Freud calls the '...eternal primordial struggle for
existence', the contemporary form that this takes according
to Marcuse is the ideological reproduction of the notion of
scarcity. Scarcity teaches us that we cannot live freely to
satisfy our own instinctual desires, life cannot be an end
in itself but must be oriented to the reproduction of
certain material action as determined by historical and
material conditions.
This historicised analysis of the renunciation and
repression of instincts is the basis for Marcuse
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radicalised version of Freud's theory. It provides the
social and political grounding for the theoretical link
between the analysis of psychic levels of 'surplus
repression', the Performance Principle and the ideological
reproduction of industrial society and its organisational
forms. In this way, Marcuse articulates the link between
the material and the subjective.
For Freud the centrality of guilt and repression for the
building of civilisation is such that a non-repressive
society is impossible. However, for Marcuse, the 'hidden
trend' in psychoanalysis is found in its critique of the
rationalisation of repression, and its questioning of the
connection of civilisation and barbarism, progress and
suffering, freedom and unhappiness. In short this
metapsychology of psychoanalysis relates for Marcuse to a
more general questioning of the equation of Reason with
repression and its manifestations in industrial capitalism.
Whilst questioning and uncovering the dynamic of
civilisational domination, Freud's position culminates in
the essentially conservative argument concerning the
inevitability of the repression of individual instincts,
and the possibility of freedom only within this wider ambit
of repressive restraint of instincts. Freedom can only be
'freedom in civilisation' and this is essentially
antagonistic to happiness. Marcuse radicalises Freud's
insights by arguing that instinctual repression does not
equal the removal of the unconscious and the potential for
the reassertion of the Pleasure Principle. He attempts to
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articulate the psychic counterpart to the political
dimension of the radical potential of 'new sensibility' and
expanded autonomy (Marcuse 1979, Gorz 1989).
For these reasons, Marcuse is concerned to articulate the
significance of the work of Freud for the critical analysis
of the repressive transformation of individual subjectivity
by specific socio-historical institutions. The specifics of
(neo)Human Relations management strategies can be
conceptualised from within this framework. This proceeds
through an ontogenesis, the growth of the repressed
individual from early infancy to the repressed state of
conscious societal existence; and phylogenesis, the
repression and return of strengthened introjected
repression involved in the rebellion against (symbolic)
authority. This tends towards the development of the
repressed social being in the fully developed 'administered
society'. At both levels there is the potential for a
contribution to the Critical Theory of organisations and
the analysis of the socio-cultural control of subjectivity,
as well as an analysis of the nature of that control in
both political/structural and subjective/cultural aspects.
Marcuse's politicisation of psychoanalysis thus relates
more generally to a socio-historical anatomy of
institutional power, one which demonstrates an inherent
subject/object dialectic.
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Ontongenesis: Origins of the Repressed Individual.
Freud traces the development of repression within the
development of the instinctual structure of the individual.
In Freudian terms this is a struggle of the instincts of
life and death. Freud's final theory of the instincts was
not presented until the 1920's. However, throughout its
development Freud's theory involves the dynamic union of
opposites which make up the conscious and unconscious
structures of mental apparatus. Freud's final version of
his theory of instincts moves within this dynamic
formulation of the structure of the mind whilst emphasising
the common origins of the instincts before differentiation.
This is based on the notion that when faced with external
reality, instinctual drives tend towards achieving a state
of equilibrium.
Marcuse is in part interested in developing this Id, Ego,
Super-ego formulation. The Id is the 'oldest' and the
'largest layer' of the mental structures of the mind and is
organised only in accordance with the Pleasure Principle.
Out of the Id, and through the 'mediation' of external
reality develops the Ego. It is geared towards the
preservation of the organism in relation to a 'Reality
Principle'. The integrative function and the normative
changes encouraged by managerial technologies of cultural
compliance can be related to this deeper subjective
development. The integrative function of (neo)Human
Relation management encourages a similar 'substitution' of
the self-interest in sexual and sensual pleasure for an
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organised sensibility which '...promises greater security
and success' in relation to external reality, as chapter 9
will show in detail. For example, the development of the
Ego as the mediation of the individual with the external
reality is related to the mental process which are involved
in the accommodation exhibited in the development of a
'corporate personality'.
Out of the Ego's mediation with the external reality
develops the Super-ego, the identification with authority,
which leads to the development of a kind of 'Morality
Principle'. At the subjective level this tends to
consolidate the integrative functions and the
transformation of a sense of 'morality' into a 'Performance
Principle'. As Marcuse puts it, 'Subsequently, a number of
societal and cultural influences are taken in by the Super-
ego until it coagulates into the powerful representative of
established morality' (Marcuse 1966. p.32). This Super-ego
or external restriction becomes introjected into the Ego.
It becomes a 'conscience', the initiation of a sense of
guilt and the internally driven need for the self-
punishment of (wished for) transgressions. This development
of a self-generated sense of self-restriction begins to
explain subjective developments in organisations identified
by Michels' (1962) 'psychological need for leadership',
Sennett and Cobb's (1977) defensive presentations of the




	 Such	 a	 politicised
psychoanalytic view of socio-cultural and organisational
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relations contributes to the understanding of the impact of
such structures on the subjective development of self-
repression. The individual, through the development of the
guilt-ridden Super-ego thus comes to be the locus of the
all-seeing, all-knowing self-control, comes to be the locus
of their own repression.
However, significantly Marcuse argues that the Super-ego
undergoes a 'change in structure'. As we shall see below,
this tends towards the mobilisation of the services of the
Super-ego in the pursuit of the interests of the
organisation. This is one way of expressing the mental
process underpinning the initiation of normative control
found in the techniques of (neo)Human Relations managment.
The organisation, through its representatives, its
authority, its imagery and its discourses can become a
component of an externally derived and imposed Super-ego.
Such a Super-ego aspect to subjectivity tends to become
guided by a historically specific version of a 'Morality
Principle', that is guided by a 'Performance Principle'
underpinned by specifically industrial capitalist
imperatives and technical interests. These repressions soon
become, as initiated internally, unconscious, automatic,
natural and part of the established reality. Established
versions of normality and routine come to convey a specific
sense of duty and purpose which is politically value-laden,
and have such effects precisely because they are perceived
as 'everyday' (Berger and Luckmann 1967, Lasch 1985). In
addition to this, as required by the all-seeing, all-
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knowing Super-ego, the regimentation of the self can tend
to become increasingly total. As such it relates to the
creation of the organised reality and a psychic version of
a kind of panoptic arrangement, a Psychic Panopticon.
Marcuse's politicised psychoanalysis complements and adds
to the work of Foucault. The introjection of the
requirements of the Super-ego and the identification of the
self with one's own control ensures that the requirements
of the Super-ego tend to be unrecognisable as such. In this
way the subjective development of the self, in the context
of industrial capitalist power relations tends towards
domination becoming rational and as such ideologically
reproduced. The technical development of an 'organisational
culture' by management can be equated with the development
of such an external Super-ego tendency and as such
organisational control proceeds on the psychic level as
much as on the cultural and political. In accordance with
the established reality, organisational authority replaces
parental authority as the introjected authority which
requires the individual to feel guilt and exhibit a
Performance Principle orientation within work relations.
Marcuse argues that the specific historical forms of this
domination needs to be uncovered as ideology. To contribute
to the development of this, Marcuse develops new categories
to provide a specifically historical analysis which is more
sensitive to the particular forms it takes.
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Surplus Repression and The Performance Principle.
Marcuse provides us with the concept of surplus repression
which he describes as '...the restrictions necessitated by
social domination'. This is linked to the 'Performance
Principle' which is described as '...the prevailing
historical form of the reality principle' (1966. p.35).
Basic repression and scarcity imply the universality of
trends towards 'suspension' of pleasure and autonomy in
civilised behaviour. Freud sees this as ensuring the
incompatibility of the 'Pleasure Principle' with the given
'reality' and the necessity of the renunciation of
instinctual desires. For Freud there is a fundamental
antagonism between the 'Pleasure Principle' and the
organisation required for the satisfaction of material
needs.
For Marcuse on the other hand, this view of the
inevitability/necessity of the repression of instincts is
an example of surplus repression. Such repression is
'surplus' in that it is the consequence of a historically
specific form of domination maintained by an unnecessary
scarcity. The repressive regimentation of instincts being
a repression over and above that which is required for the
survival of the individual. The nature of such repression
relates to the 'Performance Principle' in that it is
surplus repression which facilitates the performance of
historically specified functions within an industrial
capitalist society. In this way the analysis of the
reproduction of capitalist social and organisational
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relations of power can be understood in their psycho-social
aspects as well as their political-economic aspects. The
surplus repression required by work in industrial
organisation is for Marcuse but an extension of this more
fundamental tendency of the reproduction of repression
necessitated and created by the social organisation of
scarcity in capitalist society, or the 'social distribution
of scarcity'.
To present the repression of the individual in a context
other than this is to universalise such repression and to
fail to relate it to historical conditions. To do this is
ideological in the sense that it is idealistic, but more it
is to present repression and the renunciation of pleasure
as being inevitable, as being the 'normal' conditions of
life, and thus to reify it. Marcuse radicalises Freud's
basic conception so as to maintain historical contingency
and highlight the radical potential for a non-repressive
material organisation of social life. As we shall see in
chapter 7, this politicised analysis is linked to the ideas
found elsewhere in Marcuse's work. The instrumental
mobilisation of self-repression within the management of
social psychological aspects of organisational relations
and culture represents a sophisticated form of
technological control, as subjectivity is modified by
technical interests as much as by the ontogenesis of the
self. The mobilisation of the instincts and the human
propensity to repress them is mobilised by the organisation
in line with its productivist/discipline requirements.
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Surplus repression is parallel with the (neo)Human
Relations instrumental mobilisation of culture in the
organisation. Examples of specific institutional sites of
surplus repression which Marcuse gives are the
monogamic/patriarchal family, the hierarchical division of
labour, the public control of the individual private lives
and the de-sexualisation or 'containment' of sexual
impulses (See also Leonard 1984). As such, surplus
repression and the 'Performance Principle' are related to
the organisation of life as much as it relates to life in
organisations.
This is a critique of the repression of subjectivity which
locates that repression in the basic requirements of the
capitalist industrial economic system and its
organisational forms. The 'Performance Principle' is
enshrined within the ideological project of (neo)Human
Relations management in that it is the presentation as
rational of the domination inherent in alienated labour and
organisational relations presented as the common pursuit of
the material and emotional interests of all. The
restrictions, renunciations and performances required by
the system of wage-labour imposes upon the subject an ever
more apparently rational, universal control precisely as it
operates at the level of the individual psyche as well as
on the political and structural level. The 'Performance
Principle' operates on the individual as an external
reality, as objective laws, technical necessities and
requirements for the survival of the individual as well as
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operating as internalised forces introjected by the
individual as 'conscience'. Repression and domination occur
as much on the level of the unconscious Super-ego through
the introjection of the requirements of the 'Performance
Principle' as on the level of the Ego through the
imposition of externally derived material, technological
conditions. The organised, organisational universe is as
much an external Super-ego as it is the rational realistic
universe.
Repression and Groupness; Phylogenesis and the Origins of
a Repressive Civilisation.
Chapter 2 in part discussed some of the organisation
studies which have focused upon group psychological
processes. The psychological processes the individual goes
through in the initiation into the group and the
maintenance of their group membership has relevance to the
understanding of how this general phenomena described by
Marcuse relates to organisations. Marcuse does not perhaps
pay enough attention to this group psychological dimension
in the work of Freud, although he is obviously concerned
with Freud's meta-psychology which relates to the group
psychology.
Freud (1921) sees no essential contradiction between the
psychological study of the individual and the study of
members of groups, whether that be as a member of '...a
race, of a nation, of a caste, of a profession, of an
institution, or as a component part of a crowd of people
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who have been organised into a group at some particular
time for some definite purpose (a class)' (Freud 1921.
p.96). This has relevance for the explication of Marcuse's
work, in that much of the misguided criticism of Marcuse's
position proceeds on the basis that his amalgamation of the
work of Marx and Freud is theoretically illegitimate. This
seems to stem from a misreading or perhaps non-reading of
Freud as some sort of therapeutic clinician and a neglect
of the sociological or at least meta-psychological elements
in Freud's work (1921, 1930), of which the above quotation
is an example. Freud is as concerned with relational
elements occurring in certain social contexts as is the
subject-object dialectic found in Marxism (Fromm 1972,
Larrain 1979, Zizek 1989). Freud offers the possibility
that the reactions and behaviours which occur in these
'special conditions' are expressions of a 'special
instinct', a social or herd instinct, which does not come
to light in other non-group oriented situations. He
develops an extensive inquiry into groups and their
'psychology' which has obvious relevance for the
understanding of organisational relations and processes, as
well as for the radical understanding of (neo)Human
Relations management.
Group behaviour is characterised by a high degree of
reciprocity as group members exert a mutual influence upon
each other. Thus at its most general level, this is a
concern to discover the mental and psychic processes which
the group exerts upon the individual and how the dynamics
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of groupness lead to irrationality, impetuosity, extreme
reactions and the submergence of the individual within the
group. The repressive nature of the introjection of the
'Performance Principle' and the Super-ego relate to this
more social, group oriented and phylogenetic aspect of the
modification of subjectivity. The nature of work and
organisations can be discussed within this general
theoretical perspective in that the existential and mental
status of 'human resources' are directed by the management
of the organisation on the psychic level as much as on the
economic. Freud argued that the repression of instincts and
the development of the Super-ego begins in childhood. This
development culminates in 'civilised morality' in the
adult, proceeding through 'an intensification of the sense
of guilt'. However this ontogenetic development theory
must, for Marcuse be supplemented by a wider psychological
discussion of the social context of the group setting.
Individual psychology is intimately linked with group
psychology forming the conceptual bridge between the
individual and the 'mass' psyche. This psychology can for
Marcuse unmask the ideological veil from the construction
of the individual personality, to 'dissolve the
individual...(as)... his personality appears as the frozen
manifestation of the general repression of mankind'
(Marcuse 1966. p.57). For Marcuse the Ego-ideal which has
shaped civilisation according to the bourgeois Western
thought through autonomous reason and self-consciousness,
has done so only in the 'soil of enslavement'. By
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'dissolving' this idea of the autonomous Ego-personality a
critical meta-psychology reveals the unconscious and pre-
conscious forces involved and relates the development of
the individual to the external repressive conditions.
'...it reveals the power of the universal in and over the
individual' (Marcuse 1966. p.57). This undermines one of
the strongest ideological fortifications of modern culture,
that of the autonomous individual as operating 'freely' in
whatever social arena, for example the organisation as
conceived by (neo)Human Relations management. For Marcuse,
the concrete personality as it exists in public and private
life conceals rather than represents the essence and nature
of personality. The personality as it exists within the
objective conditions of modern civilisation are
characterised by Marcuse as '...the end result of long
historical processes which are congealed in the networks of
human and institutional entities making up society, and
these define the personality and its relationships'
(Marcuse 1966. p.57). It is the universal fate of
instinctual drives to be subject to historical modification
in relation to both ontogenetic and phylogenetic
developments and the experiences of domination leading to
the development of the Super-ego. Organisations and
organisationally dominated life are perhaps examples of
this historical modification of instinctual drives as well
as an example of the universality of such modification.
Moreover,	 the	 (neo)Human Relations management of
subjectivity and culture are perhaps historically new in
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that in the late industrial period the instinctual drives
are mobilised and technologically directed through specific
instrumental managerial techniques in line with external
conditions.
Of course Freud's theory of this phylogenesis is strongly
contested and is untestable. Perhaps Freud's ideas here are
themselves a theoretical 'perversion'. Marcuse uses Freud's
'anthropological speculation' metaphorically, only in the
sense of its 'symbolic value'. It provides an allegorical
resource for the investigation of the historical dialectic
within the development of civilisation.
The Dialectic of Civilisation.
The dynamic development of civilisation and its imperatives
brings its own contradictory consequences, 'originating in
renunciation (guilt) and developing under progressive
renunciation (sublimation) civilisation tends towards self-
destruction' (Marcuse 1966. p.83). It is the 'mediation' of
such contradiction, at the levels of subjectivity and
culture which this analysis essentially highlights. In this
way it contributes to the wider analysis of organisation as
ideology, as defined in chapter 3. This 'dialectic of
civilisation', found in the process whereby the repression
of instincts by the institutional structures of
civilisation stands in a dialectical relation to the
expression of its opposite, the breaking of the
institutional impact upon subjectivity. The decisive
features in both the ontological and phylogenetic basis for
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the development of civilisation was for Freud the
pervasiveness of guilt. Freud establishes a correlation
between progress and the increased ontological centrality
of internalised guilt. Freud represents the sense of guilt
as '...the most important problem in the evolution of
culture, and to convey that the price of progress in
civilisation is paid in forfeiting happiness through the
heightening of the sense of guilt' (Marcuse 1966. p.78).
Marcuse argues that this assertion is corroborated
empirically through the increased discontent found in
contemporary civilisation. The 'enlarged scale of wars,
ubiquitous persecutions, anti-Semitism, genocide, bigotry
and the enforcement of 'illusions', toil, sickness, and
misery in the midst of growing wealth and knowledge'
(Marcuse 1966. p.78, Fromm 1980, Elias 1982, Lasch 1985).
The ontogenetic/phylogenetic development of an (external)
Super-ego identification with authority figures leads to an
'abstention from the deed' of sexual or aggressive impulses
(Marcuse 1968a). But instinctual and aggressive impulses
re-surface intermittently as civilisation threatening
aggressions which require 'renewed repressions'. The Super-
ego subsumes the Id/Ego dynamic and requires that Eros be
sublimated such that its services are enlisted in the
building of civilisation (Elias 1982). This proceeds
through the development of formal institutions in society
which require/fulfil the Super-ego function of guilt and
identification. Further, as the quantitative expansion of
guilt and the renunciation of instincts becomes
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increasingly associated with civilised behaviour a change
in the quality of guilt appears. The rationality of guilt
based upon wished for instinctual gratification disappears.
According to Marcuse, Freud was unable to develop this idea
of the irrational basis for guilt and Super-ego
identification due to his essential conservatism. Marcuse
argues that for Freud the existence and development of
culture represented the highest rationality. This position
has strong similarities with orthodox organisation theory's
conservative position on organisations and organisational
culture. The organisational context is similarly seen as
representing an objective expression of the highest form of
rationality to which the individual should respond,
preserved from a rebelliousness which is 'automatically'
labelled as pathological. This despite the fact that these
irrationalities are produced by the internal contradictions
of the processes themselves, requiring ideological
'mediation'. The defense of the development of civilisation
which internally produce their own irrationalities thus
requires the renewed and strengthened repression of the
threatening transgressions through social and cultural
apparatus, over and above the purely psychic. The
managerial techniques which attempt to technologically
control the emotional and psychological elements of
organisational members being one modernised, rationalised
variant of this process.
The process of civilisation is primarily progress-in-work,
that is work for the procurement of the necessities of
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life. For Freud such work is '...normally without
satisfaction in itself', being inherently painful and
without instinctual satisfaction. He maintains there exists
a 'natural aversion to work'. For Freud the basic work in
civilisation is non-libidinal, is labour which must be
enforced through the sublimation of instinctual energy and
its redirection into the civilisation building project.
Culture '... obtains a great part of the mental energy it
needs by subtracting it from sexuality', and '...the main
sphere of civilisation appears as a sphere of sublimation'
(Marcuse 1966. p.83). The basis of civilisation in
sublimation thus involves the desexualization of mental
energy altering the balance of Eros and Thanatos. The
concrete example of the contemporary organisational form
and its position within the civilisation process directed
towards discipline, the renunciation of sexual/instinctual
satisfaction in the pursuit of material production and the
emotional identification with the symbolic representatives
of the organisation relates to this. It also therefore
shares similar irrationalities and dialectical
contradictions, economic and existential.
Marcuse does however raise some objections to this smooth
running argument. Not all work involves desexualization and
not all work is necessarily unpleasurable. The analysis of
this requires that a more informed distinction be made
between types and contexts of work, such as the distinction
between skilled and deskilled work, between wage-labour and
a more meaningful autonomous interaction with the world,
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between hierarchically controlled and self-directed labour.
Further, Marcuse raises the objection that the inhibitions
enforced by civilisation and culture effect the death
instinct as much as the life instinct, weakening Thanatos
as much as Eros (Marcuse 1968a). The social utilisation of
mental energy in the services of civilising work is to some
extent the utilisation of the death instinct and its
aggressive manifestations. Thus for Marcuse the
relationship between work and sublimation has been
relatively neglected by psychoanalytic theory, which for
Marcuse has succumbed to the prevailing ideological
representation of 'productivity' in the conservative neo-
Freudian emphasis upon the prevailing morality. Most work
is and has been of a specific nature which for Marcuse
cannot be legitimately understood in abstraction from its
economic and historical context.
This is the point at which Marcuse again seeks to
radicalise the Freudian position. Marcuse writes 'The work
that created and enlarged the material basis of
civilisation was chiefly labour, alienated labour, painful
and miserable - and it still is' (Marcuse 1966. p.85). Of
course the Freudian position would not disagree that work
is essentially 'painful'. The radicalisation which Marcuse
propels comes with the assertion that it need not always be
so, that to understand the historical and economic context
of the subjective alienation of labour is to at least
theoretically begin to understand objective alienation and
the possibility of non-alienated conditions. The nature of
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work and organisational relations in contemporary society
are shaped by the prevailing imperatives of the economic
system within which they proceed. The notion that the
universal requirement of the renunciation of instinctual
desires is a basic feature of human existence ignores the
objective conditions which unnecessarily reproduce scarcity
and the 'surplus' nature of some repressions.
Marcuse equates the contemporarily predominant form of
rationality (purposive rationality, technological
rationality) as a manifestation, or at least as linked to
such surplus repression. The 'rational organisational'
forms which are predominantly guided by these forms of
rationality are similarly manifestations of destructive,
anti-human irrationalism, the aggressive use of humanity as
'human resource'. Despite the attempts geared towards the
humanisation of organisational relations and practices, the
context within which these practices occur can be related
to the irrationality of surplus repression and socially
utilised aggressiveness. When Marcuse writes of this
destructive rationality, '...extroverted destruction
remains destruction. Its objects are in most cases actually
and violently assailed, deprived of their form, and
reconstituted only after partial destruction; units are
forcibly divided, and the component forcibly rearranged'
(Marcuse 1966. p.86), he is also talking of the history of
the rationality which underpinned the development of the
factory system and the position of the worker therein; he
is also talking of 'scientific management' and other
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managerial projections of 'units of labour'; he is talking
of the capitalist logic requiring competitive utilisation
of 'resources', natural and human. The fact that this
context is able to represent itself as more humane, more
'rational', more consensual, more participatory does not in
itself change the fundamental nature of this rationality.
Socially utilised destructiveness must for Marcuse
inherently drive towards a destructive approach to life
itself, must ultimately end in barbarism and
technologically derived, scientifically sanctioned neglect
of human life.
This rationalised destructiveness in its manifestations,
its increased mastery over nature leads to the greater
productivity and the satisfaction of human needs only as a
by-product.
For Marcuse the smaller the level of surplus repression,
the less repressive is that stage of civilisation. Thus by
extension the smaller the level of surplus repression
within the specific organisational manifestations of the
historical conditions, the more humane that organisation
can be said to be. In this way, Marcuse radicalises the
view of the relationship between civilisation and
repression of the instincts by making a discussion of
repression historically sensitive and relating it to the
objective conditions within which it occurs, not to mention
in relation to the objective historical possibilities for
the reduction of repression. The genuine humanisation of
managerial theory and organisational forms would in this
176
view be intimately related to the reduction of surplus
repression in relation to political, economic and social
factors.
In this historical period, the increased productive
capacity of the mature stage of civilisation without a
corresponding relaxation of societally organised
instinctual repression signals a more repressive society
given those very objective possibilities. The management of
contemporary organisational forms goes to reproduce this
surplus repression. As we shall see below, the rhetoric of
'humanisation' does not alter this basic historical fact.
In this way we can begin to see 'humanisation', through the
lens of surplus repression as a 'repressive humanisation'.
The discussion above reveals the repressive modification of
subjectivity as historically contingent. Organisational
subjectivity is shown to be related to the perpetuation of
regimentation in the interests of discipline. Organisations
and the management of subjectivity and culture can be seen,
in the light of this discussion, as the perpetuation of
surplus repression in that it serves to maintain
historically specific social, political and economic
relations. Such a management of subjectivity can be
understood as the techniques for the social utilisation of
instinctual energy in the attempt to maintain this surplus
repressive discipline.
This notion has great relevance for the discussion of the
nature of power and authority within organisations in that
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the technology of managerial attempts to direct culture and
subjectivity proceeds through the attempt to engineer such
a re-established domination from within the subject. The
legitimation of authority on the grounds of rational, legal
authority, is radically reformulated here as the
irrationality of this rationalisation is highlighted, and
the socio-psychological processes of this irrationality are
expressed. This version of power and authority informed by
the views of Marcuse is thus close to the versions of
organisations as systems of power and domination found in
the work of Gramsci, Michels and Foucault. It shows that
individuals do not necessarily identify with the
legitimated authority of the organisation due to some
belief in the justice or superiority of the organisational
form as it exists, but due to the dynamics of the group and
through the maintenance of psychic equilibrium threatened
by the feelings of guilt and the need for leadership.
Marcuse argues that '..the struggle of the oppressed has
ended in establishing a new 'better' system of domination;
progress has taken place through an improving chain of
control' (Marcuse 1966. p.90). Historical developments in
management theory are characterised by a similar revolution
in the techniques advocated (although not in the underlying
paradigmatic basis) such that Taylorism required management
to go through a 'mental revolution', followed by the
(neo)Human Relations 'revolution' aimed at challenging the
received knowledge and initiating a more sophisticated
system of managerial control. Attempts to humanise
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relations within the organisation culminating in a pseudo-
change which nevertheless brings a similar 'progress' in
the effectiveness of the chain of control. In the case of
(neo)Human Relations management this involves mobilising
the very instinctual basis of the repressive nature of
progress, guilt and identification with ones own
domination, as chapter 9 shows.
As Marcuse writes, '...every revolution is also a betrayed
revolution', ending in the 'psychic thermidor'. The
development of the technology of (neo)Human Relations
managment was never a genuinely revolutionary impetus, but
it has nevertheless ended in this thermidor, and in the
reestablished, strengthened form of domination. The
'humanisation'
	 of	 (neo)Human	 Relations	 management
encourages the identification of the individual with the
context of their own domination. This is again a repressive
humanisation which can be seen as a specific case in point
of surplus repression. This is one manifestation of the
dialectical contradictions immanent in the development of
civilisation, the contradictions between the real
possibilities for liberation and the perpetuation of
regimentation, the contradiction between the 'Pleasure
Principle' and the industrialised mobilisation of the
instinctual energy and identification. The 'humanisation'
of managerial repression is the ideological attempt in the
realm of ideas to mediate these contradictions and
historically re-establish surplus repression.
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Summary.
What all the above shows is that Marcuse draws out the link
between the 'ideology of advanced industrial society' and
the psychological processes involved in the adjustment and
self-adjustment of the individual subjectivity to the
requirements of that society.
'The masters no longer perform an individual
function. The sadistic principle, the capitalist
exploiters, have been transformed into salaried
members of a bureaucracy, whom their subjects
meet as members of another bureaucracy. The pain,
frustration, impotence of the individual derive
from a highly productive and efficiently
functioning system...responsibility for the
organisation of his life lies with the whole, the
'system', the sum total of the institutions that
determine, satisfy and control his needs...hate
encounters smiling colleagues, busy competitors,
obedient officials, helpful social workers who
are all doing their duty and who are all innocent
victims (Marcuse 1966. p.98).
As the subject is rationalised, rebellion has no 'rational'
focus, no target, nothing to rebel against with any
'rational' strategy. The psychological preparation for the
rationalisation of conformity proceeds, and is made more
'rational', more efficient as it is depersonalised. The
ideologically driven requirements of the productive system,
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the discipline and self-discipline are ensured as the
'Performance Principle' tends towards becoming the
subjectively accepted. Technological rationality works
towards re-initiating the subject into their own repression
through a claim to be 'therapeutic', as chapters 7 and 9
will show. The 'Performance Principle' becomes the
historically prevalent, politically (organisationally)
maintained reality principle.
Thus we can see how Marcuse's concerns with existential and
social psychological questions are intimately related for
him with a material, political-economic critique of
industrial capitalism. It is this combination of a
psychoanalytic, group orientation, an (inter)personal
psychology with an historical materialism which makes the
work of Marcuse so illuminating for the development of a
critical social psychology of organisations. We have seen
how Marcuse attempts to demonstrate that the interpersonal,
group psychological processes; the internalisation of guilt
and the development of a Super-ego; and the maintenance of
scarcity contribute to the (re)production of repression on
the subjective level. Marcuse demonstrates how the
civilisation process has an internal dialectic which whist
offering the alleviation from the struggle for survival and
progress, also brings its own opposite. The civilisation
process brings the 'change in the structure' of the Super-
ego and the consequent internalisation of self-repression.
Marcuse also demonstrates the historical specificity of
this repression and argues that it is, as enshrined within
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the Performance Principles, a surplus repression. It is
surplus in that it is unnecessary for the basic social and
sexual coordination of civilisation and is a consequence of
a particularly historical organisation of social and
economic life, namely capitalism. It is clear that such
social psychological analyses hold potential for the
Critical Theory of organisational behaviour. However, this
dimension relates to other arguments within the Marcusean
corpus which have been neglected by critical theories of
organisations. It is to a full development of these that I
now turn in theoretical terms before a distillation of the
relevance of the work of Marcuse as a whole can be applied
to the critique of (neo)Human Relations management. In the
next chapter therefore I shall broaden the scope of the
analysis, to show the relevance of Marcuse's socio-cultural
analyses of power and 'new forms of control' for the
development of a Critical Theory of organisations. This
chapter, along with chapters 6 and 7 will in this way offer
the 'social analysis' component of the 'depth hermeneutic'.
This will enable the focusing of the criticisms of the
ideological nature of the management of culture and




NEW FORMS OF CONTROL. 
A second general theme related to the above discussion of
Marcuse's work, which has relevance for the critical
analysis of (neo)Human Relations management, ideology and
subjectivity in organisations can be summarised by the
notion of 'new forms of control' (Marcuse 1964). This
general analysis is part of a wider theme within his work
concerned with the question of (un)freedom, authority and
control. Marcuse's (1973b) analysis of authority moves in
a discussion of the historically orthodox conceptualisation
of freedom, and its distinction between the realm of
freedom, conceived as internally generated free will, and
the notion of unfreedom, as externally imposed authority,
conceived as the prolongation of necessity due to the
perpetuation of scarcity. That is, Marcuse's analysis of
freedom and authority is developed against the backdrop of
the contradictory nature of bourgeois capitalist society.
He agues that the orthodox notion of freedom can be seen as
contradictory when set within the context of the dialectic
of civilisation discussed above. As we saw above this leads
him to question the (ir)rationality of authority relations
and the 'mental attitude' it creates in those subject to
it. In this mental attitude Marcuse identifies the
interpenetration of the concepts of freedom and authority
and the dialectical nature of their relationship. It is the
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ideological presentation of freedom within authority
relations and the mental attitude which characterises the
acceptance of authority as freedom that is the
philosophical basis which underpins the politico-
sociological discussion of 'new forms of control'. As we
shall see below, the notion that individuals accept
authority as freedom has relevance for the study of
specifically organisational authority relations, and the
question of ideology and subjectivity set against the
control strategies of (neo)Human Relations management.
Within authority relationships Marcuse identifies two
significant aspects. Firstly there is a 'certain measure of
freedom', that is a voluntariness, a recognition that the
bearers of authority are legitimate. Authority relations in
this respect are not characterised by open coercion.
However, the second element which Marcuse locates within
the authority relationship is the 'submission', or the
'tying of the will' (and also of thought and reason) to the
authoritative will of the Other.
For example, bourgeois individualism and the notion of
individual freedoms within the context of authority
relations provides the conceptual and political vocabulary,
a deeper, more fundamental version of what Bendix (1972)
has called a 'verbal dress', for the ideological
presentation of authority as something other than
authority. The capitalistic organisation of society is
deemed to be the embodiment of freedom in the midst of
authority and regimentation. The individual is encouraged
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to accept the illusion of individual freedom as they accept
the legitimacy of authority. Put more philosophically, the
dialectical relationship between freedom and authority as
conceived in the bourgeois society is negated, the
opposites are conflated into a false unity, freedom becomes
authority becomes freedom. 'Obedience to the law is
Freedom' and 'work makes one free'; such statements are
paralleled by the illusion of industrial democracy as it is
formulated in orthodox terms. Here the 'freedom' to
'participate' tend towards the reproduction of the mental
attitude which enables the individual or the group to feel
that they are part of decisions which have already been
taken. Marcuse expresses himself more eloquently when he
writes 'Thus the authority relationship, freedom and
unfreedom, autonomy and heteronomy, are yoked in the same
concept and united ...' (Marcuse 1973b. p.51). The subject
who now has the 'freedom' to pursue their own interests, as
self-interested economic individuals, from within the
context of the pursuit of the interests of the organisation
looses the conceptual tools to distinguish between autonomy
and control. Individuals tend to 'choose' to do what they
have to do. The objective context within which this
repressive humanisation operates, an example being the
organisation, has a tendency to remain unquestioned and
unquestionable.
One Dimensional Man  (1964) explores similar themes. It
starts with an expression of the contradictory nature of
modern capitalist society, a theme which runs throughout
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Marcuse's whole work. This is an expression of what Marcuse
sees as the irrationality of modern society stemming from
the dialectical understanding of its modernisations and
rationalisations. For Marcuse the nature of social control
has changed in that the capitalist system now has the
ability to present itself as rational. Marcuse's analyses
this in connection to historically new scientific and
technological advances, an analysis which can usefully be
applied to critical organisation theory. This historical
analysis measures the reasonableness of this society and
its organisations against its historically possible
alternatives. It involves an analysis which attempts to
transcend the established universe of facts, to talk of
potentials, capacities and alternatives. Marcuse argues
that such practically possible alternative socio-economic
organisation is deflected by the ideological nature of
capitalism, scientism and technological rationality.
Technological progress appears to remove the very basis of
such a Critical Social Theory through its ability to
present a false reconciliation between the existent and the
potential. This defends the given system of social
(organisational) relations and thus diverts the
possibilities for any radical social (organisational)
change.
Against this backdrop, Marcuse argues that the technical
apparatus within advanced industrial society should not be
seen as the sum total of mere instruments isolated from
their social and political effects, but located as
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functioning within the social system as a whole which
determines them a priori. The productive and distributive
apparatus tend to mask the opposition between private and
social needs, private and public existence which institutes
a more effective and more 'pleasant' forms of social
control. Such 'new forms of control' develop through
integrating the needs and interests of the individual with,
and therefore into those of society (the organisation). The
emphasis placed upon the integration of the individual into
the organisation by some managerial theory can be seen as
an specific example of precisely this process. For Marcuse,
traditional views of science and technology as neutral, as
exemplified by management science and mainstream
organisation studies cannot be maintained. He posits a view
of science and technology as domination, as providing the
specific techniques for more effective domination which is
at once able to present itself as rational from within.
Again the development and use of techniques in (neo)Human
Relations management theory provides empirical evidence of
this relationship between science and technology, and
rationalised domination. This is discussed at greater
length in chapter 7.
Technology is determined by a selection process, and once
these choices have been made and institutionalised they
tend to develop into a self-perpetuating system which
prescribes social (organisational) relations. This has the
effect of perpetuating and legitimating the power relations
therein. The scientific and technological project thus
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tends to shape the universe of discourse and action,
intellectual and material values, ie. culture. Managerial
technologies of organisational culture and compliance are
likewise geared towards producing certain behaviours,
attitudes and commitments. The managerial/engineering
approach to socio-cultural technologies is an example of
this type of technologically determined universe of
rationalised domination. The nature of this 'new form of
control' is for Marcuse characterised essentially by the
ability of the society or the organisation to confine
social and political relations and their possible outcomes
to within the parameters of the pre-established system. It
also involves the internalisation of the values and
requirements of the system by the individual. Again we see
the relationship between Marcuse's 'new forms of control'
and his radicalisation of the psychoanalytic perspective
discussed above.
The institutionalisation of conflict and the claimed
plurality of power within the organisation can be related
to Marcuse's notion of 'new forms of control' in that such
a plurality is managed and is contained within the
boundaries of the organisation and the organised version of
reality. Again within the study of (neo)Human Relations
management theory developed in chapters 8 and 9 there is
specific empirical evidence of the phenomena which Marcuse
is describing in the abstract. As Marcuse makes clear, the
intensification of 'new forms of (managerial) control' have
been developed to manipulate the needs and consciousness of
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the individual. 'New forms of control' are found in the
rhetoric of liberal pluralistic democracy as it tends
towards the colonisation of the very talk of autonomy,
self-determination and self-actualization. Nowhere is this
illusion of democracy and autonomy so pervasive than the
rhetoric of socio-cultural management found in (neo)Human
Relations perspectives. Modern managerial controls attempt
to integrate the whole individual. Industrial psychology
and sociology are the legitimated scientific
representatives of this project, geared towards the
creation of the individual and organisational culture which
identifies with its own control.
Marcuse relates this tendency towards one dimensionality to
his critique of positivism as the predominant version of
science and scientific method. This is particularly the
case in terms of management theory and the 'operationalism'
it exhibits. This 'operationalism' is characterised by the
restriction of thought and understanding to something
synonymous with a set of operations. This resonates with
the more basic features of positivism in that understanding
is expunged of any critical potential and is restricted to
the empirical. As Marcuse writes, 'The radical empiricist
onslaught thus provides the methodological justification
for the debunking of the mind by the intellectual- a
positivism which, in its denial of the transcending
elements of Reason, forms the academic counterpart of
socially (organisationally) required behaviour' (Marcuse
1964. p. 32).
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The managerial attempt to create organised subjectivity and
the underlying technological rationality found in
management theory coincide to form the basis of its
inherent ideological nature. Management theory, operating
in terms of predetermined efficiency-oriented goals seeks
theoretically and materially to adapt behaviour to the
requirements of the organisation, whilst claiming a
legitimacy and even humanism related to its claims of
technological reasonableness. The rhetoric of 'self-
actualization-whilst-pursuing-the-objectives-of-the-
organisation' is perhaps the most sophisticated and yet
obvious example of this ideological claim of reasonableness
and humanism in management theory. Such ideology '...
serves to coordinate ideas and goals (organisational
culture and behaviour) with those exacted by the prevailing
system, to enclose them within the system' (Marcuse 1964.
p.19). In this way the (neo)Human Relations management
project to coordinate and direct behaviour can be seen as
an important representative of the tendencies towards a
one-dimensional (organisational) reality.
The organisation attempts to place limitations on ideas and
behaviour, ideas which step outside the organised
organisational reality are ideologically deemed outside the
limits of Reason. This attempt to ideologically limit
reality and close the universe of discourse is not new, but
for Marcuse we are faced with 'new forms of control' which
are 'more ideological' than previously. The attempt to
develop this total and totalitarian reality tends towards
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the ideological transformation of any and all opposition to
the system into a metaphysical irrationalism or utopianism.
The (neo)Human Relations approach to the management of
thought and behaviour in all its variants can be
characterised as this ideological demarcation of the
reasonable from the unreasonable/pathological as it
projects the normality of integration into the organisation
and its objectives as the only reasonable course, as
chapter 9 will show in detail.
It is Reason itself which is for Marcuse the powerful
moment around which ideology and control through
integration revolves. Any more genuine potentials for
humanised organisational relations is neutralised by the
very conceptual and organisational framework within which
(neo)Human Relations management operates. As Marcuse writes
of this ideologically maintained universe, '...validated by
the accomplishments of science and productivity, the status
quo defies all transcendence... operationalism in theory
and practice becomes the theory and practice of
containment' (Marcuse 1964. p.28).
Repressive Tolerance
Apart from the extended analysis of 'new forms of control'
found in One Dimensional Man, Marcuse (1964) discusses
'Repressive Tolerance', which has relevance here in that it
relates to the more general notion that individuals become
active in their own domination, and the reproduction of
power relations proceeds through the repressive aspect to
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purported liberation and humanisation. The more general
discussion of the socio-historical backdrop to 'new forms
of control' above, and the discussion of 'repressive
tolerance' below can be applied to the specific historical
trend within (neo)Human Relations management as highlighted
in chapters 8 and 9. Such an application can also
characterise the 'humanisation' of the (neo)Human Relations
perspective as a 'repressive humanisation'.
Marcuse (1964) defines 'repressive tolerance' as the
situation whereby '...what is proclaimed and practised as
tolerance today, is in many of its most effective
manifestations serving the cause of oppression' (Marcuse
1964. p.81). Marcuse demarcates the potential for the
expansion of tolerance and autonomy in contemporary
society, given the potential for social and material
change, from the institutional inability to translate such
potential into emancipatory practice. Marcuse's radical
humanism leads him to argue that 'tolerance is an end in
itself' as it is the elimination of oppression and implies
progress towards a more humane society. Marcuse argues that
this potential is ideologically arrested and the politico-
empirical analysis of 'tolerance' demonstrates its
repressive nature. Democratic and authoritarian societies
(organisations) alike demonstrate a rhetoric of tolerance,
but do not practice tolerance. Witness certain versions of
Industrial Participation/democracy and the post-Fordist
team. What is 'tolerated' is the acceptance of already
taken decisions and the autonomy to display discretion
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within the controlled organisational context.
In relation to 'new forms of control', the effect of this
'repressive tolerance' is to transform political
(organisational) action from an 'activity', where authority
is tolerant of dissent, into a passive state whereby the
governed tolerate the pre-defined system of authority. 'It
is the people who tolerate the government which in turn
tolerates opposition within the framework determined by the
constituted authority' (Marcuse 1964. p.83). The
established system of authority is already established and
tolerated before politics, and it then only tolerates
dissent from within these prescribed boundaries. In this
way the established system of authority is internally self-
validating. The resistance, which is 'already always
present' is tolerated as it consolidates established
authority rather than challenges it. Such tolerance by pre-
established authority is in this way repressive.
Management's 'tolerance' of self-actualization, a divergent
plurality of interests, conflict, negotiation, dissent,
competition and informality within the pre-established
parameters of organisationally defined systems of authority
are examples of this. However, the notion of 'strategic
leniency' is perhaps the example par excellence of
'repressive tolerance', for purely operational, that is
efficiency motivations.
As Marcuse argues, tolerance is extended to everything
within the whole, and as such helps to perpetuate the whole
as it already exists. Such a managerial tolerance is
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repressive to the extent that the whole, of capitalist
socio-economic relations within the organisation, are
repressive. The rhetoric of 'participation' was always
different from the discussion of 'participation' within
academic management circles, where the illusory nature of
'participation' and the emphasis on 'feelings of
participation' has long been recognised (Patemen 1970,
Blumberg 1971, Kilmann 1985, Olins 1989). It is this
situation of repressive tolerance which Marcuse (1964)
describes	 as	 'loaded'	 as it brings	 'background
limitations', a 'background ideology' referred to in
chapter 3. Given this, the 'humanisation' of the managerial
tolerance of a more active human subject within the
organisation is a 'repressive humanisation' as it similarly
operates in the context of, often even more precise
'background limitations' of organisationally defined
imperatives.
The Containment of Social Change.
Given the existence of 'new forms of control', Marcuse
explores the wider question of the containment of the
potential for social change. This implies a repressive
transformation of social action and perception over and
above purely individual action. This is of particular
interest for the development of a Critical Theory of
organisations in that it relates to the general question of
the relationship between working class opposition and the
reproduction of capitalist organisations.
194
Marcuse argues that contemporary society is characterised
by the assimilation of individuals into an identity as
workers; the development of integrative leadership styles
in business and industry; and the management of leisure
time. These trends mark the unification of opposites in the
political sphere, especially in the 'collusion' and
'alliance' between business and organised labour. The
integration of individuals and workgroups into the
organisation involved in the post-Fordism phenomenon is
perhaps a contemporary version of this. This is so in that
the older conflicts of the industrialised West have been
modified and contained by the dual impact of technical
progress (the modernisation of management techniques) and
the threat of communism as the enemy without.
Clearly historical developments have rendered the
statements of the impact of the enemy without as obsolete.
Nevertheless the development of post-Fordist structures has
involved the development of conflict or competition between
work groups as an institutionalised replacement for the
normative, cohesive function that previous symbolic enemies
had. A state of 'internal union and cohesion' continues to
be created, which differs from the 'normal' social process.
Such trends point towards a social and cultural cohesion
which is artificially engineered and managed, within
society at large and in the organisation in particular. A
study of the (neo)Human Relations approach to
organisational culture, and the managerial attempt to
create socio-cultural relations in the pursuit of
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organisational objectives provides an empirical example of
this tendency, as chapter 9 demonstrates. On these grounds
Marcuse identifies what he calls a 'universe of
administration' which transforms political conflicts into
technical problems of adminstration. The mediation of such
problems is contained to within the pre-established system
of authority relations. As such, existing forms of social
and organisational relations are stabilised and
universalised.
The classical Marxist view, which sees the transition from
capitalism to socialism as being essentially a
revolutionary change in political structures and the
socialisation of the means of production, is challenged by
Marcuse. He argues that technological rationality is
embodied in the productive apparatus as part of the
capitalist rationality (Marcuse 1968). This applies to the
hardware of the capitalist technology, but also to the
technological rationality used in the subjective adaptation
of the workforce and the socio-cultural technologies of
(neo)Human Relations managment. The socialisation of the
means of production is for Marcuse the pre-condition for
social change, but does not in itself constitute social
change. This requires a corresponding change in the
rationality embodied in the productive apparatus and their
organisational forms. Marx argued that the organisation of
production by the 'immediate producers' would bring
qualitative change in that it would facilitate the
satisfaction of freely developed needs and production for
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use. However, for Marcuse the established technical
apparatus engulfs both the private and public space
(physical and mental) of the individual. This becomes the
internalised medium of 'new form of control' and obviates
the possibility of any such change, incorporating the
individual within a reified political universe. Radical
social change would thus for Marcuse require the change in
both technological rationality, and also the organisational
forms, relations and 'cultures' which are effected by such
technological rationality.
For the growing majority in an affluent society this
neutralisation of subversive imagination and its
corresponding manipulation tends to be ensured by the
installation and satisfaction of 'false needs'. The history
of the (neo)Human Relations approach to management provides
evidence of this process. We can identify this from Mayo's
concern to ensure the 'spontaneous co-operation' of the
members of the organisation to ensure both higher
productivity and greater social solidarity, to the 'false
need' of 'self-actualization' still within the prescribed
arena of the organisation. This is evidence of the
installation and satisfaction of false, manipulated and
managed needs and conceptions which has been the locus of
management, leading to the development of the specific
strategies and techniques involved. The factors involved in
this transformation include;
(1) the mechanisation of the quantity and intensity of
physical labour. Notwithstanding the extremes of the
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physical and biological manifestations of exploitation,
mechanisation modifies the attitudes of the exploited.
Given this mechanisation, the nature of wage labour becomes
even more stupefying, mentally and emotionally exhausting,
so creating more urgent needs for the development of
techniques for the management of consciousness and the
creation of the happy robot. The worker in previous times
as the 'beast of burden' which was the living denial of the
society which exploited him or her, has been replaced. The
organised worker in the advanced and more thoroughly
contained arenas of social life lives this denial 'less
conspicuously'. The tendency is towards the more thoroughly
incorporated individuals into the 'administered
population', seduced by the 'drugging rhythm of the work'.
Marcuse rejects the claim that this type of production can
or does produce 'human satisfaction', and argues that
'being in the swing' is testimony to the rationalisation of
domination. This situation is characterised by the
managerially created and maintained illusion that
individual satisfaction and fulfilment can be obtained
through the pursuit of the interests and objectives of the
organisation. This is the ideological concealment of
exploitative relations of capitalist organisations. The
nature of the ideologically reproduced humanised,
'participatory' organisational environment facilitating the
human and social needs of the individual is hidden behind
this veneer.
(2) With the growth of the white collar sectors there has
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been an increased assimilation of individuals into the
occupational structures in many key organisational arenas.
There has been an expansion of the restriction of
individual and professional autonomy given the rationalised
relations of domination, guided by the technological
rationality underpinning many organisational structures and
practices. Thus whilst this 'professional autonomy' was
always to some extent the 'enslavement of the job', for
Marcuse it did offer some chance for the individual to make
decisions. Marcuse sees this as being increasingly denied.
Automation comes to alter qualitatively the relation
between dead and living labour as it tends towards the
point where productivity is determined by the machine,
using individual labour as mere instrumentality. The
management of production thus becomes routinised given this
tendency towards a new type of thoroughly mechanised
production (Gorz 1982). One can then perhaps see the
(neo)Human Relations perspective as the attempt to adapt
and routinised the social and cultural phenomena to this
new economic reality. Management assumes the imperative of
an ideological/normative function to persuade the worker to
work in this new organisational situation, as opposed to
being primarily concerned with the management of production
as such.
(3) These changes in the nature of work and technology
produce changes in the attitudes and consciousness of the
worker, manifested in the widely discussed social and
cultural integration of the working class into the
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capitalist system as a whole (Gorz 1982, 1989). Marcuse
rejects the idea that we can understand this integration
without a consideration of the integrative experiences in
the wider 'societal experiences' of the individual. That
is, Marcuse rejects the idea the such integration is a
change in consciousness alone.
'Assimilation in needs and aspirations, in the
standard of living, in leisure activities, in
politics derives from an integration in the plant
itself,	 in	 the	 material	 process	 of
production
	
 The negative features of
automation
	 are	 predominant;	 speed-up,
technological unemployment, strengthen the
position of the manager, increasing impotence and
resignation on the parts of the worker' (Marcuse
1964. p.31).
So integration of the individual proceeds in a sense wider
than simply on the level of consciousness in that changes
in technological organisation bring about a 'mechanical
community' and a 'larger interdependence which integrates
the worker with the plant'. The worker now '... joins
actively in applying their own brains to technical and
production problems... (and they show) ... a vested
interest in the establishment - a frequently observed
effect of 'workers participation' in capitalist
enterprises' (Marcuse 1964. p. 38. See also Pignon and
Querzola 1970, Parker and Slaughter 1990). Given such
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changes and the increased importance of the
ideological/normative function of management, their role is
to encourage this very sense of participation.
(4) This new technological work-world weakens the
negative/historical position of the working class, as they
are less conscious of the possibility of themselves as the
living contradiction of the society (organisations) in
which they live. The novel feature of this rationalised
domination is thus the depth of the level of
preconditioning of the instinctual, emotional individual
aspirations, and the manipulation of the consciousness of
the individual. For example, Maslow's (1970) 'self-
actualization' and his claim that 'man (sic) must be what
he is', is transformed into Herzberg's (1968) idea that man
will be allowed to 'be what he is' within the prescribed
universe of the organisation. Fundamentally therefore this
ideological function of management is the illusory
reconciliation of the contradictions between the human
individual and all the potential that it entails, and the
'wage-labourer'. The human mind and body is reduced to the
level of the instrument to be purchased and used by the
organisation. The historical novelty of this situation is
characterised by the use of administrative rather than
physical controls (especially in industrial organisations).
It brings changes in the nature of the work which
determines social relations and the equalisation of the
sphere of consumption, both in material terms and perhaps
more pertinently here in the equalisation of the
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consumption of a managerially produced (organisational)
culture (Marcuse 1968a). For Marcuse this purported
equalisation in no way compensates for the fact that the
control of decisions of life and death, personal and
national security, still rest in a place over which the
individual has no control. That is the '...slaves of
developed industrial society are sublimated slaves, but
they are slaves nonetheless for slavery is
determined....neither by obedience nor by hardness of
labour but by the status of being a mere instrument, and
the reduction of man (sic) to the state of a thing'
(Marcuse 1964. p.38).
This domination in its pure form, the being of 'a thing' is
not lessened by the fact that 'the thing' is animated,
makes 'choices' and does not feel his/her being-a-thing.
Alienation can be an objective condition, can persist with
or without feelings of alienation. The reified
organisational form increasingly tends towards tying all
relations to and within the rationalised organisation. The
mutual dependence of organisational relations is no longer
one of the master/slave relationship, but enslavement
continues as both sides are enclosed within the technical
universe. (Neo)Human Relations and Post-Fordist industrial
relations, as the 'solution' to this problem of working
class opposition is the 'solution' of containing politics.
This containment closes down the realm of politics and
consciousness whilst maintaining orthodox capitalist
relations of production.
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Marcuse is not simply being dystopian or overstating a
pessimistic view of the nature of political and social
containment in advanced industrial society. Within the
field of management and organisation theory there is
objective evidence to support Marcuse's claims. The Post-
Fordist plant where management emphasises the control of
culture, the integration of the individual into the work
team, where flexibility and commitment to the objectives of
the organisation are of paramount importance, can be
understood by using the theoretical framework which Marcuse
provides here.
However Marcuse asks whether such philosophical inquiry
into the nature of existence and the possibility of freedom
are sufficient grounds to reject the real advances of
democracy, perhaps not. At the organisational level, the
practical, technological and managerial arguments (as well
as the philosophical and political arguments) hold water.
'Self-actualization' can lead to greater efficiency.
Therefore perhaps more self-determination would lead to
even greater efficiency and productivity. Thus perhaps the
repressive humanisation and pseudo-pluralistic
participation of 'industrial democracy' schemes, the
containing nature of Post-Fordist teamness and the
administered 'self-actualization' of the (neo)Human
Relations perspectives are themselves the barrier to that
which they themselves espouse. That is, such an ideological
emphasis on the release of human capability and freedom
contained within the capitalist organisational universe of
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action prevents greater motivation and innovation.
Managerial theory is insufficiently thorough and far-
reaching, operating within a managerially oriented paradigm
restricted to a meta-paradigm of industrial capitalism.
This is linked to Marcuse's argument that the theoretical
and technological development of management is only
legitimately understood in relation to the economic,
political and cultural context in which it operates. Such
theoretical and technological developments '... tend to
make the whole immune against negation from within as well
as from without... The reality of pluralism becomes
ideologically deceptive. It seems to extend rather than
reduce manipulation and co-ordination, to promote rather
than counter-act the fateful integration' (Marcuse 1964.
p.51).
Genuinely political relations would for Marcuse require the
development of a new conceptual and practical framework.
Autonomy of thought and agency would be more real if it
negated the universe of pre-established givens. Autonomy
requires a more thorough-going self-determination and the
determination of a new range of needs beyond the realm of
necessity and the struggle for survival. As discussed
below, this requires a new set of organisational
principles, relations and structures guided by a much
expanded notion of organisational democracy, a new agenda
for organisational relations beyond the given alternatives
for organisations. The political and organisational
principles of some new social movements and radically
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democratic organisations are perhaps prescriptive forms of
this expanded ontological and political conception and can
be investigated on that basis.
Summary.
As this chapter has shown 'new forms of control',
'repressive humanisation' and pseudo-pluralism are
coterminous with continuous trends towards organisational
self-affirmation and the consolidation of power therein. In
relation to theories of power, a Marcusean analysis of
power shows the absence of conflict due to the containment
of possible perceptions and actions within the
organisational context as the operation of power producing
subjects/ive attitudes. The debate between the unitary and
pluralistic models of power in organisations comes full
circle as pluralism in its contained form becomes evidence
of unified power. As Marcuse writes 'Democracy would appear
to be the most efficient system of domination' (Marcuse
1964. p.52). Managerially generated integration, as well as
increased productivity and affluence makes such 'new forms
of control' more pleasant. This is particularly apposite to
the new managerial techniques located under the rubric
(neo)Human Relations, as the concern to generate a team
orientation involves an increased organisational loyalty,
motivation and commitment to the organisationally aligned
objectives in competition with other work teams. In this
way the exposition of 'new forms of control' and
'repressive tolerance' contributes to the development of
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the thesis here in that it describes tendencies towards the
initiation of the active involvement of the subject into
their own control. 'Repressive tolerance' contributes to
the critique in that it shows the ideological and
internally self-validating nature of (neo)Human Relations
management as repressive in its purported 'humanisation'.
This can highlight tendencies within management such that
the 'tolerance' to resistance is afforded and dissent
accepted whilst being within the pre-established orthodoxy
of authority relations. These two conceptions of Marcuse
therefore contribute to a deep analysis of the theoretico-
political nature of worker-management relations as
conceived from within (neo)Human Relations management
theory. Fundamentally such an analysis highlights a
dialectic of (un)freedom. This is understood as the
expression of 'freedom' brought through initiation into the
reproduction of conditions of unfreedom.
As will be discussed in detail in chapter 9,
characteristics of (neo)Human Relations management theory
exhibit such features. Such management offers self-
actualization within exploitation; individual participation
within the reproduction of capitalist authority relations.
For these reasons, the highlighting of (neo)Human Relations
management theory in the light of 'new forms of control'
and 'repressive tolerance' shows the ideological nature of
such theory as it exhibits the fundamental trajectory of
'mediating' the contradictions between the ideational
aspects of organisational culture, commitment and attitude
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with the materiality of exploitation and the
instrumentalisation of the subject. That is, 'new forms of
control' tend towards ensuring that the contradiction
between a committed workforce and their simultaneous
continued exploitation is facilitated. In this way the
potential for more general social change is also
'contained'. As well as the political, this 'containment'
is also encouraged in cultural and linguistic spheres of
organisational behaviour by (neo)Human Relation management.
Marcuse goes on to show how the specific arenas of culture
and language exhibit the characteristics of 'new forms of
control'. Such a critical analysis of culture and language
are important for the general development of the social
analysis component of this thesis, as well as contribute to
the specific discourse analysis component developed in
chapters 8 and 9. So it is to an analysis of this cultural
aspect of domination; the linguistic/discursive




CULTURE AS DOMINATION. THE DISCOURSES OF TOTAL
ADMINSTRATION AND THE AFFIRMATIVE CHARACTER OF CULTURE. 
Related to the discussions in chapters 4 and 5 concerning
the radicalisation of psychoanalysis and the concept of
'new forms of control', is the notion that culture and
language operate to reproduce relations of domination. The
liberal notion of culture adopted within contemporary
organisation theory, as something neutral and benign is
challenged through this application of the work of Marcuse
to the specifics of (neo)Human Relations management. Such
a critique of culture as reproducing relations of
domination relates to the main themes of, firstly the
impact of organisations upon subjectivity, and secondly the
ideological nature of the organisational construction of
knowledge, discourses and 'reality'. The critical analysis
of organisation culture in relation to the reproduction of
relations of domination clearly shows in both these
respects the political as well as social nature of the
construction of cultural knowledge.
Marcuse (1964) relates the analysis of political
integration through technological rationality to the
analysis of a corresponding cultural integration (Marcuse
1968a). A novel feature of industrial society is the
removal of the antagonisms between culture and social
reality, due largely to the industrialisation of culture
and the corresponding assimilation of cultural production.
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Culture looses its oppositional, transcendant elements
which once presented another dimension of possible
existence/reality. For Marcuse, this two dimensional
reality has been liquidated through incorporation, as
culture tends towards being organised, both in the sense
that the transcendant elements have been expunged, but also
in that culture has been reduced to something managed, to
within and for the parameters of the institutional and
commercial. Marcuse (1968a) provides a history of this
reduction of culture. The basic position which Marcuse
outlines is that culture in an industrial society has
undergone a transformation such that it performs social and
political functions affirmative of the existent society and
social relations. Originally published in 1937, reprinted
in 1968 in Negations, 'The Affirmative Character of
Culture' (Marcuse 1968a) develops the view that culture in
contemporary society has undergone a transformation, from
being something which in previous historical periods was
created through the direct experience of the community, to
being something managerially created and maintained to be
affirmative of the status quo. Culture is transformed from
something which the group congregate around and shares,
into something divided into high and low, something which
is the expression of the glories of the bourgeois age as
the repository of all that is universal.
According to Marcuse, central to ancient philosophy was the
view that knowledge arrived at through experience should be
directed towards practice. Here the separation between
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practical (scientific) and experiential (cultural)
knowledge was not great. Aristotle developed the hierarchy
of socio-cultural value, a separation of functional
acquaintance (necessity and usefulness) from philosophy
(beauty). This separation had the consequence of reducing
the original project of philosophy (knowledge as linked to
practice and pleasure), and elevating that which was to
become 'high culture'. The knowledgable pursuit of
happiness is relegated to the worldly pursuit of material
organisation, as linked to the ideologically driven idea of
scarcity. Well being is relegated to the level of this-
worldly goods, as autonomous self-determination at the
level of cultural experience is correspondingly
surrendered. 'Man thus subjects his existence to a purpose
situated outside himself' (Marcuse 1968a. p.90), as the
economic penetrates the existential. Marcuse thus relates
this historical dimension of the reduction of culture to
alienation and alienated conditions of life.
The management of organisational behaviour similarly
reduces culture. (Neo)Human Relations perspectives claim a
commonality, a common pursuit of interests. The practical
application of knowledge and potential for any 'higher'
ends is thus reduced to the pursuit of organisationally
specified ends and thus involves the subjection of the
organisational 'members' to the external purpose. Further,
the 'higher' needs for self-determination and actualization
(pleasure, fulfilment) are relegated to the practical
purpose of maintaining the situation whereby the externally
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derived purpose subsumes the individual. As explored in the
previous chapter, what is claimed as self-actualization
within such cultural discourse of (neo)Human Relations
management is repressive humanisation. This has a cultural
dimension, what we might call repressive acculturation.
External purpose, as separated from the experiential world
of real individuals, is the cultural counterpart of
alienation, as 'culture' becomes something alien to the
subject. Culture as imagination, desire and the genuinely
collective generation of a belief system tends to be
reduced and confined to the pre-established social and
structural reality of the institution. We see evidence of
this in the organisation which comes to define cultural
reality for its members, culture within the organisation is
operationalised as a managerial technique, as something
imposed (Kilmann 1985, Lynn Meek 1988, Olins 1989).
The rhetoric of the Western/liberal ideals of humanism and
individual fulfilment through organisational culture found
in (neo)Human Relations discourse is used to reaffirm the
repressive reality and the cultural traditions upon which
they are based. On the cultural level, the fulfilment of
the individual is entwined with the pre-established
(organisational) universe. As Marcuse goes on,
As the great words of freedom and fulfilment are
pronounced by campaigning leaders and
politicians.., they turn into meaningless sounds
which obtain meaning only in the context of
propaganda, business, discipline and relaxation
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(Marcuse 1964. p.57).
This transformation of culture in industrial society
negates the expression of the human potential, and cultural
opposition tends towards being replaced by the sharing of
socially derived and manipulated meanings, images and
symbols. This is especially the case when we consider the
use of culture in and by those who manage the organisation.
Culture becomes the route whereby the individual is
socially and psychologically integrated into the given. The
sanitization of potential cultural opposition is ensured in
large part through the rationalised administration of the
organised/bureaucratised culture.
Repressive Desublimation.
As we saw in chapter 4, Marcuse turns to the use of
psychoanalytic concepts to analyse the nature of the
integration of subjectivity into the reproduction of
relations of its own domination. One of the important
aspects in the cultural facet of this is the notion of
'repressive desublimation'. Contemporary culture offers the
promise of greater instinctual, sexual and cultural freedom
in a way which consolidates the established reality of
domination.
Marcuse was one of the earliest Critical Theorists to
recognise culture as the ideological unification of
opposites. High and oppositional culture becomes popular
culture, becomes organised industrialised culture. This
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popular culture moves in the equation drawn between it and
increased material satisfaction and liberalised sexuality,
thus the culture develops through a desublimation. It is
however a desublimation which is repressive ,in that,
... it is desublimation practised from a position
of strength on the part of society, which can
afford to grant more than before because its
interests have become the innermost drives of its
citizens, and because the joys which it grants
promote social cohesion and contentment. (Marcuse
1964. p.59)
This is related to the 'new forms of control' and
repressive tolerance/humanisation found in the cultural
strategies of the (neo)Human Relations perspective. To
paraphrase Marcuse; it is a management practised from a
position of control on the part of the organisation which
can afford to grant more than before because (and indeed
grants more than before as a way of creating a situation
whereby) its interests have become the innermost (or at
least recognised) drives of its members, and because
participation which it grants promotes organisational
cohesion and contentment. A cultural desublimation in a
repressive society becomes repressive desublimation.
The decline of craft production and its replacement by the
economic and organisational principles underpinned by a
capitalist/technological rationality involve the
subsumption of the Pleasure Principle into the Reality
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Principle. (Marcuse 1966). This involves a 'de-
eroticisation' of human activity, especially labour
(Marcuse 1973). However, the victory of the Reality
Principle and its manifestation through organisation and
organised work reduces the need for sublimation and reduces
the requirement of instinctual renunciation. Such
renunciation is already achieved from within as a
consequence of the (externally derived) Super-ego.
Managment through this type of control becomes, at the
instinctual and cultural level, automatic as it proceeds
through a self control. In this way Marcuse identifies the
psycho-cultural aspect of control through self control. He
makes the point that the social and organisational reality
preconditions the behaviour of the individual when he
writes
The individual must adapt himself to a world that
does not seem to demand the denial of his
innermost needs- a world which is not essentially
hostile. The organism is thus preconditioned for
the spontaneous acceptance of what is offered (or
what 'performances' are required) (Marcuse 1964.
p. 63).
Power tends to become automatic and continuous. Relations
of domination which offer greater humanisation and freedom
also requires the contraction of autonomous cultural and
sexual activity. Subjective freedom becomes something
accepted passively, and the humanisation offered is
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parallel to the maintenance of conformity.
The very idea of installing a Reality Principle is
essentially an illegitimate use of the concept of culture,
analogous to the bastardization of the concept of culture
in (neo)Human Relations management theory. The
technological/organisational rationality asserts itself in
the instinctual sphere, allowing greater satisfaction of
socially prescribed and created desires, whilst reducing
the desires of the Pleasure Principle to those compatible
with the Performance requirements of the established
society/organisation.
....the range of socially permissible and
desirable satisfaction is greatly enlarged, but
through this satisfaction the Pleasure Principle
is reduced - deprived of the claims which are
irreconcilable with the established society.
Pleasure, thus adjusted, generates submission.
(Marcuse 1964. p.75).
To again paraphrase Marcuse, at the organisational level,
the range of permissible political participation is greatly
enlarged (and management therefore claims a humanism), but
through this humanisation the de-alienated political
consciousness is reduced - deprived of the claims which are
irreconcilable with the established organisational culture.
An organisational culture referring itself to
participation, democracy and teamness thus adjusts the
individual and generates submission. The progressive
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'humanism' in management and industrial relations is
reduced to a recognition and compliance with the
established (organisational) Reality Principle.
Marcuse's treatment of psychoanalysis involves reference to
group psychology. The group becomes the social vehicle for
the movement of culture within the organisation. In terms
of the production of conformity, culture articulates the
Performance Principle and the 'civilised' repression of
instincts required by the removal of guilt and the
internalisation of group norms. This cultural 'reality' is
internalised and the Performance-orientation grows in the
strength as does the acceptance of culturally imposed
behavioral requirements within the group dynamic. The
culturally shaped subjectivity of individuals comes to be
recognisable as a politically shaped subjectivity and
knowledge. The subject is '....led to find in the
productive apparatus the effective agent of thought and
action to which their personal thought and action can and
must surrender' (Marcuse 1964. p.79). The compoundedness
and intensity of such one-dimensionality, as distinct from
less instinctually grounded ideological, political and
cultural controls, is paralleled by the novelty of the
socio-cultural, symbolic and psychological nature of the
integrative emphasis found in management theory since the
(neo)Human Relations perspective developed. Its ability to
present itself as self-generating, self-legitimating and
humanistic is the vehicle of this compoundedness. Given the
ability of such a normative orientation claiming a humanism
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to present itself as its opposite, effective coordination
becomes what the individual who is being coordinated wants
at the group/cultural level. Such an ideological stance
moves from the claim that what is 'good for G.M. is good
for the U.S.A' to the claim that 'what is good for G.M. is
also good for the individual'.
Despite all this, counter-tendencies are recognised by
Marcuse. The unconscious is still the reservoir of
discontent and is perhaps open to political mobilisation
and cultural expression which would challenge the pre-
established system of power relations. As explored below,
this 'new sensibility' could provide new guiding principles
for social and organisational relations and behaviour if
genuine self-directed cultural expression and value were
expressed.
The Closing of the Universe of Discourse.
Marcuse therefore argues that the manipulated subjectivity
tends to exhibit cultural facets to the political belief
that the 'real is rational' and is the system which will
'deliver the goods'. The existent comes to be universalised
and de-historicised. This is in part a reflection of the
cultural closing of the possibilities of language and
discourse to express the alternative, given the language of
administration and the administration of language.
The universe of communication and mediation tends towards
being controlled and technicised, contributing to the
shaping of 'one-dimensional behaviour'. For Marcuse, '(one-
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dimensional) language testifies to identification and
unification, to the systematic promotion of positive
thinking and doing, to the concerted attack on
transcendent, critical notions' (Marcuse 1964. p.85). Such
linguistic framing thus helps to generate one-dimensional
habits of thought, reducing the dialectical conceptions of
the tension between appearance and reality to one of
identity thinking, the elements of autonomy and critique
receding before such definition and designation. Or as
Marcuse puts it, 'The concepts which comprehend the facts
and thereby transcend the facts are losing their authentic
linguistic representation' (Marcuse 1964. p.85).
This can perhaps be expressed by drawing an analogy between
Marcuse's notion of one-dimensional language and Barthes'
(1972) discussion of the colour of plastic. Barthes
suggests that plastics are unable to possess a real depth
of colour, but are characterised more by concepts of
'redness', 'blueness' etc. rather than real colour.
Marcuse's ideas on one-dimensional language are similar in
that such language, whilst having the conceptual ability to
say things, is denuded of expressive potential. One
dimensional language is increasingly unable to express
transcendant or critical thought, is increasingly unable to
hold a genuine depth of meaning. It seems apposite to
relate the one-dimensionality of this 'plastic language' to
the administrative nature of the official discourses of
'friendly fire'; 'body bags'; the Second World War ending
'not necessarily in the best interests of Japan' etc.
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(Kellner 1990). We see managerial equivalents around
organisational activities. For instance, witness the
language around redundancy; the language of 'downsizing';
'dehiring';	 'rationalisation';	 'realignment';	 'core-
reemphasising'; and 'skill-mix readjustment'.
For Marcuse this one-dimensional language is the
'functionalisation of language', as a structure operating
within the established and administered reality. The
managers of the established reality therefore speak a
language of performance, acceptance, consumption. Such
language becomes a tool of the political and cultural 'fait
accompli'. Functionalised language is operationalised as
thing rather than communicative interaction. Human beings
are reduced and linguistically conflated with their
function, their potential uses within the technological
rationality and their status within the organisation. The
use of this operationalised language can be found in the
theory and practice of (neo)Human Relations management and
the socio-cultural technologies of the organisations, as
chapter 9 shows in detail. Indeed the use of the phrase
'the organisation' is itself an example of this
operationalistion. The concept is one-dimensional in that
it has no meaning outside the universe designated by and
equated with the publicized, standardised use. The
'organisation' is equated with its structures, name,
procedures, symbols, imagery, etc. Other future
possibilities and relationships which could occur within
the organisation are absorbed and closed off. This specific
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case in point is expressed in a more general sense when
Marcuse writes,
The word (organisation, name, symbol) becomes a
cliche, and as cliche, governs the speech or the
writing; (and so by extension organisational
relations) the communication thus precludes
genuine development of meaning (organisational
alternatives).... These terms are generally
understood so that their mere appearance produces
a response (Marcuse 1964. p.87).
For Marcuse, such one-dimensional discourse develops
through a system of 'self validating analytical
propositions' which contain critical opposition to the
existent. Critical thought is contained to within the
prevailing reduced usage of terms within institutionalised
discourse. Critical thought is closed down by closing down
definitions, which themselves are created a priori by the
object of critique. As Marcuse writes 'The syntax of
abridgement (the illusory/ideological reconciliation of
contradictions through linguistic conflation) proclaims the
reconciliation of opposites by welding them together in a
firm and familiar structure' (Marcuse 1964. p.88). The
'self validating analytical propositions' specific to the
socio-cultural trend within (neo)Human Relations management
include, to name a few, such terms as 'industrial
participation' (the participation in a system built on
hierarchy and the denial of participation?), 'human-
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relations management' (the management of the relationships
between autonomous free-born men and women?), and 'flexible
specialisation' (the commitment to a flexible approach to
the work which is based upon the increased fragmentation of
labour and the standardisation of tasks?).
A critical reading of such official managment and
organisation discourse provides empirical evidence of the
process of which Marcuse writes and testifies to its one-
dimensionality. As Marcuse writes, such a use of
language... 'once considered the principle offence against
logic, the contradiction now appears as a principle of the
logic of manipulation' (Marcuse 1964. p.89). The universe
of discourse is closed, and language both in, and about
organisations becomes ideological in that opposites are
conflated and the particular is conflated linguistically
with the general. What is of sectional interest is
linguistically presented as universal.
The linguistic conflation of opposites makes rhetorical
conceptualisations immune from criticism, whilst presenting
a pseudo-pluralism which enables 'conflict', 'dialogue' and
'negotiation' to occur within prescribed boundaries, (ie.
repressive humanisation). The language of this type of
discourse further strengthens the idea that the real is
rational, and the only rational. Thereby linguistically and
politically '...combining the greatest possible
(organisational) tolerance with the greatest possible unity
of control, over conceptualisations' (Marcuse 1964. p.90).
Therefore there can be extrapolated a link between
221
repressive tolerance and the proposed notion of repressive
humanisation, which moves in and through the illusion of
more humanistic, enlightened management and this linguistic
aspect. The functional reduction of language and the
specificity of its humanistic claims found in (neo)Human
Relations perspectives coincide in contributing to 'new
forms of control' which are internally self-legitimating
and tend towards immunity from criticism, at the cultural
level.
There is a tendency towards the creation of a symbolic and
perhaps traditionalised association of certain nouns with
specific 'explicatory' adjectives and attributes. The
language of organisations tends towards ideology in effect
because such established communications are transformed
into sentences which become 'hypnotic formulas'. What
Marcuse is here describing is of relevance to organisations
in that he is partly describing the linguistic counterpart
to what Michels (1962) describes when the leader of the
organisation becomes the personification of the
organisation and culturally located as authoritative. This
'plastic language' is demonstrated empirically through the
identification of managerial catch-phrases or 'buzz words'
and the meanings and associations attached to them. One
specific way in which the normative/ideological appeal of
such linguistic forms operates is through
'personalisation'. This personalisation of linguistic usage
gives us 'our' M.P., 'our' town etc., and in relation to
organisations and organisational membership gives us 'our'
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manager, 'our' organisation, 'our' job. This expansion of
linguistic usage into such areas creates an impression of
the subject as an extension of the place, job, employer,
enterprise etc. Individuals thus become linguistically, and
then perhaps conceptually and culturally, extensions of the
organisation, come to be understood increasingly as
individuals only through their organisational 'membership'
and functional Performance.
A further device involved in the creation of a linguistic
imagery is that of hyphenation. This involves the linking
of	 political,	 technological,	 military,	 personal
characteristics and other elements into easily
recognisable, and thus uncritically acceptable phrases.
Examples which Marcuse gives are those of the 'science-
military complex', the 'nuclear-powered...', which come to
stand as recognisable phrases where the conflation of
military with science, nuclear with the power of humanity
are embodied but not recognised as such, creating the
linguistically seamless join between the two, immune from
any critical discussion. In the case of (neo)Human
Relations managment such hyphenation is best evidenced by
its very title. In the phrase 'human-relations' and 'human-
resources'. Here the seamless linguistic join is between
the human individual and the instrumentality of the wage-
labourer (another hyphenation) who can only be understood
and related to as a 'resource' to be managed. Power
relations are always already present in such linguistic
formulations. Such language thus embodies the one-
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dimensional conceptualisation which reduces the individual
to the requirements of the organisation.
Related to this hyphenation, but perhaps more marginal is
the acronymisation of language. Organisations in particular
are reduced to a series of initials which have the tendency
to remove them from a critical recognition of the nature of
the organisation. Thus the politically laden 'North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation' simply becomes N.A.T.0, less
politically laden, and as such linguistically, culturally
and politically more enshrined within the everyday scheme
of things.
A critical analysis of grammar, the relationship between
grammatical, logical and ontological elements, especially
in relation to the subject can perhaps reveal the
suppressed contents of this plastic language. Such a
discourse analysis and critical interpretation of meaning
as found in a 'depth hermeneutic' occurring in relation to
a Critical Theory can re-establish the dialectical, two
dimensional elements in potential thought and language and
express the tension between the 'is' and the 'ought'. That
is, to think and speak critically and historically.
Linguistic opposition to one-dimensionality is thus the re-
invocation of time and memory in the face of the
dehistoricised universe of mechanised time and 'history as
biographical details' (Marcuse 1979). Some radically
democratic organisations try to emphasise an (anti)
organisational behaviour which exhibits a change in this
'language as power' relationship, and a non-functionalised,
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non-hypnotic language as the framework for radically
democratised organisational communication. Such a
linguistic/cultural opposition rediscovers more open-ended
and humanised forms of communication. They seem to exhibit
a conscious attention to developing a discursive context
free from structured inequalities which approximates what
Habermas has called 'ideal speech situations' (1989).
Linguistic opposition involves the language of a re-
eroticised reconceptualisation of human subjectivity
connected to the Pleasure Principle. It rejects the
functionalised language which bridges the gap between
politics and advertising as a reflection of the continuity
between domination and administration in a technological
society.
The Research of Total Adminstration.
For Marcuse the functionalised culture and language of one-
dimensional tendencies are the 'outer layer' of the
attempted coordination of individual subjectivity. Marcuse
turns to two representative pieces of empirical research
which he presents as specific examples of social scientific
research concerned with this cultural coordination.
Firstly, Marcuse specifically considers the Hawthorne
Studies, of which he argues, 'The operational concepts
terminate in methods of improved social control' (Marcuse
1964. p.108). According to Marcuse, the workers' complaints
in the Hawthorne Studies were seen as vague and indefinite.
Guided by 'operational thinking' (positivism) the research
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'translated' vague statements by workers into precise
conceptual statements to identify particular operations and
conditions which gave rise to such worker dissatisfaction
and de-motivation. Such research 'translation' changes the
meaning of the actual statements from general/generalised
statements about the prevailing social and economic
conditions, to statements about particular phenomena and
dissatisfaction which can be dealt with within the
parameters of the prevailing organisational conditions and
structures. Thus Marcuse writes of the Hawthorne Studies
operationalised, positivistic research,
... the untranslated statements (eg. 'wages are
too low') established a concrete relation between
the particular case and the whole of which it is
a case - and this includes the conditions outside
the respective job (etc)...This whole is
eliminated in the translation, and it is this
operation which makes the cure possible (Marcuse
1964. p.110).
Thus what Marcuse is expressing here, in the specific case
of the Hawthorne Studies is the operationalisation of
research which reduces any possible 'solution' to a re-
coordination of thought in line with the interests of the
organisation as it is. Such a research agenda which is
geared to providing an organisational cultural expression
of such an ideological 'solution' is the conceptual basis
for the repressive humanisation of the 'humanised'
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managerial 'cure' within the pre-established organisational
parameters. Chapter 9 demonstrates the (neo)Human Relations
rhetoric of 'humanism' and 'cure' in detail.
The Hawthorne Studies research expresses the concrete
position of the worker, but the positivistic translation
disrupts the greater concreteness of such, and reduces it
to a particular concreteness. The greater concreteness of
the workers position, of the discontent as a worker is thus
ideologically reduced to a complaint, not a social and
organisational position, but simply about a position within
the organisational culture, which is then amenable to
'technical solutions'.
The use of the term 'human' in (neo)Human Relations theory
is not operationalised to the extent that 'relations' is,
and is thus in need of some analysis as to how the concept
'human' is used and reduced. It is my contention, as
already alluded to, that the use of the term 'human' in
(neo)Human Relations thinking is one which relates to
Marcuse's notion of repression and repressive tolerance.
Despite imputed differences between (neo)Human Relations
thinking and earlier management theories, the term 'human'
does not refer to the whole person (attitudes, values,
needs, group memberships etc.). Instead it is used within
the conceptual universe of labour as a commodity, the
purchasing of abstract labour power and the deskilling of
labour. Within this purportedly humanistic (neo)Human
Relation management theory, 'human' still essentially
refers to the 'hands', albeit in a less mechanistic way
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than previous managerial theories. This use of a concept of
humanity parallels the 'skirting of the edge' found
elsewhere in the (neo)Human Relations tradition. The idea
that workers have needs, desire responsibility, can use
their own initiative and can be self-directing are other
examples of a management theory which goes as far as the
edge of workers self-managment but can not go conceptually,
politically nor economically beyond the edge to encompass
the logical conclusions of some of its findings. This
position is, although essentially illogical, (re)supported
by its scientificity, and relates to the more general
'therapeutic' effects of one-dimensional, positivistic
science outlined below. So Marcuse writes,
In this context, (for our purposes here
(neo)Human	 Relations	 managerialism)
functionalisation has a truly therapeutic effect.
Once the personal discontent is isolated from the
general unhappiness, once the universal concepts
which militate against functionalisation are
dissolved into particular referents, the case
becomes a treatable and tractable incident.
(Marcuse 1964 p.111).
Discontent and potential opposition to the established
cultural context is thus through functionalisation and
translation, individualised. The individual worker becomes
'the problem' and can be treated as such. An example of
this is 'management-by-stress' (Parker and Slaughter 1990),
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whereby technology affords a kind of 'functional
translation' of operational imperative into a matter of
individual/cultural retraining. Zuboff's (1988)
'Information Panopticon' can be seen as an expression of
something similar. The individual is perceived as being in
need of 'help' or 'cure'. The 'inefficiency' of the
individual is de-structuralised and relocated within the
personal realm, as a functionalised part of the
functionalised conceptual universe. Any transcendant
opposition which might stem from the general discontent is
thus neutralised and contained within the organisational
culture and its procedures. As Marcuse writes '.... once
the 'unrealistic' excess of meaning is abolished, the
investigation is locked within the vast confine in which
the established society validates and invalidates
propositions. By virtue of its methodology, this empiricism
is ideology' (Marcuse 1964. p.113).
So for Marcuse the 'history' of culture is the history of
the transformation of the concept of culture and its
reductive separation from the human fulfilments in the
service of material necessity. It is the separation of the
spirit from the body, the beautiful from the material, the
unreal from the real. This 'history' is related to the
developing objective conditions of industrial capitalism.
The concept of culture itself is separated in this period
into the notions of 'high' culture and 'low', or today
'popular' culture. Culture comes to be related to the
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administrative technologies of the industrial system. At
the same time, in dialectical contradiction, it is
potentially the preserve of all that is great, beautiful
and good in society.
Organisational culture is presented as something human and
social, as distinct from the technical and structural, as
something distinct from the 'work'. And yet (neo)Human
Relations management 'engineers' a cultural technology to
imposed 'culture' as something shared by all members of the
organisation. As 'normative glue', culture is conceived of
as something which can and indeed must be managed,
something over which effective control should be
maintained, as something which should be made 'appropriate'
for the organisational task. Culture is seen as something
technical, manipulable, controllable.
Affirmative culture is ultimately ideological in that it
tends to mediate the contradictions between appearance and
reality. In terms of affirmative organisational culture, it
facilitates the identification of the individual
organisational member with their own operationalisation.
Affirmative culture performs the 'illusory reconciliation'
of the contradictions between the mutability of bad
experience/existence and the need for happiness to make
such existence bearable. Organisational culture
demonstrates this affirmative function in that it tends to
be a vehicle whereby the organisation seeks to ensure the
identification of the individual with their performances,
whilst simultaneously identifying with the structures and
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relations which require these performances. The
organisation and what it requires of the individual thus
through culture tends towards universalisation. Naturalised
and dehistoricised organisational culture is affirmative of
the given and negates the potential for change, it ensures
in the realm of ideas the continuation of the given
organisational form and relations. Affirmative culture is
the political shaping of knowledge, representations,
discourse and subjectivity.
Summary.
In this chapter, pursuing an explication of the Marcusean
perspective as it is relevant for a critical study of
(neo)Human Relations management theory, we have seen
specifically and in some detail how the (re)production of
culture and language is held to relate to the
(re)production of organisational power relations. Marcuse
shows how cultural relations are intertwined with relations
of authority and domination. This is so in that culture is
reduced from something which is shared and collectively
generated into something functionalised and manipulated,
that is culture becomes a managed variable which is
'affirmative' of pre-established socio-economic conditions
and cultural/linguistic interactions. The (re)production of
culture falls under functional criteria and is seen as an
operationalised variable by (neo)Human Relations management
theory. For Marcuse this tendency is connected to the
broader question of the socio-political shaping of
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knowledge and as such is connected to his deeper critique
of the effects of technological rationality, positivism and
scientism which are explored in the next chapter.
This chapter has tried to extrapolate from the work of
Marcuse aspects which are relevant to the critique of the
specifics of (neo)Human Relations management theory as it
exhibits this functional approach to culture, language and
meaning production. This critique shows that (neo)Human
Relations management theory exhibits features such as the
repressive humanisation of organisational relations;
demonstrates that its approach is guided by an underlying
position similar to what Marcuse calls the 'closing of the
universe of discourse', where language and communication
operates within an artificially constrained research agenda
and a correspondingly contained universe of perception and
meaning; this has involved an analysis of the linguistic
constructions themselves, where certain linguistic
construction embody the underlying containment. Part of the
critical analysis of these linguistic constructions,
against the backdrop of the more general critical analysis
of culture has been to shown how language (within
(neo)Human Relations management theory) proceeds through
the loss of meaning characterised by the 'personalisation',
'hyphenation', 'acronymisation' and the general reduction
of language and communication to a 'plastic language'. It
is argued that such a critical analysis holds potential for
the development of the Critical Theory of organisations in
general and the specific critique of (neo)Human Relations
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management theory in particular. This is especially the
case given the 'depth hermeneutic' methodology proposed for
the analysis of ideology in chapter 3. It is these critical
conceptions which will be taken forward and applied in a
more concrete way in chapter 9 as the 'interpretation of
meaning' component of such a 'depth hermeneutic'.
Firstly however, there is one further aspect of Marcuse's
work which needs to be elaborated for the fully developed
application of his critical insights. This is an
explication of his theories of rationalisation,
specifically the rationalisation of relations of
domination, and the critique of the 'technological
rationality' underpinning this. It is with an analysis of
this that the next chapter is concerned.
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CHAPTER 7.
TECHNOLOGICAL RATIONALITY AND THE RATIONALISATION OF 
DOMINATION. 
A fourth significant feature of Marcuse's work is his
critique of technological rationality and 'one dimensional
thought' (Marcuse 1964). In this critique, Marcuse relates
the nature of reason and rationality to the changed nature
of social control and a rationalisation of domination. He
locates this rationalisation within the 'triumph of
positivistic thinking' and to the political effects of the
technological/utilitarian orientation inherent within one
dimensional thought. In exploring this, it is constructive
to consider what Marcuse considered to be its opposite, as
the critique of one dimensional thought is articulated
through the development of an alternative orientation.
In opposition to one dimensional thought, Marcuse discusses
a 'negative thinking' or 'negative philosophy' which echoes
a central theme of the Frankfurt School as a whole (Marcuse
1955, Fromm 1961, Horkheimer 1972, Adorno 1973, Adorno and
Horkheimer 1979). This critique relates to the development
of a critical, dialectical understanding of the world as
process, where the 'truth' of a phenomena is not given by
its formal (logical) definition but is enshrined in what
the phenomena can become, its potentialities (Marcuse
1955). The truth of the 'is' can only be found in terms of
its relation to the 'ought', the truth of becoming is
greater than the existent. Reason, as the comprehension of
this becoming is the route to truth and reality over and
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above formal, definitional logic and the positivistic
reduction of knowledge to method. In relation to this basic
position therefore, the 'truth' of an organisation is found
in its ability to become that which it can become, beyond
any pre-defined definitions of what 'an organisation' is .
This is the philosophical basis for an 'anti-organisation
theory' (Burrell and Morgan 1979). Here the organisation is
related to that which it could become in terms of the
human, creative and spiritual needs of individuals and
groups as part of the 'environment' upon which the
organisation is 'contingent'. Thus a negative philosophical
basis for a Critical Theory of organisations relates to the
development of '... the conditions in which men and things
become what they really are'.
One Dimensional Thought and the Study of Organisations.
However, Marcuse argues that a technological rationality
and the negation of Critical Reason is predominant. The
contemporary social reality is characterised by the
continuum of domination which is epistemologically linked
to pre-technological forms of Reason. Given the
rationalisation of domination civilisation replaces a
domination resting on the personal/charismatic with a form
of domination which rests upon claims about 'the objective
order of things'. The rationalisation of domination has
new, more 'objective' legitimations, as scientific, and
legal-rational legitimations replace more traditional ones.
For Marcuse domination within this one-dimensional way of
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thinking claims a higher rationality in its claim to be
linked to progress, rationalism and humanism. (Neo)Human
Relations management claims of humanism mean that
management can be rationalised and develop more
sophisticated techniques whilst still claiming a legitimacy
by colonising the rhetoric of humanism, thereby being more
'legitimate' as it becomes more ideological. Opposition to
this (irrational) rationalism is neutralised by a new
social (organisational) structure where formerly negative,
critical social forces are integrated by 'new forms of
control' as discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. The
integration of the potentially critical individual into the
organisation through the political, cultural and
psychological techniques found in the (neo)Human Relations
tradition and its contemporary versions is as much an
example of rationalised domination underpinned by a one-
dimensional thinking, as it is evidence of more obvious
political control. Such a rationalised domination creates
'... a mode of thought which is immune against anything
other than the established reality'.
The management of organisational culture and subjectivity
emphasises the development of a cultural environment
whereby the resolution of conflict can proceed within a
similarly predefined conceptual and structural framework,
of the organisation as it is. The orthodox academic study
of organisations tends to operate within an ambit beyond
which 'respectable' organisational theory does not go. A
radicalised analysis of the predominant 'structural-
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functionalist paradigm' within organisational studies
(Burrell and Morgan 1979) can be articulated effectively
through Marcuse's notion of one-dimensional thought. Within
the 'structural-functionalist paradigm', the organisation
is conceptually equated with 'the normal', as a given and
universal reality which legitimately operates as the
definer and arbitrator of the rational, over and above any
more human or ethical considerations. The organisational
universe is an example of the triumph of Logos over Eros,
whilst simultaneously allowing Logos to appear as a neutral
embodiment of scientific rationality. Values lie outside
this 'real' universe and such considerations are defined as
marginalised given their subjective nature, as less real
than the hard facts of the objective world and the
scientific investigation thereof.
Within the cultural and normative aspects of management,
'unreal' questions of subjective values geared towards the
expansion of autonomy and political efficacy have no part.
The development of managerial techniques which attempt to
control subjectivity by using the rhetoric of a humanism is
testimony not to the genuine humanism in management, but to
the contradictory nature of the technological rationality
underpinning such management.
Such a science/technology of management uses techniques
which attempt to foster values which are efficacious to the
interests of the organisation and develop a normative
dimension to control whilst simultaneously claiming a
legitimacy on the basis of scientific value-freedom and a
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neutral rationality. The rational grounds for legitimacy is
therefore in essence contradictory to the nature of some of
the contemporary techniques used. The useable elements in
the realm of ideas are operationalised by managerial
technologies of cultural compliance, whilst any
transcendant, oppositional elements in cultural values are
resisted.
This is evidence of the contradictory nature of the
application of purportedly objective science and technology
to a social and organisational world in the pursuit of
sectional interests, which offers an immediately
legitimated 'rational' set of techniques. This is evidence
of the reduction of science to 'scientism' and its
ideological and socio-political effects. Scientism in
management is not genuine science (the scientific approach
to the investigation of the social world may even be
inappropriate), and (neo)Human Relations management theory
adopts the verbal dress of the rationality and neutrality
of science. This however does not effect the central point
here, that 'scientific management' and the science of
management derives its academic and professional legitimacy
from the illusion of objectivity whilst referring to
normative and ideational criteria. In this respect the
(neo)Human Relations approach to managment which supersedes
'scientific managment', also supersedes it in its
ideologicalness, in its illusory scientificity which
involves the attempt to technically manipulate the realm of
ideas. Such management still moves in the scientistic
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reduction of knowledge to methodological principles and the
corresponding suspension of critical thought.
We have in Marcuse's work an expression of the deep
politico-epistemological basis for the critique of the
ideology of this instrumentalisation. In particular,
Marcuse articulates the link between the abstract
philosophical analysis of scientism and the political
process of domination. This is relevant to a critical
theory of organisations as it demonstrates the link between
the a priori establishment of the experiential universe and
the dominant rationality of the instrumentalisation of
individuals within management theory. The organisational
instrumentalisation of subjectivity and body by the
(neo)Human Relation tradition is the height of this
'reestablishment' of technological perceptions applied
precisely to the social and cultural 'systems' within the
organisations.
The Politics of Technological Rationality.
It may be argued that the 'machinery of the technological
universe' is or at least can be neutral in that specific
techniques are not synonymous with the political selection
process of a whole technology. However even this neutrality
is prescribed, and culminates in a non-neutral effect as
the social mode of production, organisational imperatives
and authority relations. Thus technological rationality is
the basic historical and conceptual underpinning of
specific elements of technology. Thus whilst specific
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techniques may be neutral, technology as a reflection of
the society in which it exists cannot be neutral. Marx
wrote, '...the hand-mill gives you the society with the
feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial
capitalist', and Marcuse echoes this when he writes
'...when technics becomes the universal form of material
production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects
a historical totality- a world' (Marcuse 1964. p.154).
Marcuse relates the development of scientific method to
this politics of technology. This involves the conflation
of the purely scientific realm of thought and the discovery
of a version of the 'truth', with the applied sciences
which are concerned with the operationalisation of
developments to control the natural and social worlds.
Although Marcuse recognises the essential difference
between pure and applied sciences, he argues that there is
an intimate connection.
The question here is to what extent is this connection
found within (neo)Human Relations management theory, and
what impact does the applied, technological nature of the
imperatives of much theory have upon its overall direction?
Expressed differently can such theory be seen as an example
whereby there is a simultaneous recognition and technical
solution to 'problems' predefined from within an already
existing productivist/instrumental meta-paradigm, as well
as within a more conceptually rigorous and explicit
structuralist-functionalist paradigm. To what extent does
(neo)Human Relation management theory define its own 'pure'
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science remit from within this meta-paradigm and proceed to
develop technical solutions accordingly? Chapter 9 in part
analyses the discourse of (neo)Human Relations management
theory as it relates to the interests of professional
management in terms of the received version of what
constitutes 'the problems' to be solved. As we shall see,
it provides evidence of the close link between the meta-
paradigmatic and one dimensional nature of such theory, the
technical imperatives it is thus faced with, and thus the
politicised nature of technological rationality. It
demonstrates the one dimensional nature of perceptions of
the techniques which can and should be developed and the
common assumptions around which theorists and practitioners
operate, especially with regard to 'the problem' of labour.
Marcuse argued that technological rationality tends towards
a politically interested rationality. This rationality
leads to the scientific elimination of independent
substances (in the natural and social world). The totalised
and reductive reason of science as method leads to a
specifically 'practical' conception of the relation between
object and subject, '...science has become in itself
technology' as the logic of technical domination is
embodied increasingly within the logic of science itself.
Rationalisation and instrumentalisation develop the
methodical organisation of matter (natural and human) as
the '...stuff of control'. Rationalised domination is found
on the epistemological level as much as on the political
level. The science of managment is perhaps the exemplar of
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this rationalised domination as it develops its own
particular science and technology. It is a form of
rationality which embodies its control orientation within
its very conception of the world as exploitable resources,
as well as the subsequent techniques for more effective
control of those exploitable resources.
Management theory can be seen predominantly as an
instrumentalist approach within an a priori determination
of the criteria of efficiency, productivity etc. Such an
instrumentalist attitude and its ideology of neutrality is
neutral in a methodological sense, but is only neutral
within and to the prevailing perceptions which are





rationality projects formalised, functionalised means which
are held to be prior to all application in concrete social
practice.
	 Thus bureaucracy,	 scientific management,
organised, organisational culture are examples of this
formally rational, instrumentalised means which, whilst
presented as such are underpinned by a specific,
politically active rationality and scientistic world-view.
(Neo)Human Relation management theory is perhaps novel in
the closeness of the link between the underlying
rationality and the techniques which it involves.
The one-dimensional tendencies within such a technological
rationality (as found in management/organisation theory) is
manifested in the particular engineering orientation to the
questions of structure and function and the reduction of
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subjectivity to operationalised primary qualities. This is
the basis of the underlying unity of the meta-paradigm of
the productivistic positivism of management theory, an
underlying unity characterised negatively by the common
neglect of the subjectivity and human potentialities in a
dialectical conception. Adorno and Horkheimer write, 'By
virtue of the rationalisation of the mode of labour, the
elimination of qualities is transferred from the universe
of science to that of daily life' (Adorno and Horkheimer
1979. p.50), and Marcuse goes on '...the internal
instrumentalist character of this scientific rationality by
virtue of which it is a priori technology, and the a priori
of a specific technology - (is) namely, technology, as a
form of social control and domination'. (Marcuse 1964.
p.157).
The political nature of technology and technological
rationality thus, for Marcuse relates to the fundamental
scientistic approach to the external world as a way of
thinking, not simply from specific concrete applications.
The instrumentalism within positivistic scientism
characterises it as a particularly 'rational' ideological
form of technological domination moving to define and
redefine the world in its own image, as well as provide
techniques of manipulation. Pure scientific objectivity
merges with practical domination and provides the
instrumentalities and conceptual universe for a domination
which operates by initiating a one-dimensionality at the
243
conceptual level as well as at the overtly political level.
A domination which carries its own internally derived
legitimation through its ability to circumscribe the
theoretically rational/realistic and thus the politically,
culturally and socially rational/realistic. In this way,
such technological rationality tends towards the
ideological in that it enshrines a self-legitimation and a
self-universalisation. The technological rationality of
(neo)Human Relations management theory is similarly
ideological in that it demonstrates the 'impossibility' and
'irrationality' of the conceptualisation and practice of
autonomy and independence outside the technically derived
organisational/organised universe. 'With respect to the
institutionalised forms of life, science (pure as well as
applied) would thus have a stabilising, 	 static,
conservative function' (Marcuse 1964. p.165). In this way
Marcuse relates the political/ideological nature of science
and technology to 'one-dimensional thought'. This position
is summarised when he writes
... in the medium of technology, man and nature
become fungible objects of organisation. The
universal effectiveness and productivity of the
apparatus under which they are subsumed veil the
particular interests that organise the apparatus.
In other words, technology has become the great
vehicle of reification - reification in its most
mature and effective form' (Marcuse 1964. p.168).
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In his critical analysis of the work of Weber, Marcuse
(1968b) can in essence be seen as providing an adjunct to
his more general critical discussion of 'one-dimensional
rationality'. He argues that for Weber, 'the concept of
industrial capitalism...becomes concrete in the formal
theory of rationality and of domination which are the two
fundamental themes of Economy and Society' (Marcuse 1968b.
p.203). The connection between capitalism, capitalist
organisations, rationality and domination stems from,
the specifically Western idea of reason
(which) realises itself in a system of material
and intellectual culture (economy, technology,
'conduct of life', science, art,) that develops
to the full in industrial capitalism, and this
system tends towards a specific type of
domination which becomes the fate of the
contemporary period; total bureaucracy (Marcuse
1968b. p.203).
Marcuse relates this history of politico-structural change
to a history of changes in Western philosophy culminating
in the triumph of positivistic science and technology.
Marcuse argues that the work of Weber shows that the form
of rationality in its specifically Western form is formed
by and helps to form capitalism. The 'rationalist way of
life' and the 'spirit of capitalism' stands in relation to
the objective concrete activities of the capitalist mode of
production. This 'elective affinity' of rationality and
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activity (ideas and interests) has decided upon the
specific form of power relations and their grounds for
legitimacy, the legal-rational grounds for authority in
bureaucracy. Marcuse's radical formulation sees this as
rationality becoming domination, rational action becoming
the maintenance of power. Rationalism, in the specific
concrete activities of bureaucratization are evidence of
what Marcuse refers to as the 'abdication of Reason'
(Marcuse 1955).
Marcuse's treatment of Weber highlights three factors
involved in purposive-rationality. Firstly the 'progressive
mathmatisation' of knowledge and experience. This is
related to the success of the natural sciences and leads to
the increased scientisation of other areas of study and
practice, culminating in the scientisation of the 'conduct
of life' in the rationalised society (eg. organisational
culture). Secondly a rational spirit is exhibited in the
insistence on rational experimentation and proof given the
adoption of the methodology of the natural sciences as
equated with the rational. This relates to the 'language of
total administration' discussed in chapter 6. Thirdly, this
culminates in the decisive factor of,
...the genesis and solidification of a universal,
technically trained organisation of officials
that become the 'absolutely inescapable condition
of our entire existence' With this last
characteristic, the transition from theoretical
to practical reason, to the historical form of
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reason is effected (Marcuse 1968b. p.204).
Such rationalisation is viewed by Marcuse as the
historically specific form of (surplus) repression and the
surrender of the bourgeois realm of freedom (internal will)
to the realm of unfreedom (external authority) (Marcuse
1968b, 1973b). Marcuse links the formal rationality of
bureaucratization to the substantive project of capitalism
and the modification of subjectivity in the pursuit of
discipline. Industrialisation and rationalisation, along
with its attendant repressions and irrationalities, are
ideologically expressed simply as the 'fate' of humanity,
as simply the 'iron cage' from which there is no escape, no
rational alternative. The interests from 'outside' which
determine such developments are presented as largely
independent of the individuals and institutions which
pursue them. The rationalisation of domination is presented
as occurring due to 'its own logic'.
Marcuse rejects this notion that rationalised domination
can be understood, as it is by Weber and Michels, as
separate from the material interests in society, as a
somehow 'objective technological law'. 'This fate (of
bureaucratic domination) has become a fate and inasmuch as
it has become a fate it can also be abolished. Any
scientific analysis that is not committed to this
possibility is pledged, not to reason, but to the reason of
established domination' (Marcuse 1968b. p.215). In
opposition to this one-dimensional thought Marcuse proposes
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a 'qualitative physics', as the recognition of the
relationship between truth and objectivity, and historical
human agency, as well as the rejection of the reduction of
human subjectivity to primary objective qualities. In terms
of how this might relate to organisation theory, the link




qualitatively different organisational practices,
behaviours and relations; of how organisations might be
informed by a qualitatively new science and a 'new
sensibility' (Marcuse 1979). Also of relevance here is the
reaffirmation of the dialectical tensions contained in
'another rationality', linked to the notion that truth lies
in the tension between the 'is' and the 'ought', that truth
lies in the notion of 'becoming' (Marcuse 1955). For
Marcuse, this would constitute the practical application of
'negative thinking' in a specific socio-political arena.
However, it is 'positive thinking' which has triumphed.
The 'Triumph of Positive Thinking'.
One-dimensional thought tends towards the establishment of
a particular social 'reality' through a 'therapeutic'
function. It is here that (neo)Human Relations management
theory provides the clearest evidence of such one
dimensional tendencies, given the 'therapeutic' claims and
emphases on integration it makes. Examples can be found in
the conceptualisation of organisations as organisms;
'organisational doctors' re-establishing a state of
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homeostasis; industrial psychology's emphasis on
'counselling'. Such 'therapeutic' claims are linked to the
claims of a (repressive) humanism. They are one-dimensional
in their reductive, ideological and essentially
conservative nature, as a fundamentally instrumentalist
conception. Such 'therapeutic' claims contribute to the
containment of thought to the confines of the established
universe of discourse. The (neo)Human Relations discourse
provides evidence of managements claim to 'cure' the
individual from any transgression of the established
boundaries of (organisational) thought or behaviour through
this integration and cultural identification with the
'rational' organisation. The ideological nature of this
'therapy' relates back to the 'closing of the universe of
discourse', the 'therapeutic' correction of behaviour which
the established one dimensional rationality may define as
'pathological'. This excludes critical thought and promotes
a conformist way of thinking.
For Marcuse, one-dimensional thought is closely linked to
the empiricist nature of positivistic thinking. Marcuse
writes 'the (empiricist) analysis, via correction and
improvement, terminates in affirmation; empiricism proves
itself as positive thinking' (Marcuse 1964. p.170). This
empiricist analysis tends to close the universe of
investigation to the technical questions, in this case to
the technical questions of management and is thus closely
linked to a pervasive managerialism involved in industrial
psychological and sociological investigation. Marcuse
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defines positivism as encompassing the validation of
cognition and experiential thought through relation to some
notion of the experience of objective 'facts'; the
orientation of cognitive thought to the methodology of the
physical sciences, as a method of certainty and exactitude;
the belief that progress in knowledge depends on this
orientation, that 'correct' thinking must be empiricist,
unified, physicalist; and that this positivism can
demarcate truth from falsehood and re-orient wayward
thinking through the aforementioned 'therapeutic' function
when applied through specific technologies. Such positivism
thus claims a produced harmony (again linked to a
therapeutic reorientation) between theory and practice,
truth and facts. This is achieved through a scientifically
authorised comprehension and transformation of the
(organisational) world.
This positivistically produced harmony and 'therapy' which
is able to re-orient wayward thinking is clearly evidenced
by the technocratic use of the concept of culture within
the (neo)Human Relations management theory. This is reduced
from a notion of the shared creation and generation of
meanings to something used within the technological
manipulation of the organisational relations to reorient
thought to that required by the organisation. Such a
technocratic use of the concept of culture thus tends
towards having this 'therapeutic' effect upon subjectivity.
It tends towards having the ideological effect of producing
an affirmative 'correctness' of attitude sanctioned by the
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organisation, as discussed in chapter 6. We have here in
Marcuse analysis of the political impact of positive
thinking, a conceptual/epistemological counterpart at the
level of rationality to the social psychological formation
of a group-mind and its tendency towards producing
conformity to received norms and attitudes. Such a
political impact upon subjectivity is doubly hard to resist
given both its 'rationality' and its sociality.
For Marcuse therefore, positivist thinking displays a self-
validation. It tends to be self-legitimating of the
boundaries of the rational.
Marcuse speaks of a 'philosophical behavioursim', as the
movement between the two poles of 'pontificating authority'
and 'easy-going chumminess'. He argues that this is a
characteristic of positivistic thinking derived from the
self-incurred curtailment of philosophy to the natural
scientific project, and a masochistic attitude with which
such philosophy surrendering itself up to scientism. This
masochistic characteristic of philosophy is paralleled by
something similar in the general arena of Human Relations,
Personnel Management, Human Resource Management and
managerialist social science. All exhibiting the same bi-
polarity between 'pontificating authority' and
'chumminess', developing out of a similar masochistic,
alienated objectification of itself in/to/for the
organisation. Managerialist social science ultimately moves
between the 'pontificating authority' of Scientific
Management and the 'easy-going chumminess' of the
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(neo)Human-Relation perspective. As the detailed analysis
developed in chapter 9 will show, such a formulation makes
some sense. When Marcuse writes the following of one-
dimensional thought in general, it could easily be applied
to a (neo)Human relations managerialist social science
underpinned by positivist thinking. He writes;
orienting itself on the reified universe of
everyday discourse, and exposing and clarifying
this discourse in terms of this reified universe,
the (one-dimensional) analysis abstracts from the
negative...by classifying and distinguishing
meanings, and keeping them apart, it purges
thought and speech of contradictions, illusions
and transgressions (whilst initiating new
illusions)...The therapeutic character of the
philosophical analysis is strongly emphasised -
to cure from illusions, deceptions, obscurities,
unsolvable riddles, unanswerable questions, from
ghosts and spectres. Who is the patient?'
(Marcuse 1964. p.182).
The 'patient', and their 'suffering' is defined by the one-
dimensional conception of the social world and by the
political practice which it legitimates. The 'patient' and
the 'illness' is defined by the manager and by the
organisational reality as such a one-dimensionality in
thought, language and culture is the restriction of those
elements of social life to the parameters of the 'real'.
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The 'therapeutic' co-ordination of the individual as a cure
for an organisationally defined 'illness', as an
individualised problem occurs on the technical level as the
individual is helped to become more efficient, and on a
more general normative level as the social and cultural
reality of the organisation is reaffirmed. Power in
organisations thus involves the ability to generate and
maintain on both the practical and conceptual level a
similar philosophical reduction of experience and thought
to behind the curtain of the rationally, scientistically
established world of empirically 'proven' positive facts.
This is an especially effective 'new form of control' when,
as in the case of contemporary (neo)Human Relations
management perspectives, the rationally derived curtain is
that of 'humanistic' organisational relations,
participation and a 'plurality' of power in organisational
negotiation. A unitary version of organisational power
emerges from behind the facade of pluralism as real power
is seen in the ability to circumscribe, here on the
conceptual level, the nature and content of an
institutionalised conflict.
Given the above, Marcuse writes, 'The technical
achievements of advanced industrial society, and the
effective manipulation of mental and material productivity
have brought a shift in the locus of mystification...the
rational rather than the irrational becomes the most
effective vehicle of mystification.' (Marcuse 1964. p.187).
Exactitude and (critical) analysis is as vital as ever as
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positivist and empiricist social science has colonised the
intellectual high ground, in management theory as much as
anywhere else. However positivistic social science fails to
be concrete with respect to the context and determination
of the functions to which such analysis relates. For
example structuralist-functionalist organisational analysis
claims exactitude and scientificity without recognising its
technical and managerialist underpinnings and the sectional
interest which they stem from. For Marcuse the challenge to
this type of social science requires the development of a
qualitatively different social theoretical stance, but one
which is still and perhaps even more exact and thorough.
For Marcuse, 'exact' knowledge should not be reduced to the
politically sanitised production of techniques. It should
develop a more genuine exactitude, should be more empirical
than positivism in that it would not so easily assume the
relevance or irrelevance of certain variables. For Marcuse
this qualitatively new knowledge would be a knowledge which
understood its own historical and socio-political context.
With relevance to the development of this type of knowledge
in the field of organisation theory, Marcuse writes 'This
context is larger than that of the plants and shops
investigated... This real context in which the particular
subjects obtain their real significance is definable only
within a theory of society' (Marcuse 1964. p.190). That is
to say, to develop a theory which locates the factors which
determine, influence and require certain data and which
make them relevant, whilst not hypostatising society.
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Marcuse therefore demonstrates his commitment
philosophy.
The Historical Commitment to Philosophy.
For Marcuse the commitment to philosophy and rejection of
positivistic social science revolves around the
continuation of the commitment to universals such as Will,
Self and Soul. Marcuse argues that positivistic philosophy,
and perhaps more recently some post-Modern philosophies,
have tended to exorcise such concepts. This philosophical
commitment to universals involves a supra-linguistic
analysis of the 'part' within the whole, but also an
analysis which transcends the contained appearance of
everyday reality. This philosophical commitment continues
as part of the critique of the political and experiential
process whereby universals are 'dissolved' as
analyzed/sanitised particulars. Marcuse's commitment to
philosophy maintains a critique of the process whereby
'circumstances' compel the individual to identify Mind with
managed mental processes, their Self with the duties and
responsibilities required for accordance with socially
(organisationally) conditioned behaviour. The micro-
linguistic analysis of traditional hermeneutics would be an
example of the philosophical neglect of such
'circumstances' for Marcuse, and thus we can see that the
'depth hermeneutic' central to this thesis is commensurate
with the Marcusean politics-epistemology. Indeed it could
be argued that the continued commitment to philosophy is
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the key similarity between Marcuse and the Habermasian
development of 'depth hermeneutics'.
For Marcuse, philosophy and Critical Theory must translate
and articulate social and experiential processes
influencing and reducing Mind and Body. A problem with this
formulation however is the invocation of universals by
politically conservative philosophy, universals such as
'nation' and 'state', and indeed 'organisation'. Marcuse
argues that these conservative universals are reified terms
for entities which do not exist in any existential sense.
Here we see that Marcuse's commitment to philosophy
contributes not only to a critical theory of organisation,
but to an 'anti-organisation theory' (Burrell and Morgan
1979). Conservative universals are collective terms for
various forms of relations and activities (Bittner 1965,
Hassard and Pym 1990). The organisational integration and
operationalisation of sub-entities does give the
'organisation' an existence, in the sense that there is a
tangibility to the effects and symbolic manifestations of
the organisation, but this is evidence of the ideological
conflation of the particular and historically contingent
with illusory universals. As alluded to in chapter 3,
Parekh (1982) makes similar criticisms of Classical
Economics. The existence of entities such as the
'organisation' should not be equated with universals in any
fundamental sense, as the reality of such entities is
superimposed as an independent existence through
ideological representations. The commitment to philosophy
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involves a commitment to a 'transcendant' recognition that
these entities should be translatable to economic functions
and thus understood as historically contingent. For
instance, in Essay on Liberation and Eros and Civilisation
Marcuse articulates the political possibility to go beyond
the institutionalised universalisation of repressive
authority relationships, experience (of labour) and (self)
perceptions. In terms of substantive political philosophy,
this is a commitment to a negative philosophical
reconceptualisation of the radical potential involved in
genuine universals such as sexuality, labour and
consciousness for the articulation of the potential of
expanded autonomy and happiness. The purported difficulty
in social theoretical investigation which involves such
notions as subjectivity, happiness and autonomy is produced
by the difficulty in translating these universals due to
the division of experience between on the one hand world of
fact, the 'is', and on the other the world of value, the
'ought', which scientism generates. Such a division is a
priori imposed by the positivistic world-view and
references to it as an arbiter of the epistemological
status of a theory are as such already political. To
counter this conservative position one can only refer to a
radical humanism which does not claim truth but a concern
to articulate the practical potential for the improvement
of the human condition, discussed in chapter 1. This is to
articulate the distinction between the actual and the
potential which one-dimensional thought both generates and
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closes down to the dimension of the actual. In the end
Marcuse (1979, 1979b) proposes an aesthetic rationality
which involves the glimpsing of other dimensions of reality
and potentials for social and sexual existence which do not
rest upon the reductionist, definitional logic
characteristic of positivistic social science.
One Dimensional Thought, Technology and Progress.
As part of his general critique of one dimensional
rationality (Marcuse 1941, 1964) Marcuse develops a
critique of one dimensional conceptions of progress.
Marcuse (1970) makes a distinction between what he calls
'technical progress' and 'humanitarian progress'. This
highlights the ideological nature of technological
rationality in advanced capitalism, and uncovers the effect
of this ideology upon the subjectivity of individuals
(Marcuse 1966).
For Marcuse 'technical progress' is understood as a
quantitative phenomena, revolving around the concerns for
more knowledge, more techniques and more mastery over
nature and humanity. Such a 'technical progress' tends to
imply the conception of nature and humanity as having the
status of resource. This underlying conception of humanity
as resource is fundamental to (neo)Human Relation
management theory, indeed the very notion of management is
itself to a large extent an emanation of such a view.
Management as the use of others to meet a
person/professional/commercial end not determined by the
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person being used is precisely to reduce humanity to a
resource. The 'humanism' of contemporary management does
not alter this underlying feature of the purely 'technical
progress' of managerialism.
On the other hand, the notion of 'humanitarian progress'
moves through the realisation of human freedom and
potentialities, the reduction of (surplus) repression and
of emotional and material suffering, That is, for Marcuse
'humanitarian progress' is a qualitative phenomena, or a
qualitative reconceptualisation of the very notion of
progress. These two conceptualisations of progress can be
linked to the notion of degrees of ideology discussed in
chapter 3. On both methodological and political levels,
'technical progress' is formally biased with a
preconception of what is meant by progress given definite
institutional imperatives. This incorporates a substantive
bias in that some use others as a resource. 'Humanitarian
progress' is formally biased in that it also has a
teleology and preconceptions as to what will constitute
progress. However it involves less substantive bias given
its open-endedness and its refusal to define the human
simply as resource. It is therefore less ideological.
There is for Marcuse an inner connection between these two
conceptions of technology, 'technical progress' being the
precondition for 'humanitarian progress', but 'technical
progress' is also the negation of 'humanitarian progress'.
Marcuse's conceptualisation of progress and the
potentialities within the material conditions which
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pertain, is a dialectical one. For him, 'humanitarian
progress' can perhaps best be understood as the de-
alienation of 'technical progress', the notion of the
'humanitarian' being distinguished from the (repressive)
humanism which is the ideological solution to the
contradictions of industrial capitalism. This is both based
upon and creates the purportedly neutral 'technical
progress' as something conflated with the common good. For
Marcuse, 'technical progress' assumes firstly a high degree
of mastery over nature as the basis for social 'wealth'.
This is itself a 'technical' conceptualisation of 'good'
and as such relates to the self-referential, self-
legitimation of one-dimensional thought.	 Secondly,
'technical progress' involves the philosophical
neutralisation of the concept of progress, the negation of
the link between technological developments and human
needs. This is the negation of the link between the
necessary and the beautiful, the body and the mind, reality
and the possible. This philosophical negation or
'splitting' parallels the cultural and political
'splitting' in other spheres of life (Marcuse 1964, 1966,
1968a, 1973).
Marcuse relates this reduction and negation of the concept
of progress to the utilitarian nature of positivistic
underpinnings of technology which leads to the relegation
of the qualitative, humanitarian notion of progress to the
status of 'utopian'. Marcuse argues that the form which
this utilitarianism takes in contemporary society is linked
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to the notion of (organisational) productivity and
efficiency. This 'technical progress' related to
(organisational) productivity and efficiency is also
related to the technical concerns with transformation of
human subjectivity as much as with the transformation of
matter. Given this, the ideological negation of
ontological/humanitarian questions about the nature of
progress tend to remove the questions of whose interests
the particular historical manifestation of progress are.
The formal bias of 'technical progress' embodies a
substantive bias of the movement towards specific ends. The
easy assumption of the system and its technology as in the
common good becomes a self-justifying proposition.
Scientific management's notion that labour and the
management of labour can be reduced to a set of purely
technical questions is a concrete example of such a
reductionist 'technical progress', which also ideologically
negates the inherent political and existential questions
involved. Marcuse writes 'It seems as though productivity
becomes increasingly an end in itself, and the question of
the application of productivity not only remains open, but
is increasingly repressed' (Marcuse 1970. p.30).
A critical theory of organisations is improved given this
critique of scientism and technologism. A critique of
management technology which attempts to control the social
and cultural aspects of the organisation is an example in
a specific field of the ideological nature of the
'technical progress' which Marcuse describes. The
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historical trends within (neo)Human Relations management
theory described in chapter 8 relate to the imperatives of
the technical coordination and social control of the
aspects or the organisation.
Marcuse highlights a particular technised factor which also
has a good deal of resonance with the notion that
management and organisation, and their impact upon the
subject. The example which Marcuse points to here is time,
and the mechanisation of time. It is argued by Marcuse that
the mechanisation of time is a particular characteristic of
the modern, technical view of progress. Time is
operationalised into work time and is thus separated from
the lives of those whose time is subject to management. The
clock becomes the most powerful piece of technology which
changes the subject (Mumford 1936, Giddens 1991). For
Marcuse this example is inherently linked to the view that
technical progress, or more accurately the technicised
conceptualisation of progress, is linked to disturbance,
unhappiness, negativity and heteronomy. Technical progress
so conceived, is or becomes an end in itself.
For Marcuse such a critique is linked to the radicalisation
of Freud's general thesis that progress in civilisation is
premised upon discontent and the renunciation of
instinctual gratifications. The logic of the (neo)Human
Relations position which holds that progress is best
produced by increasing the 'happiness' of workers in the
organisation can be seen as the 'solution' in the realm of
consciousness to this fundamental contradiction. The
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provocativeness of the (neo)Human Relations position is the
recombining of the human and the technical elements within
the organisation. But this 'happiness' of the human, the
concentration on the 'human factor' (plastic language)
within the organisation is motivated by essentially
technical concerns. A provocative humanism, claimed by
(neo)Human Relations position, can only be maintained if
and when its logic and dynamic is transcendant of the
existent objective conditions which fundamentally require
the discontent of the individual in the name of necessity
and productivity. That is, the 'humanism' of the (neo)Human
Relations perspectives stems from a 'technical progress'
and not a 'humanitarian progress'. As we saw in chapter 4,
Marcuse defines the nature of repression as surplus
repression which means that the technological maintenance
of repressive conditions is not an historical
inevitability. The technology of (neo)Human Relations
management maintains a level of surplus repression. To the
extent that the maintenance of civilised conduct and stable
social relations requires some repression of instinctual
drives, some basic repression is inevitable, Freud and
Marcuse agree on this. The Reality Principle must govern or
at least mediate the Pleasure Principle. But Marcuse
questions why the particular, historically contingent
reality should be based upon this 'productive renunciation'
characterising surplus repression, and why this reality
should be equated with progress. It is this qualitative
questioning of the dehistorisiced and dehumanised content
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of 'progress', as linked to his more general themes of the
critique of the nature of reason and rationality, which is
fundamental for Marcuse. The organisation, given the
centrality of the cultural dimension of management and the
unquestioned centrality of progress through productivity,
can perhaps be seen as the vehicles for this unprogressive
progress. In parallel to this, the organisation as an end-
in-itself culminates in the negation of the humanisation of
production, the negation of the truly human creative
potential. This situation is especially powerful in
modifying behaviour where the moment of repression where
managerial and organisation technologies revolves around
the rhetoric of 'freedom' and 'democracy'. That is, the
more 'pleasurable' the reality within the organisation the
more secure is the system of repression. The more
'humanistic' the 'psychic prison' the more secure the
prison is. In relation to the theoretical formulation of
degrees of ideology, the more reasonable the formal bias of
'technical progress' the more secure is the substantive
bias.
'Technical progress' as underpinned by a 'truth'
orientation fuelled by positivism (Marcuse 1941, 1955) can
be seen as a practical combination of a formally biased
system of knowledge and substantively biased, practically
interested and 'closed' technological orientation.
'Humanitarian' progress is a more qualitative conception,
involving a formal bias given its underpinning values, but
this formal bias does not necessarily culminate in a
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substantive bias. The qualitative nature of 'humanitarian
progress' involves an openness with respect to the
historical possibilities of the content of progress, it
does not embody the specific imperatives of greater control
and mastery.
Summary.
This chapter has elucidated the more conceptual,
epistemological and philosophical aspects of Marcuse's work
which relates to the critique of (neo)Human Relations
management theory. Marcuse demonstrates the one-dimensional
tendencies within orthodox scientistic thought and
technological rationality. He links this 'triumph of
positive thinking' to a politics of knowledge and culture
and relates these meta-theoretical objections to the more
practical political consequences of theoretical
pronouncements and technological strategies emanating
therefrom. Of particular relevance here, we have seen how
Marcuse relates the (spurious) 'therapeutic' trajectory
within such technological rationality. Such tendencies
serve to integrate the individual into (ideological)
cultural patterns, beliefs and norms affirmative of
existent authority relations. A critique of this 'therapy'
forms a major point in the critical analysis of (neo)Human
Relations management discourse developed in chapter 9.
A further aspect of this critique is the distinction
Marcuse makes between 'technical' and 'humanitarian'
versions of progress. This critically elucidates the notion
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that whilst (neo)Human Relations management theory purports
to be progressive, in that it 'humanises' organisational
relations, it does so from a particularly affirmative
perspective which exhibits a similar positivist and
conservative tone. The 'progress' of (neo)Human Relations
management theory is a 'technical' progress which has at
its heart the reproduction of already existing authority
relations and as such exhibits a substantive bias. This
critique enables the resituating of (neo)Human Relations
management theory as an contemporary example of
technological rationality which has ideological
connotations. As with the other aspects of the work of
Marcuse which have relevance for the critique of (neo)Human
Relations management theory, these aspects of critique will
be taken forward for the detailed analysis of (neo)Human
Relation management theory below.
The previous four chapters have been concerned with an
exposition of certain aspects of Marcuse's work which form
the 'social analysis' component of a 'depth hermeneutic'
outlined in chapter 3. Such an exposition has sown the
relevance for a critique of (neo)Human Relations management
theory of the radical social psychology of Marcuse and his
radicalisation of psychoanalysis; his discussion of the
ideological nature of 'new forms of control'; his critical
analysis of culture and language linked to the
(re)production of power relations and the part these
aspects play in ideological reproduction; and his critique
of technological rationality, the positivistic/ scientistic
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underpinnings and the rationalisation of domination. These
aspects have been discussed as and when they have been
relevant for a critique of (neo)Human Relations management
theory in general terms. However having discussed the
details of this Marcusean perspective, it is now necessary
to turn to a more detailed and concrete analysis of the
(neo)Human Relations management discourse in the light of
these critical conceptions. This again is in line with the
'depth hermeneutic' methodology, highlighted above. The
prolonged discussion of the work of Marcuse forms the
social analysis component of this method. We now turn to
the discourse analysis and interpretation of meaning
components advocated by Thompson (1984). The first aspect
of this is to highlight the historical emergence of a
constellation of discourses which all revolved around the
growing managerial concerns with socio-cultural relations
in general, the human subject in the organisation,
questions of motivation and meaning in work and ultimately
the development of managerial techniques to increase
control over such aspects of organisational behaviour. The
contemporary 'leading authors/texts' in the historical
development of this discourse will then be empirically
identified. This will form the 'discourse analysis'
component of the 'depth hermeneutic' to allow for the
subsequent critical 'interpretation of meaning', in the




SUBJECTIVITY AND CULTURE IN (NEO)HUMAN RELATION MANAGEMENT
THEORY; THE HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF A DISCOURSE AND ITS
LEADING AUTHORS. 
As outlined in chapter 3, a necessary component of the
'depth hermeneutic' research strategy central to this
thesis is a 'discourse analysis'. This chapter will be
concerned with two aspects of such an analysis, firstly a
brief discussion of the historical emergence of the
managerial discourses which revolve around questions of
subjectivity and culture. This history will explore some of
the broad structural features against which this shift of
emphasis within management theory occurred. It will also
suggest that a 'human relations movement' (Hollway 1991) is
at the heart of this shift. Secondly, it will provide an
empirical indication of the leading authors and texts
within this 'human relations' discourse. Such a discourse
analysis will then enable the 'interpretation of meaning'
component of the 'depth hermeneutic' to be developed in the
next chapter. This will enable the analysis as a whole,
relating to the critical inquiry into the ideological
nature of organisations and the power-laden reproduction of
subjectivity and cultures within organisations, to be
developed.
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The Historical Emergence of a Management Discourse Around
Subjectivity and Culture.
Chapter 2 has explored some of the existent critical
organisation theory which focuses upon the issue of
subjectivity and culture in organisations. To contribute to
this I have suggested the application of the Critical
Theory of Marcuse. To develop such an applied analysis, it
was also suggested that a 'depth hermeneutic' strategy
would be germane. This however requires the development of
a specifically discursive analysis and an inquiry into the
historical emergence of the particular discourse in
question.
At its most general, the historical background to the
concerns with subjectivity and culture within
organisational theory relates to a structural dimension.
This refers to the rationalisation and bureaucratization of
organisations and society. This historical process brings
with it the unintended consequences of making the question
of consensus, commitment and meaning within work
problematic. Part of this is the general shift from
mechanistic approach to management and organisational
design to more 'organic' approaches. These more 'organic'
approaches tend to revolve at least in part around the
control of the human, social and cultural features of
organisations. An analysis of rationalisation and its
unintended consequences raises question first and most
thoroughly explored by Max Weber (1964, 1968). However,
post-Weberian and 'human relations' scholarship does more
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to emphasise social, subjective and cultural features
within the history of organisational studies in the sense
that the informality of organisations was recognised
(Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939, Mayo 1949, Gouldner 1954,
Burns and Stalker 1961, Blau 1963, 1972, Merton 1968,
Lawrence and Lorsch 1969). Although these theorists in no
way constitute a recognised 'school', such management and
organisation theory can be seen as making the following
points. (a) most fundamentally, that the dysfunctional
nature of bureaucratic structures and 'scientific
management' practices stem from the structural, personal
and relational features of such formally rational systems;
(b) that social and individual action within these formal
systems of rule-governed behaviour, result in inefficiency,
ineffectiveness, goal-displacement and over-conformity; (c)
that informal practices and attitudes contrary to the
organisations declared aims will arise; (d) that a
depersonalisation of relations within the organisation, and
between the organisational representatives and potential
clients will arise; (e) management should therefore assume
the responsibility for the control of social, cultural and
motivational factors inside the organisation.
For these theorists such dysfunctions arise due to the
immanent qualities of bureaucratic and 'scientific
management' formalism, not due to some particular
pathological incidents.
Contemporary versions of a structural emphasis signalling
this historical shift are found in 'post Modern' debate in
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organisation theory (Burrell 1988, Clegg 1990). This points
firstly to the dysfunctions of bureaucracy, and secondly to
the increased effectiveness of less rigid, hierarchical,
and more decentralised organisational forms. It was in part
due to this recognition that the focus upon socio-cultural
and informal aspects of organisational behaviour emerged
within managerial discourse. The relative breaking up of
the bureaucratic form as the norm within capitalist
industry is the most contemporary aspect of the historical
process which has given impetus to the development of a
managerialist approach to subjectivity and culture
(Alvesson 1989, Lepietz 1992). In recent years similar
shifts in debate around decentralisation, de-
differentiation and 'voluntarism' within the labour
process, flexibility within the team orientation have
fallen under the rubric of 'post-Fordism' (Piori and Sabel
1984, Sayers,A. 1985, Pollett 1988, Murray 1989, Rustin
1989, Clegg 1990, Parker and Slaughter 1990, Brenner and
Glick 1991, Lipietz 1992). If Fordism was and is about
large scale centralised productive units; an intense
division of labour; the deskilling of work characterised by
the separation of conception of work from its execution;
and Tayloristic management principles all culminating in a
notion of 'the one best way' of organising, then the
practical move away from this method of organisation has
been labelled 'post-Fordism'. Leaving aside whether, or to
what extent such changes have occurred, (Pollet 1988,
Murray 1989, Brenner and Glick 1991) at its most general
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level 'post-Fordism' is purportedly characterised by the
following; a decentralisation of the large monolithic
productive unit into smaller units operating a more batch
production orientation; a return to a 'craft' production
process and a 'reskilling' of the flexible worker; the
attempt to facilitate more flexible responses to the
contingencies of diversified markets; and a deconstruction
of established hierarchical relations within the
organisation (Piore and Sabel 1984). These structural
changes in organisational responses require the
facilitation of a more committed workforce, integrated into
the organisational project. For such organisational
structures and strategies to succeed this integrative and
normative aspects is of increased importance. As Willmott
(1993) points out the growth in the concern with corporate
culture and integrative aspects of managerial concern with
worker subjectivity can be seen as 'an important
ideological element within the global restructuring of
capital'	 (Willmott 1993. p. 518), as post-Fordism
emphasises teamness, co-operation and collaboration within
and across traditional organisational boundaries.
The decentralisation and fragmentation of the bureaucracy,
and the end of the 'one best way' of Fordism forms the
structural backdrop for the development of managerial
strategies for the control the organisation understood as
a social, cultural and political system and the managerial
focus on subjectivity.
The other important general and structural aspect of
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historical shift of emphasis was the development of a full
employment economy in the West in the 1950's and 60's which
meant that labour and the attitudes of the workforce was
seen as an important variable by capital (Bendix 1972,
Baritz 1974, Anthony 1977, van der Wee 1986).
Given the decentralisation of many organisations and the
emphasis on the control of socio-cultural factors which
these structural changes create, management has been faced
with a historically new set of imperatives (Bendix 1972,
Baritz 1974, Anthony 1977, Parker and Slaughter 1990). The
historical development of the managerial strategies for the
control of the human component and socio-cultural aspects
of the organisation is therefore revealing and forms the
data-base for the critical analysis developed below.
The historical development of the specific function of
personnel management, along with industrial psychology and
sociology can be related to the more general historical
development of managerial concerns with the control of
socio-cultural factors. (Fox 1966, Chrichton 1969, Cherns
1972, Henstridge 1974, Anthony 1977, Watson 1980, Thompson
1983, Rose 1989, Steffy and Grimes 1993).
Fox (1966) shows how by the 1920's British Personnel
management were concerned to be the 'human engineer who
goes into the factory to see that all the human machines
are working at their highest potential' (Fox 1966. p. 14).
The imperative to deal with socio-cultural aspects came
from the need to control informality and subjectivity. We
see here that at the heart of the historical development of
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personnel management was the dual function of the
coordination of material factors and the control of human
factors of production. This is a specific case of the more
general proposition that the technical function and the
ideological function have always been central to the
management profession in general as well as to the 'human
relations movement' in particular (Pollard 1965, Alvesson
1989, Hollway 1991).
Steffy and Grimes (1993) argue that Personnel and
Organisational Psychology (POP) as a discipline has
developed from positivistic 'knowledge-producing' roots
common with scientific management and human engineering
which has developed into Human Resource Management. Given
the historical development of such managerial endeavours,
it has been argued that experiences of work have had an
impact on the social production of individual identity
(Sennett and Cobb 1977, Salaman and Thompson 1980, Rose
1989, Knights and Willmott 1990, Thompson and McHugh 1990,
Collinson 1992).
This is evidenced by the growth in the post World War 2
professional management and administrative endeavour to
reshape or 'correct' the behaviour of others. Salaman and
Esland identifies psychiatry, social work, industrial and
occupational psychology and personnel management as
examples of the organisational/institutional site and
professional discourse within this historical trend.
There has been a historical growth and professionalisation
of these 'people-working' professions, of which personnel
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management and organisational psychology are part. For
Salaman and Esland this 'therapeutic' control is related to
the growth of technological rationality in relation to the
understanding and control of human behaviour, the
subsequent bureaucratization of specialisms and the
rationalisation of human behaviour. It also signals the
shift in the nature of control and domination which arises
as such 'therapeutic' control stems from the
professionalised impact upon subjectivity. In this way the
workplace setting, as the reproduction of definite socio-
economic relations impacting upon the identity of
individuals, relates to a critique of ideology and the
ideological impact of organisations. Formal rationality as
exemplified by the mechanistic, bureaucratic structures and
processes also relates to the ideological nature of
domination as it is able to equate itself internally with
the 'rational', technical necessity, so masking the
sectional interest which often lay behind particular
decisions (Anthony 1977, Burawoy 1979, 1985, Edwards 1979,
Alevsson 1989).
The historical emergence of the organisational psychology
discourse is worth commenting on here in that it forms part
of the technological armoury which the history of the
management of subjectivity highlights. Thompson and McHugh
(1990) have shown how socially produced identities are a
'central factor' in delineating the experience of work, and
how the management of the 'subjective factor' in
organisations forms a route whereby the experience of work
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and individual identity is managed. However, in connection
to the main point being developed here, we can see how the
historical emergence of organisational psychology discourse
is part of the technicist reproduction and transformation
of identities formed in the workplace.
Another aspect of the general historical emergence in
organisational studies of a discourse around subjective and
cultural features is the 'culturism' in organisational
analysis (Willmott 1993). Whilst tangentially recognising
the social network within the organisation, such analysis
does more to emphasise the specifically cultural and
symbolic components of the organisation.
In recent years this has been an area of particularly rapid
growth in managerialist, instrumentally oriented
organisation theory (Davis 1984, Graves 1986, Olins 1989,
Denison 1990, Hampden-Turner 1990, Lessem 1990, Kotter and
Heskett 1992, Aldersey-Williams 1993). This historical
shift of emphasis has not however escaped critical
attention (Turner 1986, 1990, Alvesson 1990, 1993, Willmott
1993).
The general approach to 'culture' here is a technological
approach to corporate identity and symbolism from within
this general managerialist perspective. The rationale
behind such analysis involves the technological attempt to
operationalise culture, motivation and identification to
within the pre-established ambit of the organisational
culture. The development of this general concern with
culture is thus shown to be linked with the fundamental
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concern with organisational efficiency and success,
especially with regard to motivating its personnel through
the generation of a collective, normative framework and
shaping subjectivity. The general concern within this area
of organisational studies involves both the attempt to
analyze the cultural features of organisational culture,
the 'honest grapplers' (Turner 1986. See also Willmott
1993); and the attempt to generate operationalised
corporate cultures as some magical formula to solve the
problems of recalcitrant labour and to socialise
individuals into the corporate universe (Peters and
Waterman 1982, Davis 1984, Kilmann 1985, Graves 1986, Olins
1989, Denison 1990, Hampden-Turner 1990, Lessem 1990,
Kotter and Heskett 1992). The historical development of
such technicist research into organisational culture comes
from the general 'human relations' perspective. As Willmott
writes, the origins of corporate culturism lay in
managerial gurus promotion of 'excellence' through a
'strengthened' organisational culture (Peters and Waterman
1982), in Human Resource Management and in the concern with
the symbolic dimensions of organisational life (Gagliardi
1990, Turner 1990). These managerial strategies all relate
in some way back to the general 'human relations movement'
central to this historical development. These views all
emphasise organisations as being socio-cultural systems of
human and social interaction, which is intimately linked to
managerial imperatives of controlling these variables so as
to maintain a state of internal cultural equilibrium. The
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management of organisational culture is a specific case of
the general scientistic integration of the individual and
potential sub-cultures. Externally it is concerned with the
projection of an appropriate 'corporate personality' into
the environment.
Willmott highlights the inherently ideological nature of
corporate culturism in its attempt to 'solve' in
consciousness the practical contradictions of capitalism.
He highlights how corporate culturalism approaches the
human subject to be managed in terms of a human nature
which is to be 'simultaneously respected and exploited', in
such a way that any 'humanism' within such managerial
strategies and the theories which underpin them is
inherently geared towards increased performance. This
relates to the notion that such managerial strategies are
characterised by a 'repressive humanism', discussed in
detail above.
There seems little point in entering into a prolonged,
purely descriptive account of the basic features of the
(neo)Human Relations approach to management as such. This
has been adequately achieved elsewhere (Reothlisberger and
Dickson 1939, Mayo 1949, Pollard 1965, Blumberg 1971,
Bendix 1972, Baritz 1974, Anthony 1977, Burawoy 1979,
Edwards 1979, Giddens 1982, Thompson, P. 1990). Suffice to
say that in our historical overview of management and
organisational theory which emphasises the subjectivity of
individual workers and workers culture, the specific
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developments within the (neo)Human Relations approach to
management are the most significant and widespread. Indeed
it can be argued that the specific developments of
(neo)Human Relations management gave rise to the more
general 'human relations perspective' referred to above as
the underpinning assumptions of the various management and
organisational theory so far discussed.
The historical development of the managerial concerns with
the subjective features of work relations and the
subsequent development of the (neo)Human Relations
technologies of cultural compliance can be related to the
bureaucratization of the organisation. This can also be
related to the rationalisation of the managerial claims of
professionalism and the legitimacy in dealing with both
technical and cultural issues in a neutral way, as a
'technical necessity' (Bendix 1972, Burawoy 1979, Edwards
1979, Rose 1989). Such a management of subjective and
cultural aspects depended upon the internalisation of a new
set of moral and ethical imperatives by the worker, that
implied a new work ethic, 'a new type of worker' (Gramsci
1971). The development of (neo)Human Relations managerial
discourses/technologies which impact upon the normative and
subjective features of work emerge historically in relation
to this wider history. It became necessary for such
management to develop techniques of normative control to
ensure that individuals would react in ways which responded
to the 'spirit of the firm', because the increased size and
complexity of production had made direct forms of physical
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control less viable. Taylorism was the zenith of the
rationalisation of work performance which relate to the
basic technical function of management, whilst subsequent
developments within the social and cultural technologies of
(neo)Human Relations management relate to the basic
ideological function, what Baritz (1974) and Alvesson
(1989) have referred to as the 'increased need for
ideology'.
As with the specific specialism of personnel management, so
with (neo)Human Relations management in general. The
bureaucratization of the enterprise and the rationalisation
of management confronted it with new, often contradictory
problems. On the one hand managerial authority was defined
in terms of their bureaucratic position and technical
expertise, but on the other hand the day-to-day running of
the efficient enterprise required a more communicative
interaction between workers and management. The ideological
appeals made to workers to internalise a false mediation of
this contradiction produced imperatives for the new
cultural and symbolic technologies of cultural compliance
and the normative managerial project. This problem was
historically approached in two ways by management (Bendix
1972, Baritz 1974). Firstly management emphasised a shared
universe of discourse between workers and management, a
mutuality of interests, an appeal to the 'good faith' and
sense of commonality amongst the workforce. Secondly
management have historically encouraged the view of a
contractual obligation on the part of workers, that they
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'owe' the organisation something. Such contractual
relations are expressed as an even playing field which
workers are free, as 'free wage labourers', not to enter
should they wish. A third element might be added to
Bendix's distinction. Particulary in (neo)Human Relations
management, there is a 'therapeutic' tone to the discourse
whereby management purport to 'cure' workers of the
'pathology' of unco-operative behaviour and so forth. These
emphases signal the historical shift to represent
management as the technically necessary coordinative
function in the common interests of all, as the neutral
'third force'.
In the early years of the 20th Century examples of the
historical emergence of (neo)Human relations management
discourse are connected to the representation of industrial
work relations and the legitimacy of management. These
legitimations tended to emphasis Social Darwinist and
individualist features, as exemplified by Smilesianism and
the 'captains of industry' ethos of the late 19th and early
20th Century (Bendix 1972). The individualism within this
ideological mediation reached its height in the New Thought
Movement of 1890-1915 which emphasised the power of
individual thought and action as the basis for the
demarcation of the successful and those to be denigrated as
lazy and indolent, thereby legitimating class division.
However, the unionisation of workers within industrial
society raised historically new problems for management and
the legitimation of their authority. It also brought new
281
contradictions between this virulent individualism and the
recognition of the need for collective social action. The
growing political challenge of unionised workers brought
with it the perception for management that the consequences
of 'the labour problem' was something which would have to
be 'solved', rather than ignoring the consequences of
social inequality as somehow a natural consequence of
social organisation. Given the structural and
organisational features of industrial enterprises and their
growing bureaucratic nature, the notions of individualism
and the 'survival of the fittest' became increasingly
contradictory to the organic solidarity and interdependence
which the industrial system was beginning to exhibit.
Initiative within the established constellation of work
relations came to replace the emphasis on outright
individualism as the source of legitimation of the relative
position of workers within large organisations. The
demonstration of this historical movement in the early 20th
Century implies the emphasis upon a more inclusive,
integrative impetus as opposed to the earlier exclusive,
judgemental ethos.
Two examples from the time can be given, one is the
rejection of the crude Tayloristic 'economic man'
conception of human nature, in favour of the recognition of
the sociality of workers, as outlined by Mayo's original
Hawthorne Studies. At a more general level Ewan (1976)
points to the impetus towards the 'Americanisation' in the
first few decades of the 20th Century U.S Social
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adminstration. Both are based upon a shift from
individualistic legitimations of inequality towards a
managerial/administrative recognition of the importance of
social solidarity and integration. It can be no coincidence
that the historical emergence of the (neo)Human Relations
management discourse as such occurred in the USA at this
particular time, and exhibited a similar underlying
Durkheimian concern (Mayo 1949). Such shifts were the wider
historical backdrop against which the emergence of
(neo)Human Relations management techniques developed after
World War 2. This integrative concern and the new
imperatives faced by management gave rise to new strategies
born of more sophisticated techniques.
Management turned to the burgeoning social sciences for the
theories to begin to develop these social, cultural and
motivational techniques which focused on normative control.
Baritz (1974) discusses the historical growth in the
relationship which developed in the first half of this
century between the social scientific community and the
imperatives of management. It was and is the social
scientific community's growing involvement with these new
industrial issues, firstly in psychology and then in
sociology which facilitated and influenced much of
(neo)Human Relations managerial theory. There was in
Baritz's words the historical 'need for knowledge'. This
culminated in the situation whereby, whilst certain
commercial and strategic aspects of the firm were dealt
with through established methods by management, the
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'manipulation of people' and techniques for the adaptation
of the workforce came to be of paramount importance.
Such managerial technologies which centred on the control
of the human aspects of the worker did not develop without
resistance from those who doubted its relationship to
improvements in profitability and efficiency, but develop
it did. One of the first theoretical fields which attempted
to facilitate such managerial techniques was Industrial
Psychology, at first through the development of selection
and individual personality tests. As Hallway (1984, 1991)
argues, this emphasis is still the stock in trade of
Industrial/Occupational Psychology. The concerns with
personality, motivation, selection and training around
which industrial psychology revolved, gave impetus for the
development of the (neo)Human Relations movement which was
to challenge the simplistic assumptions of 'scientific
management' and other mechanistic approaches, if not
replace such approaches as the dominant paradigm of
management (Hollway 1991).
By the 1930's the management of industrial capitalism was
beginning to come to some important recognitions. Firstly
that workers had to be considered as human beings who would
respond to personnel programmes, counselling and were
motivated to work by factors other than simply maximising
there financial return. Secondly, in relation to this
workers had to be considered as members of groups which
were able to develop and sustain their own sub-culture and
values. Although not many firms actually developed
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managerial strategies to deal with such factors in the
1930's, these recognitions were to become the basis of
standard (neo)Human Relations management theory for the
control of individual subjectivity.
Hollway (1984, 1991) shows that the development of the
fundamental assumptions of management and their relation to
the workforce gave rise to the development of the discrete
techniques developed within the general 'human-relations
movement'. However, Hollway understands this 'human-
relations movement' as more than the specific technical and
managerial developments coming from the work of Mayo and
his followers. She understands it as being characterised by
the more general discourses concerning the control of
social, psychological, cultural and relational aspects of
work in the attempt to facilitate greater organisational
efficiency. These are industrial psychology, the social and
cultural emphases of Mayoism, post World War 2 developments
in the (neo)Human Relations management of motivation,
Organisational Behaviour and Organisational Development,
organisational culture and symbolism. This also relates to
contemporary Human Resource Managment.
Hollway (1991) argues that this 'human-relations movement'
has become the dominant approach of understanding
organisational behaviour, and is immanently related to the
development of specific techniques in the interests of
management. The general development of the 'human-relations
movement' as a social-psychological paradigm of
understanding is linked to the historical development of
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managerial imperatives and techniques. Hallway (1991)
refers to the assertion made by Braverman (1975), who
himself cites Drucker and Soule, that Taylorism was not
superseded, but became so institutionalised as a way of
organising the physical design of work, that it ceased to
be an issue of debate or recognition. Hallway implies the
same about the 'human-relations movement', that its basic
features have become so central to contemporary management
that it significantly contributes to the basic assumptions
of a general managment paradigm.
Hallway (1991) argues that by the 1950's, the 'human
relations movement' was firmly on the map of management and
organisational theory, especially in the area of management
training. However this emphasis on 'changing behaviour'
still tended to proceed through a behaviouralist
perspective. This led to problems of 'authenticity' and the
charge of manipulativeness. In response to this the 'human
relations movement' moved away from the purely
behaviouralist position to emphasise the 'whole person' as
the site for change as workers began to 'see through' the
rhetoric of 'humanism'. Given this shift, Hollway argues
that 'Human relations premises underpinned much of the
theory of organisational behaviour, through their influence
on the development of social psychology' (Hollway 1991
p.111). Thus Hallway posits a continuity between the
historical emergence of the general 'human relations
movement' discourses in the 1930's and 1950's, and the
specific developments of Organisational Behaviour and
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Organisational Development in the 1970's. In terms of
Organisational Development, Hollway argues that McGregor,
in the 1970's, was one of the first behavioral scientists
to talk systematically about 'the organisation',
organisational programmes and strategies for the
facilitation of change '...from a human relations
perspective'. Hollway goes on to argue that the development
in the 1970's of 'industrial participation' and 'industrial
democracy' also stand within the general 'human relations
movement' in that they relate to the central human
relations concern with motivation.
Organisational Culture in the 1980's also stands in the
general 'human relations movement' in that it deals with
...the same old human relations imperatives:
participative management, democratic leadership, team
building,	 consensus,	 planned change,	 conflict
resolution and employee opinion surveys.., the study
of organisational culture remains within human
relations and social psychology, a position which
successive approaches to organisational change have
not departed from since the 1930's. (Hollway 1991
p.137)
The contemporary debate around 'post-Fordism' which in part
focuses upon team building, workers self-directed quality
control circle, organisational culture (touted as a
discovery from Japan) and the encouragement of
'flexibility' (ie. commitment) on the part of the worker
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seems to exhibit very similar features and thus can also
easily be located within the general 'human relations
movement'.
Thus having established the underlying unity of the 'human
relations movement' and discussed its historical emergence
as a discourse through its essential concerns with the
social, psychological and cultural features of
organisational dynamics we are in a position to argue that
the critical theory of organisations which is developed
below can deal with these essential features rather than
illusory differences and internal disputes of emphasis
within the managerial community. It is the analysis of
these underlying features and the ideological consequences
of the techniques developed, set against this historical
emergence of the discourse located in the wider context of
the social totality which is the basis for the contribution
to a critical theory of organisations. The discourse of the
(neo)Human Relations management theorists will therefore
form the data-base for a critical account of the impact of
the organisation upon the subjectivity and consciousness of
the individual given this history. However, to enable a
more focused discourse analysis and a critical
interpretation of meaning, it is necessary to highlight the
specific content of this discourse, set against its
historical emergence. To facilitate this, the discursive
analysis continues through the empirical identification of
the leading authors and texts which specifically convey
(neo)Human Relations management theory.
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Empirical Indication of (Neo)Human Relations Management
Theory.
Set against the broad historical backdrop described above,
it is necessary to, as it were, 'pin down' this historical
trend to something open to detailed critical empirical
analysis. For the study of the ideological nature of these
managerialist strategies using the 'depth hermeneutic'
approach it is necessary to empirically demonstrate the
content of the (neo)Human relation discourse. This
empirical indication can be gained by demonstrating the
significance of the work of 'leading authors' and the
(critical) interpretation of meaning found in these key
texts. The empirical demonstration of this significance
will be made up of 3 elements. This will allow for a degree
of generality as well as an appropriate level of
specificity. The 3 elements will also enable the
triangulation of this empirical demonstration to thus claim
a higher degree of justification (Bulmer 1984, Denzin
1989).
Firstly, I shall draw upon secondary sources which have
identified writers and texts which are held to be of
significance in the (neo)Human Relations discourse.
Secondly I shall demonstrate that these writers and texts
are discussed widely within their community by developing
a citation index. Thirdly through the collection of
statistics of library use, I shall demonstrate that the
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education of managers into the (neo)Human Relations
discourse proceeds at least in part through initiation into
ideas developed by these writers and texts. This will not
be presented as evidence that these writers and texts are
the most referred to, used or discussed. It will be
presented as evidence that they are often referred to, used
and discussed. It will therefore be claimed that they are
significant and characteristic of the (neo)Human Relations
discourse. As such it is claimed that a critical
theoretical analysis of such texts can legitimately stand
as an ideology-critique of the (neo)Human Relations theory
and its discourses around the manipulation of subjectivity.
Secondary Sources.
Pugh and Hickson (1989a, 1989b) provide a description of
...the contribution that many prominent writers
have made to the understanding of organisations
and their management...the views of leading
authors whose ideas are currently the subject of
interest and debate...(contributions which)
...continue to form part of the flow of concepts
and theories which nurture the field (Pugh and
Hickson 1989a. p.1)
Pugh and Hickson identify such 'leading authors' in various
fields in management and organisation theory. A specific
group of authors within (neo)Human Relations management
theory have relevance for us here. Pugh and Hickson group
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the 'leading authors' in this field as operating within the
general concern with 'People in Organisations'. The authors












They also identify the Tavistock group of writers,
specifically Trist and Herbst.
Huczynski (1993) also provides secondary source data which
has relevance for the identification of 'leading authors'
in the (neo)Human Relations discourse. In the 'management
idea families' of Human Relation and (neo)Human Relations,
Huczynski identifies the following as the 'most popular














The 'leading authors' who occur in both lists, and who are
thus agreed upon by both Pugh and Hickson research, and
Huczynski research to be 'leading authors' or 'most popular










To begin to confirm this secondary source data through
triangulation, I shall now turn to a citation index of
these 'leading writers'. This will test the contemporary
level of interest, discussion and debate of the work of
these writers by indicating the number of times their work
has been referred to and cited in academic journal
articles. This citation index is developed by using the
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BIDS electronic data-base system. This allows the number of
citations for each author for each year back to 1980 to be
developed. Such a citation index allows us to measure the
level of significance of the sample authors/texts within
managerial discourse. Such empirical indicators are however
not exact and need to be qualified with several points.
1. The citations may not be strictly from managerial
discourses, and citations of the sample authors may on
occasion be in terms of discourses unrelated to management.
2. The inquiry into the specifics of (neo)Human Relations
discourse is what informs this thesis and the citation
index as developed through BIDS does not relate only to
this particular field of managerial discourse.
3. The citations measured of the sample authors may include
citations in articles which are entirely negative or
critical of their work and reject their ideas out of hand.
4. Such a citation index measurement can not determine
whether the sample authors are the most cited, but only
whether or not they are often cited. There may be unknown
authors who are cited more often and are more significant
in terms of a citation index. This seems unlikely however
in that their very 'unknownness' tends to preclude them
from being cited often.
5. We cannot determine from this purely statistical
analysis determine the level of influence that the sample
authors have in managerial discourses, only that attention
is paid to their work.
So the data collected through this citation index is not a
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definite indication that the sample authors/texts are the
'leading authors' in the (neo)Human Relations field. It can
however indicate the level of significance they have in
terms of the discourse, and it does offer a way of
triangulating the findings in the research of Pugh and
Hickson, and Huczynski.
The BIDS citation search was applied to the authors
identified in the sample in terms of citations of two of
their representative texts. Where only significant numbers
of citations for one text were found these were recorded.
The representative texts for each author in the sample
which were measured for citations is as follows.
Mayo - Social Problems in an Industrial Civilisation.
Argyris - Personality and Organisation; Integrating the
Individual and the Organisation.
Likert- New Ways of Managing Conflict; New Patterns of
Management.
Herzberg - Work and the Nature of Man; The Motivation to
Work.
McGregor - The Human Side of the Enterprise.
Schein - Coercive Persuasion; Organisational Culture and
Leadership.
Blake and Moulton - The Managerial Grid.
With reference to the texts above, the chart below shows
the number of times each author in the sample was cited in
each year.
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Total 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989
Mayo 232 8 15 18 14 14 18
Argyris 331 14 14 22 13 14 20
Likert 424 16 22 23 19 24 25
Herzberg 656 14 32 42 29 44 43
McGregor 445 28 25 28 26 27 33
Schein 49 1 0 2 0 1 5
Blake and 29 0 0 1 1 1 1
Moulton
1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981
/0
Mayo 19 20 17 16 19 24 11 12
Agryris 23 25 22 34 38 24 34 37
Likert 28 25 29 33 37 38 61 44
Herzberg 47 58 60 45 49 57 73 65
McGregor 30 27 29 31 33 32 46 48
Schein 12 12 6 0 5 2 2 1
Blake
and
4 4 3 4 1 0 6 3
Moulton
This	 shows	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 significant	 level	 of
attention being paid to the work of Mayo, Argyris, Likert,
Herzberg and McGregor over the last 15 years and that these
authors can thus be regarded as being 'leading authors' in
managerial discourse, albeit with the qualifications
alluded to above in mind. This corroborates the research
findings of Pugh and Hickson, and Huczynski. However, the
citation index findings tend to contradict the research
findings of Pugh and Hickson and Huczynski with regard to
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the status of Schein, and Blake and Moulton as 'leading
authors'. The citation index suggests that little attention
is paid to their work in journal articles. For this reason
the triangulated confirmation of these two authors is not
possible and they can not be assumed to be a significant
element in managerial discourses. For this reason Schein,
and Blake and Moulton will be dropped from the sample
'leading authors'.
Statistics on Library Use.
A further element of the triangulation of empirical data on
the nature of (neo)Human Relations discourse used here is
the collection of statistics on the use of relevant texts
from Nottingham Trent University Library. To a large extent
Kuhn's (1970) notion of the paradigm resonates with the
notion of the intra-community discourse being discussed
here. One of the major points emphasised by Kuhn in
relation to the development and maintenance of the 'normal
science' which characterises a paradigm is the initiation
of new scholars and practitioners into the paradigm. We can
gain an empirical indication of the nature of the
initiation into the (neo)Human Relations paradigm/discourse
by collecting statistical data on the lending of texts from
libraries. Nottingham Trent University Library keep such
material on computer files and such data was accessed. Such
data will give an empirical indication of the authors/texts
that initiates into the (neo)Human relations discourse
are/were asked to consider and digest.
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The figures below show the number of times the work of each
member of the sample author/text list was borrowed from
Nottingham Trent University Library over the year 1993-94.
Mayo - Social Problems in an Industrial
Civilisation
45
Likert - New Ways of Managing Conflict 14
Likert - New Patterns of Management 51
Argyris - Integrating the Individual and the
Organisation
18
Argyris - Personality and Organisation 26
McGregor - The Human Side of the Enterprise 33
Herzberg - The Motivation to Work 44
Herzberg - Work and the Nature of Man 77
This shows a significant level of reference to the texts of
the sample authors by students being initiated into the
(neo)Human Relations paradigm. However students do not
always refer to primary texts during their initiation into
a discourse, and so it is necessary to construct some way
of attempting to explore the use of secondary texts as it
relates to this initiation.
In order to attempt this, and to fully triangulate the
empirical data from secondary research and citation
indexes, the following method was used. After collecting
indicative reading lists from general management courses
run at Nottingham Trent University, from HND level up to
MBA level, a random selection of 25 texts was made which
were shown to deal, at least in part with the (neo)Human
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Relations discourse. It was assumed that if the scale of
borrowing of these types of secondary texts was significant
it would support the proposition that the 'leading figures'
within the (neo)Human Relations field were of central
significance. This is because the secondary texts tested
for the scale of borrowing all, at least in part, dealt
with similar issues as a matter of central importance.
These issues can be shown to revolve around;
motivation.




The following chart shows the 25 texts selected at random
from the indicative reading lists of management courses and
the number of times each one was borrowed from Nottingham
Trent University Library in 1993-94.
Handy - Understanding Organisations 601
Torrington - Personnel Management 569
Buchanan and Huczynski - Organizational Behaviour: An
Introductory Text
384
Morgan - Images of Organisations 258
Peters and Waterman - In Search Of Excellence 231
Child - Organisation: A Guide to Problems and
Practice
228
Pugh and Hickson - Writers on Organisations 213
Kanter - When Giants Learn to Dance 177
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Armstrong - Personnel Management; A Handbook for
Employers and the Manager
159
Pascale and Athos - The Art of Japanese Management 141
Dessler - Personnel Management 134
Handy - The Age of Unreason 129
Stewart - The Reality of Management 105
Kanter - The Change Masters 101
Denison - Corporate Culture and Organisational
Effectiveness
98
Schein - Organisational Psychology 87
Handy - Gods of Management 78
Deal and Kennedy - Corporate Culture 75
Attwood - Personnel Management 70
Flippo - Personnel Management 64
Ouchi - Theory Z 47
Kilmann et al. - Gaining Control over Corporate
Culture
38
Zander - Making Groups Effective 27
Lawler - Power and Politics in Organisations 24
Lawler - Pay and Organisational Development 17
These statistics may suffer from the same potential
inaccuracies as those related to the citation index above.
One cannot conclusively say from this data that the
secondary texts referred to here are the most borrowed,
only that some of the random sample are often borrowed.
Such data tends to corroborate the findings of the two
other aspects of this triangulated data. Taken together,
all three pieces of data show that there are leading themes
within the (neo)Human Relations management theory, and that
there are 'leading authors' whose work is regularly and
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often discussed in relation to this discourse. It may be
claimed that such 'leading authors/texts' and the secondary
texts which refer to them are therefore empirical
indications of the nature of this discourse and the aspects
around which it is organised. For these reasons it is
justified in taking the texts of these 'leading authors' as
indicative of the nature of (neo)Human Relations discourse
as a whole. It also becomes justified to approach such
'leading authors/texts' as the object of critical study
which can then be related to a critical study of the
central features of the whole (neo)Human Relations
discourse. That is, we can see these 'leading author/texts'
as an objective empirical indication of the general
historical background discussed above.
Given this, the following 'leading authors/texts' will be
taken to represent the (neo)Human Relations discourse as
part of the 'discourse analysis' of a 'depth hermeneutic'
and will be subject to critical 'interpretation of meaning'
in the light of the 'social analysis' element of a 'depth
hermeneutic'. The 'leading authors/texts' are;
Mayo - Social Problems in an Industrial Civilisation.
Argyris - Personality and Organisation.
Argyris - Integrating the Individual and the Organisation.
Likert - New Ways of Managing Conflict.
Likert - New Patterns of Management.
McGregor - The Human Side of the Enterprise.
Herzberg - Work and the Nature of Man.
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Herzberg - The Motivation to Work.
Summary.
Having explored the abstract theoretical work of Marcuse in
previous chapters in the context of their relevance for a
critique of (neo)Human Relations management theory, this
chapter has been concerned to provide a more focused and
sustained historical account of such management theory. It
has been concerned to highlight some of the general
historical and contextual conditions for the emergence of
(neo)Human Relations management theory as a specific
discourse, with its own internal concerns, logics and
imperatives. It has cast a fairly wide net discussing the
underlying growth in managerialist concerns to control
cultural and subjective aspects of the organisation. It has
also been concerned with discussing the specifics of the
(neo)Human Relations management theory itself. It has
discussed the underlying features, the continuities and
internal contradictions of such a managerialist perspective
on cultural and subjectivity.
This chapter has also offered an empirical account of the
(neo)Human Relations discourse and has highlighted the
'leading text/authors' involved. This will enable a more
focused treatment of a discourse analysis required by the
'depth hermeneutic' method alluded to above. After
empirically demonstrating the central significance of these
'leading texts/authors' the subsequent chapter deals with
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a (critical) interpretation of meaning, in the light of the
critical concepts extrapolated from the work of Marcuse.
This (critical) interpretation of meaning, in relation to
a social analysis is also required by the 'depth
hermeneutic' method. Such an inquiry also allows for a
clearer and more fully developed critical theoretical
account of culture and subjectivity to enable a general
contribution the critical theory of organisation




THE CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF MEANING OF (NEO)HUMAN 
RELATION MANAGEMENT THEORY. 
As part of the 'depth hermeneutic' method for the study of
ideology, we now turn to a critical analysis of the work of
the 'leading authors/texts' within the (neo)Human Relations
discourse. This discourse analysis and interpretation of
meaning is set against the Critical Theory discussed in
chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 and applies the critical theoretical
constructions developed in the work of Marcuse. This
'interpretation of meaning' component takes the form of a
critical re-appraisal of the meaning, rhetoric and
conceptualisations of the (neo)Human Relations discourse.
The 'leading authors/texts' identified above provides the
empirical indication of the significant elements of this
discourse to be analyzed.
To begin this interpretation of meaning we can refer to
Huczynski (1993) who highlights the recurring features of
the (neo)Human Relations discourse. From Huczynski's
discussion of the 'key ideas of (neo)Human Relations
theory' we can extrapolated the following as key features
around which this discourse has developed.
1. Leadership style.
2. Motivation.
3. Individual needs and personality.
4. The question of human nature.




However this description does not take us very far in
developing a critical interpretation of the (neo)Human
Relations discourse. The application of the critical
theoretical constructs stemming from the discussion of the
work of Marcuse for a critical theory of organisations
contributes to this, as does the application of the concept
of ideology.
Chapter 3 discussed the relevance of the operationalised
concept of ideology, as formulated within a general
humanist Marxist perspective for the analysis of the
(neo)Human Relations theory of organisational subjectivity
and culture. The central features of this discussion were,
1. The notion of ideology as the 'solution' in
consciousness to the practical contradictions of the
capitalist organisation of economic and social life.
2. The notion of 'degrees of ideology' and the centrality
of the notion of 'substantive bias' as the way in which
degrees of ideology can be demarcated.
3. Ideology as operating through legitimation, reification,
dissimulation, dehistoricisation and universalisation.
4. The 'depth hermeneutic' method for the study of ideology
which involves (a) a social analysis; (b) a discourse
analysis made up of a critical analysis of narrative
structure, argumentative structure and syntactical
structure of a discourse; (c) the interpretation of
304
meaning. In chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, the 'social analysis'
of Marcuse identifies the following key theoretical
constructs which offer relevance for a contribution to the
critical theory of organisations.
1. New forms of control, whereby the individual is
initiated into the reproduction of their own control. This
has a social psychological dimension expressed through the
notion of an external super-ego. It also relates to the
general notion that culture operates in a way which
reproduces relations of power and domination.
2. Repressive humanisation, as a construct connected to
Marcuse's discussion of 'repressive tolerance' and
'repressive desublimation'. Such a repressive humanisation
would, if successful be related to the initiation of a
voluntary compliance.
3. The nature of technological rationality, as linked to
the nature of 'technical progress' as distinct from
'humanitarian progress', which exhibits the characteristics
of one dimensional thought.
4. The 'therapeutic' function of one dimensional
rationality which moves through the rhetoric of the re-
initiating the individual into relations of power as a
'cure' to 'irrational' behaviour.
5. The corresponding rationalisation of relations of
domination.
6. The focus on one dimensional/plastic language as it
moves through the linguistic/syntactical presentation of
discourses 'contained' within the 'closed universe of
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discourse' and the 'language of total administration'.
Having highlighted these critical theoretical constructs
brought forward from the operationalisation of the concept
of ideology and the critical theory of Marcuse relevant for
the critique of (neo)Human Relations management, we can now
begin to apply them to the specific critical analysis of
the sample authors/texts identified as central to the
(neo)Human Relations discourse. We can begin this by making
some general points concerning the ideological nature of
the empirical indicators of this discourse. All the texts
in the sample exhibit the following features.
1. An articulation of attempts in theory to provide
ideological 'solutions' in consciousness. The discursive
rhetoric in the sample is consistently guided by the
practical problems that industrial management are faced
with given the capitalist organisation of work and society.
The expression of this ideological 'solution' takes various
forms, but all have in common the attempt to deal with the
practical contradictions involved in the following
recurring features. Firstly, the contradiction between the
managerialist concern to generate a heightened sense of
commitment to the organisational task/goal and the need to
improve strategies of control. Secondly, the contradiction
between the attempt to integrate the individual into the
organisation as a system which confirms their continued
exploitation. Thirdly, the contradiction between the
managerialist rhetoric of self-actualization, personal
306
growth and self-awareness and the managerialist use of the
human individual as a resource to meet the ends
heteronomously determined by management. Finally the
contradiction between the attempt to initiate a heightened
sense of motivation and meaning, and the deskilled nature
of industrial work. The sample consistently exhibited an
attempt to provide a rhetoric which presented a 'mediation'
of these practical contradictions in the realm of ideas, as
well as an unwillingness/inability to articulate theories
which went beyond this inherent managerialist perspective.
2. Given this, the sample of texts consistently exhibited
a 'substantive bias'. The theoretical constructs expressed
in the sample revolved around the basic notion that
(neo)Human Relations theory was concerned with the
generation of ideas geared towards the improvement of
methods of control over 'human resources'. This
demonstrates an inherent 'substantive bias', over and above
a 'formal bias', in that it approaches the human subject as
a means to be used and determined in the pursuit of ends
determined outside of that human subject. It is this
'substantive bias' which is the essential feature of a
managerialist perspective, one which all the sample texts
exhibited. Therefore the sample texts exhibit a high degree
of ideologicalness. This is also evidenced in the common
technological rationality which the sample texts exhibited.
This developed through the rhetoric of 'scientific' (or at
least 'systematic') theoretical developments geared towards
the instrumental ends of predicting and controlling human
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conduct. This association with both 'humanism' and
'(social) science' exhibits a consistent attempt in the
sample texts towards a self-legitimation developed through
a pre-established distinction between itself and the
management theory classified as 'old', or 'ordinary'.
3. All the sample texts exhibited a dehistoricising
reification of the organisation and organisational
relations as a pre-established universe of discourse which
was taken for granted as a neutral ambit for debate. The
sample	 texts	 consistently	 exhibited	 an
unwillingness/inability to step outside this reified ambit
of discourse and inquiry into the nature of the
organisational system of relations they had taken for
granted. This has the ideological effect of universalising
the historically contingent organisational relations and
dissimulating the nature of those economic, political,
social and cultural relations which make up 'the
organisation'. That is, there was a consistent neglect of
the totality of socio-economic and political relations
within an industrial capitalist society which, as it were,
'come before' the organisation.
4. The sample texts consistently exhibited an institutional
power attached to their discourse related to the
'scientific'/academic nature of their theory.. This
discourse was presented as an embodiment of Reason,
reasonableness and objectivity. It was consistently
presented as the development of a neutral science and
technology in the common good. This feature common to all
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the sample texts is evidence of the dissimulation of a
capitalist world-view. This also dissimulates the liberal
assumptions underlying the unity of (neo)Human Relations
theory concerning the neutrality of the enterprise, the
commonality of managerialist objectives and the pathology
of worker-management conflict. This theoretical
colonisation of reasonableness relates to the underlying
technological interest in rationalising relations of power
and exhibits the characteristics of one dimensional
thought.
5. The argumentative/syntactical structure exhibited by the
sample texts was consistently couched in terms of an a
priori established discourse of 'superior'/'subordinates',
management/workers, supervisors/members. This showed the
argumentative structure of the sample texts as moving
through the establishment of 'self validating analytical
propositions', where the basic nature of the inquiry is
'always already present' given the nature of the syntax.
Discussions of the (neo)Human Relations theory and changes
to this management-worker relations was consistently set
against this 'containing' backdrop. The specific syntax of
the sample texts consistently tended towards giving voice
to a pre-established world-view. The best example of this
syntactical evidence is found in the nature of the phrase
'Human Relations management theory' itself. This displays
the syntax/argumentive structure which is founded upon the
essential assumption of the neutrality of the sample texts
developing a theory of the way in which relations between
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humans is to be managed. Such syntax/argumentation
dissimulates the underlying managerialism of this
assumption.
6. In their inquiry into human personality, motivation,
human needs, and the group/cultural context of the shaping
of the self, the sample texts consistently demonstrated the
technological rationality geared towards the development of
not only theoretical understanding of human conduct, but
improvements in the control of human behaviour. This
developed in a way which exhibited a managerialist concern
to initiate the human subject into the organisational
system of relation as a normal state of affairs. In this
way there was a consistent emphasis in the sample texts on
the integration of the individual into the organisation.
This is evidence of the theoretical development of
managerial strategies understandable as 'new forms of
control'. Here the human subject is encouraged to
internalise the objectives of the organisation as their
own. A critical social psychological interpretation of the
meaning of this managerial strategy is available through
reference to the notion of an external agency of self-
supervision, analogous to Marcuse's notion of an external
super-ego. Here the individual is encouraged to take
responsibility for their own organisational effectiveness,
which contradicts their a priori reduction to the status of
'subordinate'. Again the sample texts exhibits the tendency
towards the ideological 'solution' of practical
contradictions.
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7. The managerialist theories exhibited in the sample texts
are consistently ideological in that they fail to analyze
the totality of organisational relations and contexts
within a capitalist organisation of society and the
economy. Such a position consistently tends towards a one
dimensional approach in that it develops through a self-
incurred reduction of theoretical analysis to the pre-
established boundaries of the organisation and managerial
function.
8. The sample texts consistently demonstrated a technicist
concern with the socio-psychological question of individual
identity and personality. The instrumental/technological
rationality within the sample texts reveals a concern to
establish a degree of control over the individual
personality, the formation and maintenance of 'identity'
and the need for a positive presentation of the self. In
various ways, the critical (re)interpretation of meaning of
the sample texts confirms (neo)Human Relations management
concern to mobilise these socio-psychological and group
process into the services of the organisation. Such
management control strategies exhibit the attempt to
manipulate the conditions whereby individuals could meet
these 'existential needs'. Such a discourse also
consistently exhibited the theoretical interest in the
installation of an 'external' super-ego mechanism geared
towards the initiation of the individual into their own
control and 'moral' surveillance. In this way such a
discourse mirrored the over-determined nature of the
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ideological/needs based manipulation of the individual
subject. Over and above these general, common features
found in all of the sample texts, there were more specific
elements which have a bearing upon a critical
'interpretation of meaning' of this discourse. It is to a
detailed analysis of these features that I now turn.
Repressive Humanisation.
Mayo's (1949) concern with the 'seamy side of progress'
involves his inquiry into developments in an industrial
civilisation which culminate in '...the increase in unhappy
individuals'. Mayo expresses a 'humanistic' concern with
the emotional and cultural plight of the individual in
industrial civilisation. This 'humanism' is a repressive
humanism however in that Mayo sees the solution to these
problems as being located in the re-affirmation of the
industrial community and the implicit involvement of a
presumption of the 'naturalness' of pre-established power
relations within capitalist organisation. (Re)integration
into the system is offered as the 'solution' to individual
unhappiness.
Mayo writes,
Every social group, at whatever level of culture,
must face and clearly state 2 perceptual and
recurrent problems of administration. It must
secure for its individuals and group membership,
(1) The satisfaction of material and
economic needs.
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(2) The maintenance of spontaneous co-
operation throughout the organisation.
Our administrative methods are all pointed at the
materially effective; none at the maintenance of
co-operation. The amazing technical success of
these war years shows that we -our engineers - do
know how to organise for material efficiency. But
problems of absenteeism, labour turnover,
"wildcat" strikes show that we do not know how to
ensure spontaneity of co-operation; that is
teamwork (Mayo 1949. p.9).
We see therefore Mayo's overriding concern is with the
engineering of a 'spontaneous co-operation', to ensure the
survival of the industrial system which a priori tends
towards the negation of co-operation and historically rests
upon the development of relations of power. The very notion
of the imposition of a 'co-operation' which is to be
'spontaneous' is contradictory, is evidence of the wider
contradictions of the capitalist economic and social
organisation. Mayo is faced with a particular manifestation
of this. Thus we see the 'humanism' of Mayo is a repressive
humanisation in that it refers to the imposed 'spontaneity'
of a heteronomous 'co-operation' within the pre-established
universe of these power relations. Mayo reifies the notion
of 'teamwork' as a common good based upon consensus, which
dissimulates its imposed, engineered nature.
The development of the industrial capitalist organisation
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which threatens the 'co-operation' with which Mayo is
concerned, is linked to the deterioration of 'human
capacity'. However this concern with the 'human' is set
against the backdrop of a re-affirmation of the industrial
system which so threatens it. Mayo is simply concerned with
the more effective management of the contradictions, of the
unintended consequences which it throws up. Again we see
the nature of the contradiction which Mayo grapples with
and the ideological nature of his attempt to 'solve' in the
realm of ideas these practical contradictions. Mayo's
'humanism' is repressive in its simultaneous re-affirmation
of already existing acceptance of pre-established relations
of 'superiors' and 'subordination'. The manipulation of the
variables of work design, rest periods, leadership styles
and the symbolism of the 'social skills' of the manager are
all very much related to the managerialist concern with the
prediction and control of the human subject within the
organisational setting. The measurement of the 'success' of
the 'humanised' management recommended by Mayo is always in
terms of statistical data on increases in output rates.
This managerial objective is taken, as a self-validating
proposition, to be a universal given by Mayo. This concern
with job redesign and the development of a 'humanised' shop
floor regime as repressive humanism based upon this pre-
established notion of raised productivity as a universal
given is expressed by Mayo when he writes, for example,
that it is '...proper to give the worker control of their
rest periods, thereby securing.., an eager and spontaneous
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loyalty' (Mayo 1949. p.60), an 'eagerness' and 'loyalty'
which is linked explicitly and solely to the question of
managerial prediction and control over human subjectivity
in the interests of pursuing organisational goals.
Argyris (1957) emphasises the 'skill' of the 'human being
as a whole' for 'self-awareness' and 'balanced growth'.
This propensity is located within the ultimate ability to
'integrate himself with the environment'. Thus Argyris
locates 'growth' and the 'human being as a whole' with this
integrative capacity. This 'humanistic' concern with the
human being and the capacity for 'growth' is however a
repressive humanism in that by the integration with the
'environment' Argyris means the pre-established relations
of power within the capitalist organisation. Argyris'
concern with 'The Human Personality' is linked to a basic
managerialist concern with 'morale', 'the organisation' and
'organisational behaviour'. For example, Argyris writes,
Total personality balance occurs when the parts
are in balance (internally) and when the
personality as a whole is in balance with the
world 	
 Practically speaking, this means the
balance....an	 employee	 exhibits
	 in	 his
personality 	  (Argyris 1957. p.23)
Thus a 'humanistic' concern with the 'human personality'
exhibits itself as a managerialist concern with the
'adjustment of employees'. The repressive humanisation of
management theory is evidenced by Argyris in that his
315
ultimate concern is with the theoretical improvement of the
facility to control the human subject as 'employee'.
Argyris'	 inquiry into human needs, relationships,
motivation and action is knit to this basic concern, to the
managerialist concern to 'predict and control'. Argyris
writes 'The purpose of the previous chapter (the inquiry
into Human Personality) ...is to lay the groundwork for
analyzing some of the causes of organisational behaviour'
(Argyris 1957. p. 54). Such an inquiry focuses upon the
potential for 'individual and group adaptation', developing
the understanding of human motivation and action so as to
adapt (repressively control) it, that is to manage it. The
'humanism' of (neo)Human Relations theory can again be seen
as a repressive humanism in that, far from advocating human
growth, self-development and autonomy it purveys the logic
of reducing the human subject to a function of the
organisation, to the pre-established status of 'employee'
or 'subordinate'.
Given his account of the 'Human Personality', the 'formal
organisation', and the problematic nature of individual
adaptation to management/organisational formalism, Argyris
argues for the necessity of 'informal organisation'. He
argues that this allows for the 'expression of human
personality'	 and ensures	 'effective adaption'	 to
organisational requirements. Again we see that the
'humanistic' concern with 'expression' is firmly located
within a managerialist agenda. Argyris writes for example,
....if there exists no informal organisation, the
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employee would soon find himself full of pent-up
tension. The human personality can absorb only a
certain amount of tension. Past a point.., the
individual loses his human efficiency. (Argyris
1957. p.231).
The rhetoric is clear, the concern with 'human
personality', with 'the individual' is only meaningful for
Argyris in as much as it relates to the discussion of 'the
employee' and 'human efficiency'. This is a repressive
humanism in its concern with the human personality as a
function of efficiency pre-established in terms of the
requirements of the capitalist enterprise. Agyris' (1964)
analysis of the possibility of integrating the individual
and the organisation is not in the interests of the
expansion of human autonomy. Rather it is concerned with
ways in which the adaptation of the individual to the
organisational requirements may be achieved. The
requirements of the organisation are taken as given by
Argyris and form the basis of his inquiry. He writes,
'Individual competence, commitment, self-responsibility,
fully functioning individuals and active, viable, vital
organisations will be the kinds of criteria that we will
keep foremost...' (Argyris 1964. p.4). Thus Argyris
demonstrates the pre-established conceptual reduction of
the 'human individual' to the status of the 'functioning
individual' defined a priori in terms of organisational
needs. Argyris is not so much concerned with a humanistic
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inquiry into the 'human personality' as with a
managerialist analysis of 'competence'.
Likert (1961) equates a movement away from Tayloristic
management and 'job-centred supervision' towards a
'employee-centred supervision' as 'humanistic'. This
movement is expressed as a movement away from 'unreasonable
pressure and implies a humanised treatment of the
'subordinate' through an increase in 'trust', 'confidence'
and the tolerance of the 'use of their own ideas'. Likert
demonstrates a repressive humanism in that he describes
this 'humanisation' of management from within the pre-
established system of relations between 'superior' and
'subordinate'. Likert emphasises the benefits of
'unselfishness', 'co-operation', a 'sympathetic attitude',
'democratic attitudes' and an 'interested attitude'. This
is a repressive humanisation of management-worker relations
in that all such changes of 'attitude' are encouraged as
the consolidation of 'superior'/'subordinate' relations and
the increase in organisational efficiency.
Concern with human attitude and feeling dissimulates the
underlying concern with productivity and increased work
performance. Likert writes for example,
Contagious enthusiasm about the importance of the
work has a marked relationship to the success of
an agency.. .and points to the importance of the
managers attitude towards the goals of the
organisation. A conviction that the mission or
task has value adds to the likelihood of high
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levels of performance (Likert 1961. p.11).
'Contagious enthusiasm' as a factor of 'humanised'
management-worker interaction has importance only as far as
'high levels of performance' is concerned.
Likert equates a notion of the 'well being' of the
'subordinate' with the humanistic concern for the worker.
This is a repressive humanism in that it is firmly set
within both an assumption of the naturalness of 'superior'-
'subordinate' relations, and an assumption of the
neutrality of the 'success' of the organisational interest
in raised productivity. Both features provide evidence of
the underlying repressiveness of such a 'humanism' in that
such a position implies power relations and the increased
exploitation of the 'human resource' given he capitalist
organisation of work and resource distribution.
Likert recommends that the 'superior'-'subordinate'
relationship be one where the communication and
consultation initiated by management allows the pre-
established 'subordinate' to 'feel' consulted. Likert
writes, 'The frequency of work-group meetings, as well as
the attitudes and behaviour of superiors towards the ideas
of subordinates, effects the extent to which employees feel
that the supervisor is good at handling people'. (Likert
1961. p.27). This implies a 'humanisation' of communication
within a repressive context of pre-established relations of
power and subordination. This is recommended by Likert as
a way of fostering 'group pride and loyalty' and so
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increasing productivity of the capitalist enterprise.
Likert argues that productivity gains will stem from
allowing the 'subordinate' to communicate 'upwards'. This
will allow '...subordinates to feel free to discuss these
matters with their boss', and will purvey a sense of
'influence' to the pre-established 'subordinate'. Thus the
'humanisation' of communication is also evidenced by Likert
to be repressive humanisation in that the positions of
superiority and subordination are pre-defined and the
emphasis is solely on purveying a 'feeling' of influence.
Likert (1975) follows similar themes. His 'humanistic'
concern with the 'employee' is couched within the desire to
alleviate 'conflict'. But this 'new way of managing
conflict' exhibits repressive humanisation features in that
it is solely linked to the pre-defined managerial agenda of
increasing productivity and allowing for the more 'smooth
running'
	 of the capitalist organisation. Likert's
'humanism' is repressive as it locates a discussion of the
individual within pre-defined management-worker relations
and reduces the individual to a discussion of performance.
Herzberg (1959) asks 'what does the worker want from his
job?' as part of his inquiry into 'job attitudes'. Herzberg
exhibits a repressive humanisation of management theory.
Firstly his inquiry into human meaning, motivation and
attitude is located within a pre-determined managerialist
concern with the prediction and control of human behaviour;
he is concerned with increased managerial effectiveness in
controlling the human subject; and with a general concern
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with the organisation as the pre-determined ambit of a one
dimensional universe of discourse and inquiry. Secondly,
Herzberg's inquiry into human attitude and motivation as
part of the development of a managerial strategy of control
implies the simultaneous negation of human autonomy as it
develops its own 'humanism'. The rhetoric of Herzberg's
research strategy which proceeds through the notion that
'workers are asked...' already defines the individual as
worker demonstrates a pre-established one dimensional
'closing of the universe of discourse'. Herzberg's
overriding concern is with the 'relationship between job
attitude and output or productivity (Herzberg 1959. p.8).
Herzberg argues that the Human Relations approach to
motivation and morale is about ensuring that 'the basic
needs of the worker is to be treated with dignity and with
an awareness of his unique personality' (Herzberg 1959.
p.108). This demonstrates a repressive humanism in that the
'worker' is pre-defined as such, which precludes a
sensitive treatment of their 'unique personality'. This is
an expression of the practical contradictions of (neo)Human
Relations management in particular, and the capitalist
organisation in general. The 'dignity' with which the
'worker' is to be treated tends to be negated by this
definition of the individual already as 'worker' which also
articulates an already present assumption of power
relations which require the repression of human autonomy
for its reproduction. Such a formulation also implies that
the 'treatment' which is to be 'dignified' is within the
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purview of established management, which also tends to
negate any notion of dignified treatment and sensitivity to
'uniqueness'.
Herzberg locates work (wage-labour) as a potential source
of self-actualization and equates this notion of work with
'personal growth'. Again the pre-established relations of
power and subordination negate the autonomy upon which
self-determination, self-development and creativity, as
functions of self-actualization might rest. Herzberg
presents us with a bastardization of the notion of self-
actualization, which is repressive in its 'humanism' due to
its wage-labour orientation. Herzberg's (1968) inquiry
into the human subject is located within the one dimension
of the requirements of the organisation. He writes 'The
essay will seek to define a human being in terms compatible
with modern industry' (Herzberg 1968. p.12). This can be
seen as a repressive humanism in that the concern with the
human being develops in terms of a location within the
prescribed theoretical boundaries of relevance to the needs
of industry, and secondly expresses the a priori acceptance
of the managerial/institutional power to 'define' the human
subject.
Herzberg's theory develops in terms of a concern to imitate
the human subject into the organisation through '....myths
that are favourable to economic growth'. This is evidence
of the attempt to provide ideological 'solutions' in the
realm of ideas to the practical contradictions of
capitalist	 organisation	 geared	 towards	 increased
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productivity and accumulation. It provides evidence of
theory tied to the managerialist definition of human
'needs' as equated with the one dimension of the industrial
organisation. For example, Herzberg writes,
...business is the dominant institution. It is
industry that has been defining the basic
characteristics of the human....the prevailing
myths that industry has served up, primarily to
justify its own views regarding the nature of
worker motivation and the nature of man deserve
to be carefully examined (Herzberg 1968. p.32).
Herzberg is critical of the 'economic man' conceptions of
human nature developed by such industrial 'myths'. However
he is only critical of this in terms of its inadequacy for
managerial effectiveness. His more 'humanistic' theory of
'human nature' and motivation based upon his hygiene-
motivator factors is a repressive humanisation of
management in that it attempts to 'improve' earlier
definitions of human nature. Herzberg's concern with human
motivation for example is geared towards a more complete
managerialist theory of the human subject facilitating
greater capacity for prediction and control of human
behaviour.
McGregor (1960) recommends the managerial respect of 'human
nature' as a way of making 'selective adaptations' so as to
increase the effectiveness of management and organisation
performance. The concern which McGregor shows for the
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understanding of 'human nature' is closely associated with
the managerial adaptation of the human subject in the
interests of increased control. It thus exhibits the
characteristics of a repressive humanisation of management
theory. McGregor writes 'We can improve our ability to
control only if we recognise that control consists in
selective adaptation to human nature rather than in
attempting to make human nature conform to our wishes'
(McGregor 1960. p.11).
McGregor points to the 'social responsibility' of
management in exerting an 'ethical code' in organisational
relations as a response to the claims of the managerial
manipulation of the subject. He likens this ethic of
management to the ethics of the medical profession. However
McGegor's theoretical developments are still knit to an
underlying reproduction of capitalist relations of power
and subordination. 'It is natural to expect management to
be committed to the economic objectives of the industrial
organisation' (McGregor 1960 p.13). In this way McGegor's
notion of an 'ethical code' relates to the general
ideological 'solution' to the contradictions of denying
managerial 'manipulation' whilst requiring such
(manipulative) management of human subjectivity in the
interests of organisational efficiency and effective
control. McGregor's 'solution' culminates in this
repressive humanism. He writes 'Management have adopted
generally a far more humanitarian set of values; it has
successfully striven to give more equitable and more
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generous treatment to its employees' (McGregor 1960. p.46).
The 'giving', from a position of pre-established power, of
an 'equitable treatment' to 'their employees' again is the
linguistic evidence of the contradiction faced by McGregor
which is ideologically 'solved' through the development of
a repressive humanisation of management theory.
The development of a 'Theory Y' of management by McGregor
involves an expression of this repressive humanisation of
management in that it is underpinned by a technological
rationality of managing the 'human resource'. Theory Y is
consistently knit to the development of 'controllable
conditions'; a 'self-direction and self-control in the
services of....' the organisation; the development of
'commitment' and the seeking of 'responsibility under
proper (that is managerially defined) conditions'; and the
'full expression of intellectual properties within
industrial life'. McGregor's ultimate concern in the
development of Theory Y management is the 'release' of
human creativity within 'proper' or 'controllable'
conditions. Theory Y is always discussed against the
backdrop of the pre-established orthodoxy of managerial
power and a capitalist organisation of society.
The release of human creativity within 'controllable'
conditions '...indicates the possibility of human growth
and development', culminating in,
The central principle which derives from Theory
Y is that of integration: the creation of
conditions such that the members of the
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organisation can achieve their own goals best by
directing their efforts towards the success of
the enterprise (McGregor 1960. p. 49)
Again McGregor's theory demonstrates the ideological nature
of (neo)Human Relations theory in its 'solution' to the
contradictions of self-structure, organisational
'membership'-worker, individual goals-enterprise goal.
McGregor posits the potential for their coincidence without
discussing the political economy of resource distribution
and the alienated nature of industrial capitalist work.
'The concept of integration and self-control carries the
implication that the organisation will be more effective in
achieving its economic objectives'. This demonstrates a
repressive humanism in that such a self-control occurs
within the 'economic objectives' of the enterprise, and
thus within the pre-established economic organisation
designed for the accumulation of surplus value and
exploitation as well as pre-established power relations. To
conflate the 'individual needs' and the 'organisations
needs' reifies the organisation and negates a more fully
developed humanism as it reduces the 'human' to that which
is to be negotiated with and sanction by management.
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Technological Rationality; 'Technical Progress' and the
Rationalisation of Domination.
Mayo's (1949) notion of progress is a 'technical progress'
located	 within	 the	 concern	 with	 the
instrumental/engineering rationality of social solutions to
the contradictions of the 'progress' of the capitalist
organisation. His theory exhibits a concern to
technologically administer and engineer a 'spontaneous co-
operation' through technical means determined through the
scientific and controlled manipulation of the objective
variables involved in the workplace. This 'administrative'
approach evidences Mayo's instrumental approach to the
individual and group membership geared toward control. In
this way Mayo's technological rationality is seen as an
example of the 'triumph of positive thinking' and is one
dimensional in that such an instrumental rationality is
located solely within managerial concerns as they apply to
organisational imperatives. The fragmentation of
communities and the loss of co-operation given the logic of
industrialisation is taken as a technical issue for
administrative treatment within the pre-established
boundaries of that very logic. Mayo exhibits a
technological rationality in his approach to the
communications coming from management as something to be
technically 'improved'.
In terms of material production and development, Mayo links
science with technology and with an easy assumption of the
'progress' they offer as a common good. This ideologically
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dissimulates the non-neutral, sectionally interested nature
of much technology, especially as applied within the
industrial context.
Mayo also discusses the 'failure' of the social sciences to
'...communicate to the student a skill that is directly
useful in human situations'. In this way he exhibits a
positivistic/utilitarian concern with science and
technology and the applicability of science for control.
Mayo implies a positivistic linking of progress and order.
Again therefore we see in the work of Mayo a demonstration
of a one dimensional, 'positive thought' and the inherent
technological rationality concerned with the prediction of
control of human affairs. This is all geared to the
conservative end of re-establishing 'co-operation' within
industrial/organisational relations of power. For instance
Mayo argues that individuals should be trained in
appropriate 'social skills'. Such training would constitute
(technical) progress for Mayo in as much as it would ensure
the technical adaptation of the human subject to the needs
of the industrial organisation. Mayo implies that the 'high
administrators' should '...accept responsibility for
training them (workers) in new (adaptive) social skills'
(Mayo 1949. p.29).
Argyris (1957) refers to science and 'experts' in human
relations as progress beyond the 'lay' notion of human
relations. This implies a scientific inquiry into human
relations which brings progress in terms of the 'expert'
control of human relations. This is the hallmark of a
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'technical progress', divorced from 'humanitarian
progress'. Argyris writes, 'A primary motivation in writing
this book (Argyris 1957) is to suggest that 'human
relations' is becoming a scientifically rooted field.. .to
understand why people behave in the way they do' (Argyris
1957. p.2). A science of 'understanding why' is implicitly
linked to the development of a technology for the
prediction and control of such human relations. This
evidences a one dimensional/positivistic theoretical
concern to develop the apparatus of administrative control.
Argyris wants to bring 'research in human relations'
together so as to provide a 'technical progress', a
'systematic' and 'practical' application geared towards
more effective technological control over human affairs.
Argyris thus exhibits a technological rationality geared
towards the instrumentalisation of human relations, linked
to this underlying managerialism and concern with
administrative control.
Thus, Argyris (1957) discusses 'The Common Task of the
Administrator and the Scientist'. He writes, The
administrator and the scientist are basically interested in
the same question, why do people behave in the way they do
in organisations' (Argyris 1957. p.5). In this way Argyris
exhibits an innate managerialism and an instrumental
rationality, where 'understanding' is coterminous with
control. The necessity of 'understanding' is given by the
imperatives of the organisation. The concern with
'prediction and control' is intimately connected with the
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concerns of the management of the said organisation.
Science and technological rationality is implicitly linked
with organisational productivity and effectiveness by
Argyris. Such a technological rationality is thus related
to the rationalisation of relations of power. As Argyris
himself puts it, 'Once they (managers and scientists)
understand, it is an easy matter to predict and control
behaviour' (Argyris 1957. p.5). Thus all this concern with
science is located within the pre-established one dimension
of organisational efficiency.
The concern the scientise the 'diagnosis' of human conduct
is linked by Argyris to a 'progress' through the
development of a 'technical plan of (managerial) action' to
initiate a change in human behaviour. This 'technical plan
of (managerial) action' is located by Argyris as the
managerial development of a situation whereby the
individual develops '...a capacity to integrate himself
with the (organisational) environment'. Again Argyris
exhibits a one dimensional argument characterised by an
internally self-referential narrative structure focusing on
a theory of the management of human relations which only
refers to managerialism itself for its theoretical
grounding.
Argyris (1964) is concerned to develop a theory which
integrates and adapts the individual to the organisation.
In this respect the work of Argyris stands in relation to
the underlying unity of the (neo)Human Relations
perspective in its attempt to provide a technology for the
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management of the subject. This is propelled by an
underlying technological rationality approach geared to the
development of the 'prediction and control' imperatives of
management. Such a technological rationality is related to
the attempt at the rationalisation of the subject, the
rationalisation of relations of power and subordination
within the pre-defined ambit of the organisation. In this
way the work of Argyris (1964) is seen as one dimensional.
Likert (1961) is concerned to increase the effectiveness in
'...managing the human resources of the organisation'. He
equates the movement away from 'cruder methods' of
management towards the measurement of 'motivational forces,
communication effectiveness' with 'progress'. This is
evidence of the technological rational utility orientation
within a one dimensional 'triumph of positive thought' and
equates with the notion of 'technical progress' as distinct
from 'humanitarian progress'. This distinction and the
underlying instrumental attitude towards 'progress' is
expressed by Likert when he writes, for example, 'It
results in improved performance if the interest of the boss
is viewed by the subordinates as genuine and not as an
intrusion on privacy' (Likert 1961. p.12).
A technological rationality geared towards the
rationalisation of power relations is evidenced by Likert
in his discussion of the dynamics of the work group. Here
Likert recommends that management should pay explicitly
instrumental attention to these dynamics as a way of
raising productivity. He writes, 'Superiors who have the
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skill to build high peer-group loyalty evidently tend to
have the leadership ability to create relatively high
performance goals' (Likert 1961. p.32). He also writes
'better interpersonal relationships (are) developed by the
foreman's effective leadership'. Likert clearly takes an
instrumental/technological rationality approach to the
management of human and interpersonal subjectivity,
approaching it as a variable to be controlled in the
interests of more effective control and raised
productivity. Likert sees motivation, loyalty, skill,
commitment and 'effective interaction' as 'intervening
variables'. Here he demonstrates a pre-established
conceptual orientation geared towards the instrumental
reduction of human subjectivity to a manageable aspect of
the productive effort. He writes, for example, 'To be
effective and communicate as intended, a leader must always
adapt his behaviour to take into account the expectations,
values, and interpersonal skills of those with whom he is
interacting' (Likert 1961. p.32). Thus we see Likert's
technological rationality approach to human interaction and
the instrumentalisation of strategies to make such
organisationally located interaction more 'effective'.
Likert implies a technology of human interaction.
Likert writes,
...research findings •..provide extensive
evidence that productivity can be increased
substantially and waste correspondingly lessened
when the goals of the work group shift so as to
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become more consistent with the objectives of the
firm (Likert 1961. p.30).
Here Likert expresses the managerial concern with the
rationalisation of the work group and the rationalisation
of the subject and subjective attitude. His concern is to
initiate a theory and practice of management geared towards
the rationalisation of 'attitude' as a specific case of the
rationalisation of power relations and the organisational
system of relations between 'superiors' and 'subordinates'.
He discusses the 'integration principle' in terms of how
the managerial facilitation of the rationalisation of
subjective attitude will come about.
Likert (1975) also demonstrates a technological rationality
approach which tends towards one dimensional thought. His
concern to 'manage conflict' is geared towards the
development of more effective methods of controlling the
'employee' from within a conceptual universe of discourses
'closed' to become the pre-established ambit of managerial
logic and imperatives. The 'humanism' of Likert's theories
are consistently linked a priori to this instrumental,
capitalist one dimension. His 'new ways of managing
conflict' are geared a priori to the development of the
rationalisation of power relations already inscribed onto
his underlying logic. Thus Likert's rationalisation of
relations of power relates to the reproduction of
capitalist relations of domination and develops through an
internally self-validating reference to the one dimension
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of managerial logic.
Herzberg (1959) exhibits an orientation geared towards a
technological rationality and a commitment to a 'technical
progress' when he writes 'A demonstration of the
relationship between the measures of attitude and resulting
behaviour is of the first importance. Industry wants to
know whether the worker's attitude towards his job makes
any difference in the way he works or in his willingness to
stick with it' (Herzberg 1959. p. 7). This shows how
Herzberg's inquiry into 'job attitudes' stands in an
intimate relation with the technical interest in getting
workers to work. We have here evidence of a crypto-
positivistic theoretical orientation which measures theory
in terms of its utility and applicability to the needs of
industry.
This technological/instrumental rationality and the
'technical' conception of progress to which its relates is
built into Herzberg's 'humanistic' account of worker
attitude. Such a technological/instrumental attitude
defines his approach to the human subject. This is
evidenced when Herzberg writes of ' 	 supervisory
training directed towards improving the interpersonal
relationship between supervisors and subordinates'
(Herzberg 1959. p.48). We see here evidence of a concern
with 'technical progress' in the 'improving' of the
effectiveness in the pre-established systemic relations of
power and subordination. Herzberg links this 'technical
progress' explicitly to a 'new science of man' to 'improve
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human relations'. The 'triumph of positive thinking' and
its one dimensional nature is seen in the notion that
'improvement' is easily assumed to be something defined in
terms of the already established institutional power
relations. In this way Herzberg's claims for the
application of the 'new science of man' and the
corresponding attempt to measure, predict and control
subjectivity contribute to the theoretical rationalisation
of the human subject and relations of power and domination.
Herzberg's (1959, 1968) concern with science and technology
is intimately concerned with the 'improvement' of
managerial effectiveness. Due to this Herzberg exhibits a
technological rationality located within the one dimension
of the logic of the capitalist organisation, which is
geared towards the rationalisation of the human subject.
Herzberg writes 'In this meshing of managers and
behaviourial scientists, the scientist becomes aware of
their presumptions in promising to industry benefits that
managers themselves could achieve infinitely better'
(Herzberg 1968. p.viii). Herzberg presents industry as
having taken a leading role '...in the search for solutions
to the problems of man's psychological needs'. Here
Herzberg dissimulates the capitalist nature of 'industry'
and exhibits a technological rationality approach towards
the instrumental manipulation of the human subject given
this 'psychological' inquiry. Herzberg comes close to
declaring the ideological, substantively biased nature of
this when he writes, 'Essentially industry has demanded
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that the behaviourial scientists bulwark the image of
rationality associated with the modern corporation by
giving a scientific aura to the management force' (Herzberg
1968. p.ix). Practically and ideologically this implies the
development of a managerial technology as a 'solution' in
ideas (images) to practical contradictions. This culminates
in '...dealing with the Geist of human behaviour in a
manner consistent with industry's image of science and
reason' (Herzberg 1968. p.x). Thus science and technology
are associated with the need for a legitimacy of the
managerial function through connecting it with Reason and
the 'reasonable' as pre-defined by management itself.
Herzberg's theory is substantively biased in that it
displays an internal self-validation geared towards
instrumental control.
Herzberg writes 'Since total adaptation depends on the
gratification of two separate types of needs, a rough
operational categorisation of adjustment can be made by
examining the sources of a person's satisfaction' (Herzberg
1968. p.81). This demonstrates a technological rationality
confined to the one dimension of reducing the human subject
to a set of variable to be 'operationalised' in the pursuit
of 'total adaptation'. McGregor (1960) discusses
'Management and Scientific Knowledge'. Here he refers to
science and the application of scientific knowledge as the
hallmark of 'professionalism' for applied ends. McGregor
thus presents science and particularly technology, as
neutral and value-free and argues that 'It is becoming
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possible for the industrial manager to be a professional in
this respect' (McGregor 1960. p.3). With this assumption of
the neutrality of science and technology as applied to
'industrial management' McGregor dissimulates the power
relations inherent in capitalistically organised industry.
He also offers the view that technology and the rational
application of technology, in his case the technologies
designed to produce compliant subjectivity, is universally
beneficial. The 'benefits of this technology are offered
from a managerialist perspective which ideologically
assumes a commonality of interests between management and
workers. He writes 'He (the manager) can draw upon a
reasonable and growing body of knowledge in the social
sciences as an aid to achieving his managerial objectives'
(McGregor 1960. p.3). Thus McGregor demonstrates a
technological rationality towards the social science
coloured by purely instrumental ends of increased
managerial effectiveness. This is at odds with the presumed
neutrality of technology and dissimulates the power related
objectives underpinning the development of the managerial
technologies of compliance geared towards the control of
the subject. This dissimulates the concern to 'predict and
control', and '...to organise human effort in the services
of the economic objectives of the enterprise'. Mcgregor's
concern is with the technologies of control and the use of
the human subject as a component of accumulation. He links
this 'prediction and control' of human effort to the
'progress' of 'higher forms of influence', and thus
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demonstrates a 'technical progress' orientation. He links
the social sciences specifically to their 'application' in
the services of control.
McGregor's theory of management exemplifies the
rationalisation of domination. It moves away from the
notion that centralised authority and coercion is the only,
or the most effective form of control. McGregor sees the
value of his theory in the development of 'methods of
influence'. He writes 'persuasion, in its many forms,
represents another means of social control' (McGregor 1960
p.19). This is presented by McGregor as a more rational,
more 'reasonable' form of control.
McGregor's interest in this rationalised control and power,
as well as his more general managerialist technological
rationality is expressed when he writes, 'The success of
any form of social influence or control depends ultimately
upon altering the ability of others to achieve their goals
or satisfy their needs' (McGregor 1960. p.40).
McGregor defines the industrial enterprise as a 'microcosm
within which some of the most basic of these social changes
will be invented and tested and refined' (McGregor 1960.
p.43). Here he clearly demonstrates a one dimensional
thought, which universalises the industrial enterprise as
'society' and presents the 'microcosm' as a neutral arena
where managerial technologies of 'influence' will be tested
as being in the common good. This dissimulates the power
relations, the historical contingency, and the managerial
definition of the nature of the technology. This results in
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ideological pronouncements and the rationalisation
relations of power and subordination.
The 'Therapeutic' Function of One Dimensional Managerial
Thought.
Mayo equates the 'extremist' with the neurotic, arguing
that those with such 'extreme' views 'have no friends',
'have no capacity for conversation', no capacity for 'the
ordinary in living' and 'regard the world as a hostile
place'. Mayo therefore implies that through the adaptive
integration of the human subject by management into the
organisation, 'therapeutic' treatment for this 'neurosis'
will be offered. This 'therapy' is evidence of one
dimensional thought in that it proceeds in terms of pre-
defined, conservative notions of 'normality', and offers
the pre-established system of power relations involved in
the capitalist organisation as 'cure'. Mayo's argument
moves though an internally self-validating demarcation
between the 'irrationality' of views which oppose his, and
thus the 'reasonableness' of his own. Mayo's pronouncements
are ideological here in that they attempt to colonise the
language and meaning of the rational and the normal. In
this way he normalises, naturalises and thus universalises
what are historically contingent and sectionally interested
organisational relations and procedures. By holding up co-
operation and the implied consensus as 'cure' he
dissimulates the power within organisational life. For
example Mayo writes, 'Acquaintance with a certain number of
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the most extreme cases is useful and indeed necessary if
one is to be able to recognise without fail the symptoms of
social maladjustment' (Mayo 1949. p.25). Mayo's 'therapy'
offered from within one dimensional thought moves through
the language of mental health/illness and adopts a
psychiatric tone.
The 'counselling programme' central to the Hawthrone
studies is evidence of the 'therapeutic' nature of the
integrative stance developed by Mayo. Counselling is
offered as the 'cure' of pathological behaviour and
improved communication between the individual and the
firm. This is also one dimensional in that it operates
solely within the pre-established boundaries of management-
worker relations and organisational requirements. It is one
dimensional in that such counselling is offered as a
'safety valve' against 'irrational' conflict and is
explicitly disconnected with action on the basis of worker
complaints. This formulation equates Reason with political
quietude, acquiesence and compliance. Conversely
resistance, autonomy and alternative vision of socio-
economic organisation are equated with irrationality.
Argyris (1957) argues for an analogy between management and
the medical profession, in terms of the common concern to
understand and 'cure disease'. '...if the work of the many
research centres were brought together in a systematic
manner, it could provide the basis for a better
understanding and, consequently, a greater degree of
practical help'. Therefore Argyris demonstrates the
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rhetoric of 'therapy', as the resolution of the 'problems'
faced by management. This rhetoric of 'therapy' resonates
with the 'therapeutic' function of one dimensional thought
identified by Marcuse. Argyris goes on to discuss the
relationship between the 'scientific understanding' of
human personality developed by (neo)Human Relations
management theory and the facilitation of administrative
'prediction and control'. This, for Argyris is intimately
linked to the ability to 'diagnose' human problems in
organisations. Argyris pursues this medical analogy by
discussing how such a 'diagnosis' of pathological
organisational behaviour relates to a 'prognosis'. This
becomes the designation of a management strategy designed
as a 'treatment' , a 'technical plan of action...to solve
the problem in the most effective way known'. Again we see
evidence of the rhetoric of 'therapy' within a pre-defined
discourse of organisational power relations. Argyris'
definition of the 'healthy individual' is derived from the
nature and imperatives of the organisational setting. The
designation of the organisation and successful adaptation
of the individual to the organisational definition of
normality is held up as the arbitration of 'health' or
'illness'. The initiation into the one dimension of the
organisational setting and its performance requirements is
designated as the 'cure' of individual 'pathology' by
Argyris.
Argyris tends to relate the 'formal organisation' as making
the 'healthy' adaptation of the individual to the
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organisation problematic. The implication being that
alternative organisational designs and management
strategies to formalism in organisations can produce more
'healthy' individuals. Again the one dimension of the
organisation is offered as 'therapy', (neo)Human Relations
management as 'cure'. The 'therapeutic' initiation into the
one dimensional universe of discourse and action is located
in managerialist informalism.
An example of this is evidenced when Argyris writes of the
individual who,
.... may decide "to hell with the organisation",
thereby clearing the way ....to fulfil his own
interest. This mode of adaptation results in
apathy, lack of interest, decreased involvement,
and lessened loyalty towards the set of factors
rejected. (Argyris 1957. p.78).
We see here, firstly the managerialist 'bottom line' for
Argyris. The mode of adaptation which does not threaten the
'loyalty' to the 'set of factors' already established is
what Argyris' theoretical discussion is ultimately
concerned with. The 'therapeutic' nature of successful
adaptation is defined by how well it fits with the pre-
established organisational objectives. Secondly we see here
evidence of the general focus on adaptation to the
system/organisation, rather than the development of a
healthy 'human personality'.
All 'negative' aspects of the failure to adapt successfully
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are couched in terms of individual pathology of failure.
Management is presented by Argyris as the 'solution' to
conflict, 'failure' is defined in terms of the individual.
We see this expressed as follows. 'An employee experiences
frustration, failure, conflict and short time
perspective....' (Argyris 1957. p. 78). These problems can
equally be presented as managerial problems which the
organisation experiences. Argyris"therapeutic' emphasis
conceals that 'failures of adaptation' threatens the
systems equilibrium and organisational productivity. The
'victim' is, as it were, 'blamed' for their own experiences
of the system/organisation, re-integration into the very
system that they have rejected is offered as 'cure'.
Failure to accept this cure of demarcated as pathology.
Argyris, in this 'therapeutic' rhetoric exhibits the
hallmarks of an internally self-validating, one dimensional
argument. It is therefore ideological. Argyris pre-defines
the individual as 'employee' and any 'negative' individual
response on the part of the 'employee' is then off loaded
not as the response to their 'employeeness', but as an
irrational, unnecessary failure as an individual. The
'therapeutic' emphasis by Argyris is thus one dimensional
in that the reductive definition of the 'human personality'
to the status of 'employee' is also offered as the 'cure'
to its own tendency towards conflict.
Argyris (1964) discusses the integration of the individual
into the organisation through the language and concepts of
one dimensional thought and the 'therapeutic' function of
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management. He writes of the '...importance of work in
being a healthy person', '...a ceratin amount of tension
and frustration actually increases creativity...happiness
can be akin to psychological death' Thus Argyris (1964)
expresses a managerialism in terms of the 'cure' of such
ills, as a one dimensional self-validation.
Argyris also discusses how management can involve training
individuals to '...develop realistic levels of aspiration'.
This demonstrates a 'therapeutic' rhetoric which takes a
particular definition of 'realistic' for granted which
emanates from the one dimension of the closed universe of
politics which is the organisational framework. All this is
expressed in terms of the development of managerial control
of the human subject which will '...tend to help men to
enhance his own growth and develop organisations that will
tend to be viable and effective'. The 'therapeutic'
function of Argyris' theory is the initiation of the human
subject into the repressive power relations of the
capitalist organisation.
Likert exhibits a concern with a 'therapeutic' function of
management in terms of how management and 'leadership' can
come to be about fostering 'favourable attitudes'. This
becomes a one dimensional 'therapeutic' focus in that it
revolves around the attempt to 'convert' the individual
human subject. In terms of the function of 'leadership'
and the impact on subjective attitudes, Likert discusses
how management can foster a sense of 'well-being' within
the individual 'subordinate'. This focus on 'well-being' is
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one dimensional in its location within pre-establishes
'superior'-'subordinate' relations of power. 'Therapeutic'
initiation into this sense of managerially defined 'well-
being' consolidates the function of management in
reproducing such relations.
Likert writes, 'Hostility, fear, distrust, and similar
attitudes tend not only to reduce the flow and acceptance
of relevant information, (ie. managerial orders) but also
to evoke motives to distort communication'. Thus Likert
implies that management's role involves the 'curing' of
such 'pathologies', so as to re-establish 'normality'. This
'normality' involves the 'acceptance' of 'information'
recognised as universally 'relevant'. This managerialism
thus offers this 'cure' to 'hostility, fear etc' within the
one dimension of managerial definitions of 'relevance'.
Job re-design and a 'pattern of work' is explicitly
presented by Likert as a way in which management can 'help'
workers to become more effective 'organisational members'.
Likert conflates 'sensitive management', 'leadership
skills', the initiation of 'favourable attitudes' and
increased productivity as the 'cure' to 'negative
attitudes' on the part of workers. Thus the integration
into the organisational system which reproduces relations
of power and 'subordination' is presented as 'therapy' for
the individual. Likert (1975) develops his theory of 'new
ways of managing conflict' through reference to the
'unnecessary' nature of management-worker conflict. In this
way he tends to present such conflict as 'pathological'.
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Given this Likert implies that the 'humanistic' managerial
function should revolve around the 'curing' of such
unnecessary' pathological behaviour. In this way Likert can
be seen as exhibiting the features of a one dimensional
'therapy' as he advocates that the, already defined,
'employee' should be introduced to the consensual
possibilities of the modern corporation. This implies that
the 'cure' which management can offer to the 'employee'
through 'new ways of managing conflict' involves initiating
them into the 'rational'.
In terms of his central question, 'what do people want from
their jobs?', Herzberg discusses the development of the
managerial view of the human subject which '...accepts the
seemingly variable nature of the job needs expressed by
employees as evidence for the irrationality of employee
motivation' (Herzberg 1959. p.109).
Herzberg expresses his view that worker motivation is
characterised by 'capriciousness', is 'transient and
unsystematic'. Given this, Herzberg goes on to discuss the
way in which management can 'communicate' to workers in
terms of 'benefit programmes, job security, safety, company
leadership in the field and the free-enterprise economic
system'. This would initiate a situation whereby management
communication would thus 'help' the worker to develop more
'realistic' motivations. Herzberg writes,
The ostensible purpose of those programmes (of
management communication) is to keep employees
informed, but it is evident that an equal purpose
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is to bring to the attention of employees the
areas in which they should gain their
satisfaction (Herzberg 1959. p.109).
Thus Herzberg demonstrates a notion of the 'therapeutic'
function of management in rationalising the motivations of
workers and 'curing' them of 'unreasonable' motivations.
The definition of reason and unreason being a self-
validating proposition defined within the one dimension of
managerial interests and the 'free enterprise economic
system'. The rhetoric of re-initiation conveys a
managerialist notion of one dimensional thought and its
'therapeutic' function. The use of 're-initiate' implies
the ordinary acceptance of the system of pre-defined power
relations, and the pathology of resistance to this.
'Therapy' consists of the re-establishment of the
'normality' which is lost. It is this that Herzberg implies
when he discusses the 'attempt to educate the worker'.
Herzberg recommends a 'positive' rather than 'negative'
approach to the morale of workers. With this he implies
that management can offer a positive 'cure' to morale
'problems' so as '....mitigate bad hygienic conditions in
order to avoid turnover, absenteeism, and individual
malfunction' (Herzberg 1959. p.131). With this Herzberg
articulates the expression of this 'positive attitude'
towards the job as 'therapy' geared towards 'good
adjustment'. He links 'negative attitudes' to the 'mentally
ill', 'breakdown', and 'the neurotic'. Thus we can see that
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Herzberg's management theory relates to the 'therapeutic'
concern to initiate the human subject into a managerially
defined notion of 'reasonable' behaviour which is located
within the one dimension of organisational performance
criteria. Herzberg writes, for example 'This implies that
the one most significant thing to be done to raise the
mental health of the majority of our citizens is to
increase potential for motivation in their work' (Herzberg
1959. p.137).
Herzberg is concerned with what he calls 'motivational
problems'. Such 'problems' are presented as pathologies,
which are to be 'cured' by managerialist theories of
control of the human subject and motivation. Such a
'therapy' is thus tied to the one dimension of a managerial
logic. For Herzberg 'cure' is facilitated by 'effective
persuasion' and 'myths' which are analogous to a
'counselling programme' geared towards producing a
'psychological unity'. Thus the 'therapeutic' conceptions
of Herzberg are geared towards more effective managerial
control of human behaviour. The motivation to work, within
the pre-defined capitalist organisation, is presented by
Herzberg as resulting in 'the psychological growth of the
individual'. In this way Herzberg sets up an implicit link
between organisational inefficiency and 'problem' behaviour
as pathology, and organisational efficiency and work as
'psychological growth' and 'mentally healthy individuals'.
Management's role is to offer 'therapeutic guidance to
initiate the individual into this one dimension of
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organisational 'normality. This 'therapy' relates solely to
the one dimension of the pre-established 'needs of
industry.
The 'prediction and control' within management is presented
by McGregor as 'inadequate' and this 'inadequacy' is linked
to 'social problems'. He goes on 'Many of the important
social problems of our time reflect this inadequacy:
juvenile delinquency, crime, the high traffic fatality
rate, management-labour conflict, cold-war' (McGregor 1960.
p.4). In this way the inadequacies of managerial control is
related to 'social problems', the development of management
is implied as the 'therapeutic' resolution of such
problems.
In the context of 'methods of influence', McGregor
discusses the 'forms of influence' involved in professional
'help'. This 'therapeutic' function moves through the
offering of 'professional knowledge and skill'. Within the
managerial context this implies the 'therapy' offered by
management to workers to 'help' them to become 'better'. In
this way McGregor exhibits a one dimensional thought as
linked to 'new forms of control'. This develops in terms of
'helping' the individual to 'recognise their needs'
manifested as the integration of the individual into the
managerially defined notion of organisational 'normality'.
McGregor's 'integration of goals' within Theory Y has this
one dimensional 'therapeutic' flavour in its claim to
prevent 'pathology', 'suffering' and general irrationality.
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One Dimensional Language: Syntax and Argumentative
Structure.
Mayo's (1949) discussion of the 'engineering' of
'spontaneous co-operation' is a linguistic expression of
the contradictory nature of industrial capitalist
'progress'. Mayo's pronouncements are linked to his attempt
to 'mediate' such contradictions. That he offers
'solutions' solely at the level of meaning, is evidence of
his ideological stance. His linguistic conflation of
'engineering', 'spontaneity' and 'co-operation' is related
to this basic point. The linguistic conflation of a
managerialist 'engineering' with a concern to therefore
impose a 'co-operation' are mutually contradictory. The
managerialist 'engineering' of 'spontaneity' are also
contradictory. The managerialist flavour of this tends to
negate the 'spontaneous' and the 'co-operative' as well as
Mayo's more general 'humanism'. The reference to an
'engineered spontaneous co-operation' which is
linguistically conflated with 'teamwork' thus tends to
dissimilate the nature of relations of power and
subordination which are themselves the structural basis
from which the prospect of such an 'engineering' stems.
In the context of Mayo's 'therapeutic' pronouncements the
syntax of 'social maladjustment' tends to convey the notion
of the 'social' as benign, consensual and neutral, whilst
the notion of 'maladjustment' conveys the 'failure of the
individual. The 'failure' to integrate the self into the
pre-defined 'social' is linguistically expressed in such a
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way that 'maladjustment' is a ready-made pathology of the
individual. This linguistically enshrines a particular
political world-view concerning a consensual society in the
verbal dress of a 'humanistic' concern with the well-being
of such 'maladjusted' individuals.
When discussing the economic decisions of organisations,
Mayo's syntax displays a substantive bias. His discussion
is embodied in a different linguistic treatment of the
individual and the firm which give an ideological rendition
of the 'inevitability' of the logic of organisations and
their decisions. Linguistically, individuals are presented
as being responsible for their own fate, whilst the
capitalist organisation has to act 'within economic
contexts'. The language of the socially 'maladjusted'
individual can be compared to the following syntax
concerning the 'economic system'. Mayo writes, '...in many
cases a company struggled for many years to retain as many
of its employees as it could without facing economic
disaster. But in the existing situation such attempts were
doomed to failure (Mayo 1949. p.33). The language for the
individual is one of personal responsibility, the language
of the organisation is one of inevitability and technical
necessity. In this way the activities of
managers/administrators are presented as rational within
the pre-established context of the (often irrational)
economic system. This linguistically reifies the
organisational system as technical necessity, as the
natural bottom line which should be preserved from
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'economic disaster', ie. the reduction of profitability.
Linguistically the organisation and management are
rationalised and universalised as the 'aberrant' individual
is irrationalised.
The argument expressed by Argyris (1957) conflates 'why
people behave in the way they do' with the management of
workers within organisation. This expresses the syntactical
conflation of humanity and human behaviour as simultaneous
with their existence as workers/subordinates. The
linguistic expression and argumentative structure moves
through the conflation of the two is ideological in its
consequent reduction of the former to the latter. This
becomes the linguistic, ideological universalisation of the
managerialist construction of Argyris' argument rooted
within the specific set of power relations. 'Why people
behave in the way they do...' becomes '....the use of
social science to understand behaviour within
organisations'. Here Argyris conflates the universal with
the particular, the general interest with the sectional
interest.
The linguistic expression of the science of human relations
proceeds through the rhetoric of enabling 'practical help'.
The 'practical', the practices of capitalist organisations
is linguistically conflated with 'help', the facilitation
of human progress. This linguistically conflates the
'therapeutic' enabling of the human subject with the
'practice' of the organisation. Thus Argyris exhibits the
ideological 'mediation' of consciousness/the human with the
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capitalist organisation of the material.
Argyris also exhibits conceptual/linguistic slippage moving
from the discussion of 'human personality' into an easy
conflation of this with 'the employee'. He also
demonstrates this linguistic conflation in the equation of
the 'personality equilibrium' with the conceptually pre-
established primacy of the organisational environment.
Given inappropriate 'individual adaptation' to the
organisational environment, Argyris argues that 'the
employee may choose to remain in conflict'. Firstly, we
have here the syntactical formulation which designates the
individual as 'responsible' for conflict, which thereby
expresses	 the	 ideological	 presentation	 of	 the
organisational system as rational. Secondly this
syntactical arrangement embodies the notion that the
'employee', as 'subordinate' within a system characterised
by power relations can decide to end conflict. These two
aspects of this linguistic formulation dissimulate the
nature of the systemic environment within which the
'employee' is pre-defined by the management theorists who
make these very pronouncements.
Argyris (1964) writes
Organisations are created to achieve objectives
that can best be met collectively. This means
that the sequences of activity necessary to
achieve the objectives are too much for an
individual and they must be cut into 'sequenced
units' that are manageable by human beings
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(Argyris 1964. p.35).
We have here an example of sanitised or plastic language.
The language of 'achieving objectives' dissimulates the
nature of those objectives of capitalist organisations in
accumulating surplus value through exploitation. The notion
that organisations meet objectives which must be 'met
collectively' dissimulates the nature of class relations
and the power and subordination this implies. The language
of work 'cut into sequential units' sanitises the
discussion of jobs which are deskilled and alienating. The
organisational operation which is 'manageable by human
beings' is a linguistic expression which dissimulates the
pre-established 'superior'-'subordinate' relationship
lpetween management and workers. Such a linguistic rendition
does not tally with other linguistic formulations offered
by Argyris, such as the language of 'human resources' which
evidences a managerialist agenda. In this way Argyris both
linguistically universalises and dissimulates the nature of
specifically capitalist organisations and the managerial
function.
Likert (1961) expresses his theoretical constructs through
the language and syntax of 'human resources' which is the
linguistic formulation of the basic managerialist approach
to the human subject as something reduced to the nature of
resource. This syntactical expression thus demonstrates the
inherently repressive nature of the 'humanistic' approach
that (neo)Human Relations management theory adopts. The
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argumentative structure of Likert's formulation proceeds
through a concern with to '...organise the efforts of
individuals to achieve desired objectives'. Here he
linguistically sanitises the discussion of the management
of workers, and the power relationships that this involves
by using the language of the 'individual'. He also
expresses himself through a language of the 'desired
objective;', which presents the sectional interest in
greater productivity and commercial profit as a universal
end which is neutral. Likert's syntactical/argumentative
structure is consistently expressed in terms of a
presumptions of the universality of 'superiors' and
'subordinates'. Despite this language he sees no
contradiction between these pre-defined functional
relationships and claims that the 'superior' should
consider the 'well-being' of 'subordinates'.
Likert recommends that 'supervisors indicate a real
interest in the well-being of their employees' (Likert
1961. p.18). The syntactical structure of his argument
consistently attaches the notion of ownership to the
relationships between managers and workers, and to the
organisational duties carried out. Thus he refers to 'their
subordinates', their department', 'their jobs'. This is a
syntactical embodiment which tends to reduce discourse to
the one dimension of the organisational and the
organisational definition of the human subject. Likert
discusses the 'improvement of both attitude and
productivity'. Here he linguistically conflates 'attitude'
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with 'productivity' and defines both as factors of
production. This belies an underlying managerialism in that
such syntax proceeds through the assumptions of the
naturalness of the modification of 'attitude' to the
requirements of increased productivity.
Likert develops his argumentative structure by positing a
ready made distinction which he himself introduces between
'Classical Management' and his 'newer theory of
organisations and management'. In this way Likert exhibits
an argumentative structure which implies his theory is
progressive in its movement away from the assumptions of
'convention management'. This argumentative structure tends
to both legitimate Likert's view as deserving of attention
in their progressiveness and conceals the common
managerialist assumptions within both approaches. The
managerialist assumption are already present within
Likert's Human Relations theory. His argumentative
structure attempts to accrue more legitimacy through
reference to its own agenda and through the use of
'internally self-validating analytical propositions'
(Marcuse 1964), such as the assumptions of the normality of
'superior'-'subordinate' relations as a priori established
facts. The linguistic development of Likert's (1975)
theories consistently move through the conflation of the
individual 'employee' with 'conflict', and the conflation
of 'management' with the 'resolution' of conflict. In this
way Likert linguistically associates negative features with
the individual and what he implies to be more positive
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features with the organisation. He also linguistically
links 'conflict' with the pathological, and consensus with
the rational. In these ways the syntactical arrangements
used by Likert consistently present a particular world-view
stemming from a pre-defined managerialism.
The argumentative structure of Herzberg's (1959) theory
also develops through a distinction between 'conventional'
approaches and his 'New Approach'. Herzberg discusses what
he calls the 'major failings of previous work in job
attitudes' and the 'inadequate information' they are
comprised of. From this Herzberg makes a self-referential
claim for superiority given this 'newness'. This claim
attempts at gaining increased legitimacy for Herzberg's
approach as well as dissimulating the common managerialist
assumptions within both 'conventional' management theory
and Herzberg's approach.
In terms of Herzberg's syntactical formulations, we see
evidence of one dimensional language and 'self-validating
analytical propositions'. Herzberg discusses for example
the notion of 'job satisfaction'. This is syntactical
evidence of the existence of contradictory imperatives
facing Herzberg in terms of the capitalistic organisation
of work committed to deskilling of work being conflated
with the potential for 'satisfaction' and the expression of
human potential. Herzberg's linguistic expression provides
evidence of the ideological nature of (neo)Human Relations
attempt to mediate this contradiction and provide a
'solution' in the realm of ideas. Herzberg also discusses
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the 'attitude of the worker towards his job'. As with
Likert, Herzberg's syntax falsely locates the notion of
'the job' as something specific to the personality and
ownership of the individual which dissimulates the nature
of the industrial capitalist organisation of work. This has
the effect of reifying the nature of the 'job' as something
which the individual has, and therefore as something they
should have a positive attitude towards. The syntactical
structure of Herzberg's argument also involves reference to
the 'participation of subordinates'. This tends towards the
linguistic expression of the notion that 'subordinates' are
able to participate in 'organisational membership' on an
equal footing. This notion is already negated by the very
definition of their 'subordinate' status. This is further
evidence at the level of syntax of the contradictions which
Herzberg is attempting to 'resolve' at the level of ideas.
As such it is specific evidence of the ideological nature
of Herzberg's position.
Herzberg (1968) exhibits a use of ideological linguistic
formulations which conflates the 'human' and the
'organisational' into a unity which becomes the 'solution'
in the realm of ideas to contradictions stemming from a
capitalist organisation. For example, Herzberg conflates
'business' and 'human aspects, 'industry' and man's
psychological needs' into this ideological unity. He
conflates 'job satisfaction' with 'human satisfaction', and
thus by implication the 'job' with the 'human'.
McGregor (1960) develops his theory of management by using
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a narrative structure which involves a ready-made
distinction between what he pronounces as 'new' and other
theories of management as 'old'. He presents his theory as
coming out a '...process of rejection and accommodation of
previous theories'. This narrative structure, linked to a
'humanism' tends to dissimulate the underlying managerial
interests which McGregor shares with 'older' management.
This therefore tends to heighten the 'humanism' of his
theory. McGregor famously moves from Theory X, as the
repository of all that is 'inadequate' in management, to
his favoured Theory Y as the repository of all that is
'insightful'.
The syntactical structure of McGregor's work consistently
evidences the ideological nature of his presumptions. His
discussion moves through the linguistic reduction of the
human subject to the status of 'human resources' as
something 'owned' by management. Organisational 'members'
are conflated with 'altering' the ability of the subject.
For example, he writes, 'Many managers would agree that the
effectiveness of their organisation would be at least
doubled if they discovered how to tap the unrealized
potential of their human resources' (McGregor 1960. p.4).
McGregor linguistically conflates the 'needs' of the
individual and the management of such subjective factors
through integration with the 'needs' of the organisation.
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Summary.
Having developed a 'discourse analysis' as part of the
'depth hermeneutic' method for the study of ideology, this
critical interpretation of meaning, through applying the
theoretical constructs from a Marcusean analysis shows that
the 'leading authors/texts' of the (neo)Human Relations
theoretical discourses exhibit ideological features. Above
it has been empirically demonstrated through triangulated
research, that the texts interpreted can be legitimately
held to be representative of the (neo)Human Relations
management theory as a whole. They consistently attempt to
develop 'solutions' in the realm of ideas to the practical
contradictions which face management given the
contradictions of the capitalist organisation of society
and the economy. General points concerning the ideological
nature of this discourse as well as more detailed points
show that what are held to be central ideas and
propositions for both the theory and practice of
contemporary management exhibits a 'humanism' which is
characterised by the interest in reproducing already pre-
defined relations of power and subordination in the
interests of capitalistic organisational efficiency and
managerial control.
Specifically we have seen how the ideological nature of
such (neo)Human Relations discourse legitimates, reifies,
dissimulates, dehistoricises and universalises what are
historically contingent, economically motivated power
relations. Central to the ideological nature of these
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'mediations' in the realm of ideas is the claims for
'humanism' characteristic of this theory which conceals its
power oriented nature. The specific application of the
social analysis extrapolated form the work of Marcuse shows
that (neo)Human Relation management theory clearly exhibits
tendencies towards 'new forms of control'; a 'repressive
humanisation'; a technological rationality; a repressive
tolerance and a one dimensional claim to 'therapeutic'
efficacy designed to re-establish power relations; a
linguistic construction made up of 'self validating
analytical propositions tending towards a one dimensional
or 'plastic' language. This analysis therefore clearly
shows two fundamental findings. Firstly the ideological
nature of (neo)Human Relations management. Secondly the
detailed, concrete and applied critical analysis of
(neo)Human Relations management theory shows the continued
relevance of the Marcusean legacy.
In the following chapter, I shall concluded the findings of
the research project as a whole, but also discuss this
continued relevance in terms of the potential for
alternatives to the repressive humanisation of
organisational relations and the possibility of more
convivial organisational relations, more humanistic





The discussion in chapter 1 tends to suggest that a
'conclusion' in the orthodox sense of declaring some
definite end point held to be proven is somewhat
inappropriate. The 'open' nature of a 'work in motion', the
epistemological nervousness, the acceptance of the
narrative status of this thesis and the rejection of a
'truth-centred' approach all militate against this.
However, some points can be made by way of a concluding
summary of the ideas and arguments presented here.
Despite the post-Modern and deconstructionist challenges
briefly explored in chapter 1, I have held that Critical
Theory contributes to the explanation of the social and
cultural aspects of organisations which are still
intelligible. Despite the epistemological problems
associated with this attempt, centred as it is around the
concept of ideology, I have attempted to construct a valid
research strategy which shows the ideological nature of
(neo)Human Relations management theory, as a contribution
to a wider debate within critical organisations theory
around the question of culture and subjectivity.
In chapter 2, I touched upon some of the salient aspects of
this wider debate. I suggested that the take up of the work
of Foucault, some aspects of (neo)Marxism, the shifts in
Labour Process Theory towards a more sustained
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consideration of the subject and some imports from social
psychology have been significant features of this. However,
this discussion also highlighted for me the significance of
the failure of critical organisation theory to take up the
work of Marcuse. I contended that the work of Marcuse held
various insights which could usefully be applied to the
critical understanding of organisational behaviour. I
suggested that Foucauldian organisational analysis lacks a
social psychological dimension as well as insufficiently
deals with the specifically material context of
organisations and their management. The application of the
work of Marcuse contributes to a fuller development of the
theory of the subject in that it offers a more sustained
discussion of the impact that authority relations have upon
culture and subjectivity. Marcuse's work adds
sophistication to neo-Marxist analyses in that it brings
culture, langauge, Reason and a psychological dimension
under critical consideration. The take up of Habermasian
themes within critical organisation theory is also added to
by a Marcusean dimension in that it enables a clearer focus
on the political features of organisational discourse over
and above the purely academic concerns with the discourses
within certain disciplines of research. In these ways I
have suggested that the work of Marcuse could be usefully
applied to the specific analysis of organisations. Central
to this was the application of the concept of ideology. A
clarification of how the concept of ideology was understood
and used was offered in chapter 3. Central to this was the
363
linking of power, the presentation of certain ideas and the
discursive organisation of such ideas to provide an
illusory 'mediation' to the practical contradictions of the
capitalist organisation of social and economic affairs.
This combined a Critical Theory of culture and Reason with
a discourse analysis. Specifically a research strategy
devised around a 'depth hermeneutic' was held to be a
fruitful way in which to proceed with the critical analysis
of the concrete empirical discourses found in the leading
authors/texts of the (neo)Human Relations management
theory. Such an analysis involved a 'social analysis', a
'discourse analysis' and an 'interpretation of meaning'.
The significant feature of a 'depth hermeneutic' is that it
relates a specifically discursive level of enquiry to a
wider political and societal level. The work of Marcuse to
some extent has always been about this, and is thus
commensurate with a 'depth hermeneutic'. Critical Theory
offers the societal level of enquiry which is vital.
Thus in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, a detailed account of the
social analysis of Marcuse was developed. This involved an
exposition of his social psychological dimension in which
he radicalises the work of Freud; the discussion of 'new
forms of control', which highlights the ways in which
individuals are encouraged to become active in their own
control; the specific discussion of culture and language as
an aspect of these 'new forms of control'; and the way in
which the development of a technological and instrumental
rationality leads to a 'technical progress' militating
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against a 'human progress' and culminates in a
rationalisation of relations of domination.
These critical concepts were taken forward as the social
theoretical backdrop for a specifically discursive account
of (neo)Human Relations management discourse. Two aspects
of the 'discourse analysis' component were demonstrated in
chapter 8, firstly the historical emergence of such
discourses within the 'human relations movement' which
began to pay particular attention to the subjective and
cultural aspects of organisations and management, from a
purely technical and instrumental perspective. Secondly,
chapter 8 demonstrated through an empirical analysis of the
(neo)Human Relations discourse, the leading authors and
texts and the central themes they identify. This enabled
chapter 9 to demonstrate specific detailed evidence of the
ideological nature of the (neo)Human Relations management
discourse through a critical 'interpretation of meaning' in
the light of the concepts brought forward from Marcuse's
Critical Theory.
It is these findings which are central to the conclusive
remarks made here. Chapter 9 clearly demonstrates two
interconnected conclusions. Firstly that, despite rhetoric
to the contrary, the managerial techniques found within
(neo)Human Relations management can clearly be shown to be
ideological in that they form a very clear example of the
attempt to 'solve' in the realm of ideas (organisational
culture and subjectivity) the practical problems associated
with managing a capitalist organisation (ie. developing a
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sense of loyalty and commitment within exploitative and
deskilled conditions). Secondly, this analysis clearly
shows the continued relevance of Critical Theory, and
particularly the work of Marcuse for the continued
development of a critical organisation theory. This
continued relevance has implications for future research
agendas within critical organisation theory.
As was highlighted in the Preface, Marcuse's thesis
oscillates between the critique of the 'containment' of
social change on the one hand. The critique developed
throughout this thesis has been an applied example of this.
The application of the work of Marcuse for a Critical
Theory of organisations as developed here has been largely
taken up with a negative critique of the ideological nature
of orthodox organisations and in particular (neo)Human
Relations management.
On the other hand, Marcuse recognises trends within society
which resist such containment and attempt to break it.
There is a more utopian element within the Marcusean
corpus, which whilst being touched upon above has not been
fully explored. Such a detailed exploration is beyond the
scope of this thesis, due to constraints upon its length.
However it would be an injustice to the richness of
Marcuse's work not to say something about this aspect,
however brief. I thus make the following points in this
context, which also indicate future research possibilities
for a Critical Theory of organisations which takes its cue
from Marcuse.
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Firstly of interest here is Marcuse's concern with 'the
radicalisation of the concept of labour' (Marcuse 1966,
1973). 'Bourgeois economic theory' defines labour simply as
an economic activity. This economic function takes
precedence over social or emotional features. Given this
conceptualisation, bourgeois economic theory is able to
operationalise labour as a commodity, as an abstraction
separated from time, place, function and meanings outside
the economic dimension. Thus for Marcuse this
conceptualisation of labour is ideological in that it
universalises a particular, historically contingent
definition of labour. As part of his Critical Theory,
Marcuse (1966, 1973, 1979) argues that the distinction
between work (wage-labour) and labour (free creative
activity) is an important one. He argues for a redefinition
through a 'fundamental philosophical discussion' of the
concept of labour. Marcuse exhibits a sort of radical
under-labourer notion here, whereby the philosophical
clarification of the essence and meaning of labour can
contribute to the political and organisational redefinition
of labour. Marcuse's concern in developing this
philosophical discussion is to shift the focus of
discussion away from the technocratic concern with what
work is in the given organisational conditions towards a
discussion of what labour could become. This involves a
discussion of how labour might be conceptualised
differently and thus practised in and through different
organisational structures and relations. Labour is
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reconceptualised by Marcuse as the potential for free
creative activity and a more 'human' interaction with
nature. The re-organisation of the conditions of work,
through the removal of surplus repression and the expansion
of human autonomy and creativity would thus for Marcuse
constitute 'humanitarian progress' over and above
'technical progress' (Marcuse 1964). For Marcuse this is
related to the potential for pleasure, related to a
'playfulness' which transcends the historically specific
conceptualisations found within the given organisation of
work. This could form the basis for a 'philosophical'
aspect of debate running alongside the more practical
organisational experiments to redesign work conditions to
expand the realm of autonomy.
Secondly, in relation to this Marcuse (1968a) argues for a
'new sensibility', the possibility of the free and more
reasonable development of humanity, the more beautiful and
freer enjoyment of life. The reductive use of culture,
found in (neo)Human Relations management is evidence of the
managerial instrumentalisation of culture. This is the
reduction of the original notion of culture to an
operationalised 'new form control' and evidence of the
'therapeutic' socialisation function of one dimensional
thought (Marcuse 1964). The development of 'new
sensibility' is linked by Marcuse to the re-awakening of an
expanded notion of culture and the expansion of the realm
of human pleasure and freedom. For Marcuse this 'new
sensibility' is evidenced in the politics of new social
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movements. In the '...rationality of the imagination' where
'...the hatred of the young bursts into laughter and song,
mixing the barricade and the dance-floor, love play and
heroism...miniskirts against the apparatchiks, rock'n'roll
against Soviet Realism' (Marcuse 1979. p.25). This
'expression on an enlarged scale' of group action as guided
by this 'new sensibility' is a way of expressing some
aspects of what the radically new organisational forms and
cultures found in some elements of the co-op movement and
the LETS scheme are doing (Dauncey 1988). It is a way of
articulating radically different economic and political
(power) relations, as well as the opposition to established
organisational forms and relations. This often articulates
something which we might call an aesthetic rationality, a
re-awakened sense of human interaction which connects with
a political commitment to human freedom and a group action
geared towards putting these values into (organisational)
practice. Further research on the relationship between
alternative organisational structures and their cultural
expressions, wider 'new politics' and this 'new
sensibility' would be fruitful.
Thirdly, in relation to this Marcuse (1964, 1979) is
concerned with the potential of human emancipation through
a political praxis characterised by 'solidarity'. The
absence of a notion of totality can give the politics of
new forms of rebellion an 'abstract, academic, unreal
character'. The development of the radical practices of
alternative organisations is thus perhaps one area where
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political praxis geared towards the concrete activities for
human emancipation is being expressed. For Marcuse the
search to identify the agents of radical change a priori is
to some extent a meaningless activity as the radical social
change and human emancipation is created by the act of
radicalism in itself. The study of radicalised, politicised
organisational activity is the identification of one
potential for human emancipation set against these wider
concerns, and could again inform future research.
Marcuse's theoretical discussions of the potential for
human emancipation also relate to his discussion of the
manipulation of human needs and the redistribution of
'existential' resources (Lodziak 1994). Marcuse's work has
informed theoretical discussions of 'the manipulation of
needs' (Marcuse 1964. See also Soper 1981, Offe 1984, Doyal
and Gough 1991, Lodziak 1994). This suggests the general
proposition that the management and control of the way in
which individuals and groups fulfil their practical needs
has as much bearing upon the shaping of individual action
and the reproduction of capitalism as does ideology. It
also suggests that the redistribution of certain
'existential resources' might culminate in an expanded
sense of individual autonomy (Illich 1973, Gorz 1989,
Lodziak 1994). By these resources I mean not just the
wherewithal for the reproduction of physical life, but also
resources necessary for the fulfilment of 'developed human
needs' (Seve 1978). Future research into the implications
for organisational relations and behaviour given this
370
resource dimension could be illuminating. It is clear that
some redistribution of such resources is under way and may
effect the future of organisations.
An 'important' resources is firstly Time. Gorz (1983, 1989)
has argued that increasingly in advanced industrial
capitalism, the amount of work to be done by humanity,
given technological development is less than the amount of
labour power in existence. That is, we have seen
technological unemployment. Gorz therefore argues that
technology offers the potential for the relative liberation
of humanity from the struggle for survival (Marcuse 1964,
1966). Given this potential Gorz has argued for the
'abolition of work', and in conjunction with this
possibility, the 'liberation of time' (Gorz 1985). Gorz has
argued for this politics of time, for the expansion of a
genuinely free time, as the central resource for the
development of autonomy and authenticity by each active,
free individual. For Gorz, freedom is the fundamental
existential need and is facilitated at least in part by the
practically possible expansion of free time. This is part
of the resource bases for an active, rewarding, long-term
and dynamic sense of self and self-creation. Some
redistribution of work time, given both long-term
unemployment in the midst of some working longer hours and
attempts to shorten the working week has already been
witnessed. Research with this time dimension could be
illuminating as to the future of organisations. Secondly,
Space. Critical theorists of space want to explore the
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possibilities for understanding the spatial embeddedness of
social (organisational) relations. These spatial
configurations, as they are encountered in everyday life
relate to questions of power, democracy and 'social
justice'. Observations suggest that often resistive
practices and oppositional cultural behaviour occurs in
spaces 'left behind' by corporate capitalism. This space
can become an essential resource for cultural development.
The result can be the reorganization of space so that it
becomes a political, material and symbolic resource for the
development of autonomy and conviviality (Goodman and
Goodman 1947, Lefebvre 1968, 1971, 1976, 1991, Harvey 1973,
1993, Zukin 1982, 1994, De Certeau 1984, Offe 1984, Whyte
1988, Davis 1990, Castells 1991, Smith 1993, 1994, Massey
1994). This spatial dimension could usefully inform the
analysis of alternative organisational behaviour, both in
terms of the spatial embeddedness of the organisation
itself, and in terms of a politics of space within
organisations.
Thirdly, 'convivial technology'. It has been argued (Illich
1973, 1978, Gorz 1983, 1989) that the facilitation of
'convivial technology' partially forms the resources basis
for the autonomous expression of self-creative activity.
This 'convivial technology' may be something as mundane as
a community workshop where individuals are able to express
their creative potential, and therefore their self-creative
potential in the production process geared towards self-
determined need and use rather than exchange. Such a
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convivial technology, as a resources dimension for the
development of autonomy could also involve the social
facilitation of such things as safe and easily available
transport, laundries, child-care facilities and food
delivery services, which would have a dramatic effect on
the everyday lives of many, especially women.
The logic behind 'convivial technology' is however being
expanded into a more communitarian notion of the
development of social relations, through LETS schemes and
green community-based technologies (Dickson 1974, Dauncey
1988) in a wider sense. Radical design theorists (Papanek
1974, Schumacher 1978, Whiteley 1993) have developed
arguments along similar lines for a radical design which
facilitates the practical hardware of life in a way which
is appropriate for the given objective, geographical,
cultural and infrastructural conditions. This can
contribute to the production of the necessities of life in
a way whereby individuals can maintain a degree of control
over such resources. The point for such radical design
theorists is that it is practically possible, given the
imaginative use of conceptual and practical resources to
maintain certain aspects of material existence in a way
which stands outside the heteronomously determined system
of exchange relations, technological fetishism and 'false
needs' (Marcuse 1964). The relationship between this
'convivial technology' and alternative forms/cultures of
organisation which attempt to develop a 'new sensibility'
would be an interesting one in its connections to the
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alternative economic, political and ecological values which
inform them.
Fourthly, at the level of social and political interaction,
a resource dimension which is seen as important is that of
'political efficacy' (Pateman 1970) or 'new forms of
democracy' (Held & Pollitt 1986). Autonomy and capacity for
successful action is seen as having a resources dimension
here in that radical democratic control is a resource for
expanded, direct and meaningful control over decision
making processes. Increased 'political efficacy' is the
reality of the input and control which individuals have
over decision which effect their lives within the political
process. Such notions of radical democracy form a resource
dimension for the development of autonomy in that they
offer the arena whereby individuals do gain an expanded
amount of control over their lives. Developments such as
the radical facilitation of legal information, radically
democracatic co-operatives and Local Exchange Trading
Schemes (LETS) can be seen as examples of the embryonic
development of this resources dimension in that they are
the beginnings of the facilitation of the power of the
individual to extend the control over the realities of
their material lives (Guttierrez and Whyte 1977,
Rothschild-Whitt 1979, MacKintosh and Wainwright 1986,
Rowbotham 1986, Dauncey 1988).
Future research into alternative organisational structures
and cultures could usefully inquire into the experiments
being made to redistribute such 'existential resources'.
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The central proposition is that the resource dimensions
discussed above, along with others as they develop, are the
necessary foundation for the expansion of autonomy. This
foundation of resources is needed to counteract the
theoretical discussions of human subjectivity which proceed
through the rhetoric of the culturally and materially
advantaged minority. It can also inform a dialectical
politics of objective and subjective issues for the social
facilitation of the basis for the more humane way of life
which is so evidently possible. It also contributes to the
fuller development of a theory of the subject in
organisations, in that it offers a materialist dimension to
questions of identity and subjectivity. The organisational
experiments of new social movements and 'new politics'
(Habermas 1981b) are examples of this political and
cultural trajectory which need to be more clearly
understood and articulated.
Finally a further prospect for future research which
contributes to the Critical Theory of organisation is one
which takes its cue from the synthesis of Marxism and
psychoanalysis offered by Marcuse. This would also deepen
the theory of the subject called for from within existent
critical organisation theory. This could include research
into the psycho-sexual basis for (organisational)
sublimation of libidinal energy into work compared with the
practical potential for 're-eroticising' work (Marcuse
1973) given the potential for an expansion of autonomy.
Further research into the notion of the organisation, its
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symbolism and culture as an 'external super-ego' mechanism
could also contribute to an understanding of both
organisational behaviour and a wider inquiry into the
'acceptance' of ideology (Mann 1986). This research on the
levels and types of 'acceptance' would usefully complement
this particular study.
However, this study has been more focused upon the
'negative philosophy' of Critical Theory. It has been about
demonstrating that ideological pronouncements have and are
being made by the leading authors within management theory
designed to provide in the realm of ideas a 'solution' to
the contradictions faced by management when they attempt to
deal with organisational culture and subjectivity. If we
return to the quotations at the beginning of this thesis,
it is clear that the future of organisations may oscillate
between two hypotheses. Firstly that existing authority
relation may be consolidated and the potential for
(organisational) change 'contained'. This study has shown
the discourse of (neo)Human Relations management to be
about precisely this. However, it is equally clear that
there are alternative organisational forms and cultures
which may 'explode' this 'containment' and lead to very
different organisations. The future of organisations and
worker-management relations will be played out in practical
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